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ABSTRACT
What makes an event count as an action? The standard answer to this question—
causalism—claims that if an event is caused in the right way it counts as an action. Causal
deviance objections, however, undermine the explanatory power of causalist accounts. Noncausal theories of action offer a promising alternative; however, they also raise a myriad of
difficulties. Many non-causal arguments against causalism unintentionally lead to dialectical
stalemates, which are methodologically undesirable and should be avoided whenever possible. I
offer a theory between these two inadequate accounts that synthesizes the strengths of noncausalism with insights from agent-causal theories. I agree with traditional non-causalist that
action explanations cannot be causally reduced; however, I also agree with causal theories that
an extrinsic relation between the agent and the event makes the difference between mere events
and actions. I call this account an “agency-first” theory of action since it neither reduces
agency—as in causalism—nor does it ignore agency to focus on the intrinsic features of
actions—as in non-causalism. Instead, I claim we must not lose sight of the agent when
analyzing action and thus posit the non-causal, yet extrinsic, relation of essential metaphysical
dependence to explain action in terms of agency without losing the distinctive character of either
concept.
To this end, I claim that essential metaphysical dependence explains what makes an event
count as an action by explaining how actions are grounded in agency. I first set-up the dialectic
between causalists and non-causalists and raise objections to both views. I then describe the
essential metaphysical dependence relation in detail and defend this account from several
objections. Finally, the relation of dependence is commonly thought to be transitive, which
entails a final significant objection—if actions depend on agency, and agency depends on nonagential forces, then actions are not really explained by dependence on agency. I argue, however,
that plausible accounts of agency’s metaphysical emergence blocks the transitivity objection. I
conclude that my agency-first theory adequately addresses what makes an event count as an
action, while at the same time keeping the agent in view.
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INTRODUCTION
What makes an event count as an action? What makes the difference between my lifting
my arm and a gust of wind moving it instead? The standard answer to this question—
causalism—claims that if an event is caused in the right way it counts as an action. Causal
deviance objections, however, undermine the explanatory power of causalist accounts both in
explaining what makes an event count as an action as well as explaining its unique connection to
agency. Non-causal theories of action offer a promising alternative; however, they also raise a
myriad of difficulties. Many non-causal arguments against causalism unintentionally lead to
dialectical stalemates, which are methodologically undesirable and should be avoided whenever
possible.
I offer a theory between these two inadequate accounts that synthesizes the strengths of
non-causalism with insights from agent-causal theories. I agree with traditional non-causalist that
action explanations cannot be causally reduced; however, unlike traditional non-causalists I
agree with causal theories that an extrinsic relation between the agent and the event makes the
difference between mere events and actions. I call this account an “agency-first” theory of action
since it neither reduces agency—as in causalism—nor does it ignore agency to focus on the
intrinsic features of actions—as in non-causalism. Instead, I claim we must not lose sight of the
agent when analyzing action and thus posit the non-causal, yet extrinsic, relation of essential
metaphysical dependence to explain action in terms of agency without losing the distinctive
character of either concept.
1. Dissertation Overview
My argument is, roughly divided in two parts. The first half—articulated in chapters 1
and 2—sets-up the debate by first presenting three important non-causal views and considering
their objections to causalism.

2
Chapter 1 focuses on three non-causal theories that together exemplify the standard noncausal views in the literature. First, the “weak” non-causalism of Ginet (1990), which allows for
the possibility that our actions are caused. Second, the “strong” non-causalism of McCann
(1998) and Goetz (2008), who both claim that our actions must be uncaused to be actions at all.
In this chapter, I present these three views with minimal critical apparatus. The goal, for the sake
of charity, is to present each view in a manner that encapsulates the author’s original
presentation. If I believe an author’s argument is particularly opaque I may expand their ideas
some, however, this is not the primary goal of chapter 1.
In contrast, chapter 2 explicitly considers causalist objections to these non-causal views.
In this chapter, I emphasize and support the criticisms that the non-causalists raise against
standard causal account while also defending them against common causalist objections. I
conclude that while their objections to causalism are successful, non-causalist are vulnerable to
several counter-arguments. I also raise a concern that non-causal arguments often lead to
unproductive dialectical stalemates within philosophy of action.
The second half of my argument—found in chapters 3 and 4—articulates my positive
account. Given the failures of both standard causal views and traditional non-causal alternatives,
a successful account of action must synthesize elements from both theories.
To this end, in chapter 3 I articulate an “agency-first” account in which a non-causal, yet
extrinsic, relation of essential metaphysical dependence explains what makes an event count as
an action by explaining how actions are grounded in agency. I begin by recapping the
conclusions reached through chapters 1 and 2, this leads to my initial definition of essential
metaphysical dependence. I then spend much of chapter 3’s middle section attempting to clarify
various terms used in this rough definition (e.g. dependence, essential, agential properties, etc.).

3
Once these terms are clarified I describe this relation in detail and apply it to the domain of
action. I conclude by responding to several objections to my account.
Finally, in chapter 4, I note that the relation of dependence is commonly thought to be
transitive, which entails a final significant objection—if actions depend on agency, and agency
depends on non-agential forces, then actions are not really explained by dependence on agency. I
argue that this “transitivity objection” is also unsuccessful. I argue that plausible accounts of
agency’s metaphysical emergence provide an ontological “gap” that blocks the transitivity
objection. I argue for this by first clarifying the concept of emergence. In particular, I engage
with debates regarding whether emergence is a unitary concept that is primarily epistemic in
scope or a pluralistic concept that is metaphysical in scope. I, ultimately, advocate for a hybrid
view. With this account of emergence in hand, I apply it to the transitivity objection, showing
that both strong and weak emergence provide enough of an ontological gap to allow my account
to avoid the problem. I conclude with a brief section that bolsters the plausibility of my account
by canvasing the various scientific domains wherein emergence is seen as a live option. Thus,
my agency-first theory adequately addresses what makes an event count as an action, while at the
same time keeping the agent in view.
2. Prior Commitments
As with any piece of philosophical writing, this dissertation depends on many background
assumptions. These assumptions are taken for granted not because arguments surrounding them
are settled, but merely because there is never enough time or space to say everything. I believe
that where such assumptions directly motivate an argument, philosophers have an obligation to
be transparent about what unargued claims they are utilizing. In this section, I do just that. I
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consider three background assumptions that, though unargued for, inform and motivate this
project.
(i.) Philosophical Dialectic and its Purpose
In chapter 2, I claim that the idealized goal of philosophical debate is to arrive at an
intersubjective, stable, and reflective judgment about a topic in the hope that this judgment by its
very intersubjectivity, stability and reflectiveness is most likely to be true. I further clarify this as
arriving at truth via reflective consensus building among the various parties of a philosophical
dispute. This claim about the ideal of philosophical dialectic is important, because it motivates a
criticism of the current dialectic between causalists and non-causalists as being in a stalemate.
I was inspired to understand philosophical dialectic in this manner from a variety of
sources: Lloyd’s (1995) work regarding the relationship between intersubjectivity and objectivity
in science; Rawls’ (1951; 1971, pp. 19-22, p. 580; 2001, pp. 1-5) reflective equilibrium
methodology as well as his claim that political philosophy can be understood as a kind of
“reconciliation;” and Brewer’s (2009) discussion of the value of dialectical activities, just to
name a few. It is worth noting here that I’m not sure this is the only appropriate philosophical
methodology. Indeed, I explicitly claim above that this is an ideal and as such certain non-ideal
circumstances might require different methods. Furthermore, there might be debates that involve
philosophy that are not themselves “philosophical debates” in the technical sense and thus
require different methods. I hope, such a conception of philosophical dialectic, is plausible on its
face.
(ii.) Metaphysics as Reconciliation
Sellars’ (1962) famous distinction between the “scientific image” and “manifest image”
runs throughout the background of my work. Metaphysics, as I practice it, is aimed at
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“reconciling” the manifest image, our pre-theoretic understanding of ourselves, with the
scientific image, the post-theoretic understanding of ourselves. Furthermore, a genuine
reconciliatory project should, I believe, aim to maintain the unique features of each “image,”
insofar as this is possible. Mere reduction is not reconciliation. In like manner, establishing the
coherence and consistency of one image without ever considering (even minimally) how it fits
with the other image is not reconciliation. That is, mere parallelism is not reconciliation.
This provides motivation for accepting the plausibility of certain views. All other things
equal, if an account allows for reconciliation rather than reduction or parallelism then it is to be
preferred. In my dissertation this assumption motivates my “agency-first” account. Of course,
this principle is defeasible and I hope in practice such a method will not diverge greatly from
other methods in metaphysics. But, I suspect taking the manifest image as something to preserve
and reconcile rather than reduce may affect my judgments regarding the plausibility or
undesirability of certain conclusions. I could see a critic claiming that I have an overly
“pragmatic” view of justification, which is inappropriate for metaphysics in general and
especially a metaphysical project that is attempting to be (in some sense) “naturalistic.” I have no
extended response to this, I merely note that in some ways I am willing to bite this bullet—by
my lights, all philosophy is in the business of discovering to what extent we can justifiably
humanize the world (that is, reconcile ourselves to each other, to non-human animals, to nature
itself, etc.) and thus some amount of practical or pragmatic justification is appropriate.
(iii.) Explanatory Realism and Pluralism
Questions regarding explanation loom large throughout my dissertation. Yet, I offer no
explicit account of the nature of explanation, scientific or otherwise. This is simply because such
a topic would be a dissertation unto itself. Given my already extensive explanation of
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“dependence” and “grounding” to try and tackle the nature of explanation in even a cursory
manner would be ill advised. As such, I will merely note that I take both a moderately realist and
pluralist stance towards explanation.
Explanatory realism is, roughly, the claim that explanations give information about what
determines the explanandum. More generally, it is the view that our best explanations tell us
something about entities in the world and this is why they are successful as explanations. I take
such a view to be relatively popular in metaphysics. For example, I believe form of explanatory
realism to undergird so-called “indispensability” arguments for mathematical realism (e.g.
Colyvan, 2001) and “no miracles” arguments for scientific realism (e.g. Lyons, 2003). The
claims I make in chapter 3 regarding how metaphysical explanation is “backed” by some real
relation depends on this assumption. It also plays a part in chapter 4, where I claim that one can
infer facts about the world from failures of explanation. There are, of course, reasons to doubt
this understanding of explanation and Taylor (2018) offers a good assessment of the state of the
debate and a rigorous argument against such realism.1
Explanatory pluralism is, roughly, the claim that there is more than one type or kind of
explanation. This claim may seem obviously true, but it is a slightly more contentious claim
when one is discussing explanations within the domain of science or the “natural” more broadly
construed. Traditionally, causal explanations have often been taken to be exclusively salient for
the domain of the natural.2 There is an ample literature on this in both philosophy of science and
metaphysics and it seems, happily for me, that the consensus is moving towards explanatory

1

Though, importantly, Taylor (2018) defines explanatory realism as the view that all explanations give information
about whatever metaphysically determines the explanandum (p 198). I would not want to hold that strong of a
position, hence my moderate explanatory realism.
2
I take the, so called, “Eleatic principle”—the principle that only things that are causally salient exist—to provide
some of the background motivation here. For a critical assessment of this principle see Colyvan (1998).
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pluralism (For example, Thalos. 2002; and Lange, 2016). This assumption plays a role in chapter
2 during my discussion of action explanation, wherein I appeal to explanatory pluralism to
suggest that certain kinds of naïve causalist arguments are implausible.
3. A Final Note
There are, of course, many deep questions regarding free human action, rational
deliberation, and moral responsibility which are inexorably linked to discussions of agency. I, for
the most part, avoid these domains. This is because before either free action or responsibility can
be philosophically considered I argue one should have a view of human action that takes agency
seriously, which is to say, one that prevents the agent’s disappearance. In what follows I lay the
groundwork for just such an account.
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CHAPTER 1: THREE NON-CAUSAL ACCOUNTS
Non-causal action theories explain actions without appealing to causation.3 My account of
action in terms of essential metaphysical dependence is a kind of non-causalism. Unlike most
non-causal theories, however, I explain the agent’s control over her actions by appealing to an
extrinsic metaphysical dependence relation rather than an intrinsic quality of the act itself. I
argue that this approach avoids many of the flaws that plague other non-causal theories. In this
chapter, I frame the debate by first examining three influential non-causal theories and defending
them against some initial objections. The views I discuss in detail are the non-causal accounts of
Ginet, McCann, and Goetz (in §1,§2,§3, respectively). I both explain and endorse their critiques
of causalism while at the same time highlighting the unique difficulties each theory encounters. I
do this with minimal criticism or comparison on my part so that each author receives a
sufficiently charitable presentation of their own view. I conclude in §4 by discussing a crucial
similarity between all of these non-causal views, which sets-up my extended critique of
traditional non-causalism in chapter 2.
1. Ginet
Ginet (1990) articulates arguably the most influential non-causal account of action. He
begins by noting that all acts are particular personal events or states, in the sense that it is agents
who do them. Ginet formalizes such doings into a canonical statement: ‘S’s V-ing at t,’ where S

3

These theories are not widely held among contemporary philosophers and, from a historical perspective, this
absence is puzzling. As late as the 1950s, philosophers argued that libertarian accounts of action required “contracausal” freedom, that is, a kind of freedom requiring the absence of any causation at all (Campbell, 1951, p. 457).
Furthermore, the mid-century debates between Hempel (1942) and Dray (1957) regarding the nature of explanation
also reveal the centrality of non-causal views, with Dray arguing that the “human sciences” cannot be causally
explained, but only rationally explained. In like manner, action theorists like Melden (1961) argued vigorously that
causal theories of action were unable to adequately provide rationalizations. After Davidson’s (1963) influential
arguments for causal theories of action and with the resources of indeterministic causation, brought to popular
attention by Anscombe’s (1971) late work, libertarians in particular no longer felt tied to contra-causal conceptions
of freedom and instead embraced the promise of indeterministic causation. In the light of their long history, it’s
worth revisiting non-causal approaches and seeing whether a plausible version of the view can be developed. In this
dissertation I focus on non-causalism regarding action itself, setting aside questions of free action for now.
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is a person, V-ing is the present participle of a verb, and t is a specific time (p. 2). Ginet’s
question is thus, when is ‘S’s V-ing at t’ an action rather than some other kind of occurrence of
S’s? He begins by considering and rejecting two standard causalist accounts: extrinsic causal
theories and intrinsic causal theories.
The type of extrinsic causal theory Ginet considers is the mental state theory.4 This theory
claims that S’s V-ing at t is an action if and only if it (S’s V-ing at t) consists in being caused by
some combination of desire or intention and belief. This account needs clarification in at least
two ways. First, the cause must happen in the right sort of way. For example, S’s desire to have
another drink might have caused S to involuntarily vomit, but it seems incorrect to say that
vomiting was an action of S’s. Second, the desire/belief pair must be of the appropriate sort. For
example, the mental state cannot necessarily be or include a desire or intention to V because
sometimes S’s V-ing is unwanted or unintentional.
Even if these clarifications are met, however, Ginet argues that mental-state theories are
undermined by counterexamples. For instance, if the motivational state precedes the action it
causes, then there are some common actions that will not be captured by the account. As Ginet
says:
Many a time, for example, I have voluntarily crossed my legs for no particular reason. No
antecedent motive, no desire or purpose I expected thereby to serve, prompted me to do it
. . . but it was an action if anything is.” (p. 3)
Conversely, avoiding this counterexample by saying the motivational state can accompany an
action rather than precede it leads to another set of counterexamples. Ginet notes that there are
instances where voluntary action occurs without any accompanying intention or desire at all. For
example, consider someone who thinks her right arm is paralyzed, but wants to exert herself on a

4

Davidson (1963) is, arguably, an early example of this type of theory.
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whim. If, unbeknownst to her, her arm is not paralyzed then she has voluntarily moved her arm
without intending or desiring to move her arm.
More generally, Ginet argues that there is something puzzling about this very approach to
action theory. It makes something extrinsic to the personal event necessary for that event to be an
action, when, all other things equal, it should be something intrinsic to the personal event that
makes it an action.5 This general desideratum leads to the second kind of causalist account Ginet
criticizes: intrinsic causal theories.
Intrinsic causal theories say that S’s V-ing at t is an action if and only if it (i.e. S’s V-ing
at t) consists in S’s causing something. To say that S’s action consists in S’s causing something
is not the same as saying that S’s V-ing at t was an action if it was caused by S. This account is
meant to be intrinsic, thus the action is not a separate entity caused by S instead the action
consists in S’s causing it. This account fulfils the intrinsic desideratum, but it raises a question.
What does it mean to say that S caused something? More generally, to say that X causes an
effect, E, where X is an enduring thing, there must be some sort of relationship between X and E,
some sort of structure that makes it proper to say that X causes E. According to Ginet, there are
two ways to understand intrinsic causal theory—the event causal and the agent-causal
interpretations.6

5

It is worth noting that there is no obvious reason why we should hold this desideratum. Plenty of things are defined
extrinsically, why should actions be an exception? Perhaps Ginet is implicitly thinking that actions, because of their
subjectively salient characteristics, are unique in their need of intrinsic characterization. I worry, however, that the
more likely error theory is a simple conflation of essential and intrinsic features. Essential features are not always
intrinsic (e.g. money) and for this reason our definition of action does not have to be intrinsic.
6
These event-causal and agent-causal interpretations can also be applied to extrinsic action theories, though Ginet
does not mention this distinction. For example, mental state theories are a type of event-causal interpretation of an
extrinsic account of action. Furthermore, one could posit that agent-causes cause action-events, which would be an
extrinsic agent-causal interpretation. Since Ginet does not discuss these possibilities I do not examine them further.
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First, on the event-causal interpretation, “X causes E” means X, where ‘X’ is an enduring
entity, causes E if and only if there is an event C such that X is the subject of C and C causes E.
To illustrate this, Ginet gives an example of opening a door. He states:
S’s relation to that event [the door’s opening], in virtue of which S causes it, is S’s
voluntarily exerting her body in connection with the door in such a way as thereby to
cause the door to open. (p. 6)
This kind of relation is similar to how causation is understood more generally in nature.
Ginet argues that this analysis is incorrect. When someone pushes me into a bookshelf,
knocking it over, it is true both that I am the subject of an event (hitting the bookshelf) and that
this event caused an effect (the bookshelf falling). But it surely fails to count as an action of
mine. An adequate account must show how the agent is the proper causal source rather than
some deviant causal chain. A plausible way to do this is to specify a certain kind of neural/mental
event that the agent is subject of, which underlies a volition or a “trying.”
Ginet notes, however, that this thesis has a fatal flaw. Namely, to try to act is to act.
Trying is a mental action if anything is. But if this is true the there is danger of a regress. For if
the event of which I am the subject, which was meant to explain what makes S’s V-ing at t into
an instance of action, is itself an action then there must be another event of which I am subject,
which causes that mental event to be an action and so on. Because of this fatal flaw, Ginet turns
to the other interpretation of what it means for a person to cause something.
By contrast, on the agent-causal interpretation, what it means for the agent to cause
something is that a relation obtains directly between the agent as a persisting substance and the
effect. There is no event that S is the subject of that’s therefore needed to explain S’s causing of
E. This analysis therefore avoids the regress worry, but does so at the expense of leading to
further concerns. Developing a concern first raised by C. D. Broad (1952, p. 215), Ginet argues
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that an agent-causal relation does not explain all it needs to—specifically, it does not explain the
time at which the action occurs. For if one side of the causal relation is an enduring agent, then
what explains why the agent acts at this time rather than at an earlier or later time? How could
the notion of something happening at a certain time (the simple mental action) be explained by
something to which the notion of a certain time does not apply (the enduring agent)?
Moreover, Ginet (1990) argues that if agent-causalism were correct, then a simple mental
act, like forming a volition, would have within it two features: the mental event, which is the
effect of the agent-cause and the causal relation to the agent herself (pp.12-13). The act consists
of both of these features. Ginet thinks, however, that there is no such complex structure to a
simple mental act. We know the difference between the simple mental act of thinking of the
number 5 and the mental event of having the number 5 come to the mind’s eye unbidden. These
are different events, but what makes the difference? It is not anything external to the mental
events but rather a difference in their intrinsic quality. It is not as though both events are identical
with only the agent-causal relation, conceived of as separate from its mental effect, making the
difference. The agent’s knowledge of the difference between these two events does not come
from knowing that one is caused in a certain sort of way. Instead, it comes from something
intrinsic to the events.
In the light of these criticisms, Ginet argues we should reject the claim that for S’s V-ing
at t to be an action it must consist in S causing something. One of the lessons of the proceeding
arguments, Ginet thinks, is that whatever makes an instance of S’s V-ing at t an action (where S’s
V-ing at t is a simple mental event), it must be intrinsic to that event. With this in mind, consider
again the simple mental act of visualizing the number 5 as compared to the simple mental event
of the number 5 coming to one’s mind unbidden. What intrinsically makes the difference
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between these two mental events? Ginet claims “the mental act differs from the passive mental
occurrence intrinsically. The mental act has what we may call (for lack of a better term) an actish
phenomenal quality.” This actish phenomenal quality is the quality of it seeming to the agent that
they did, or brought about, the simple mental event directly. Moreover, this phenomenal quality
is all that intrinsically distinguishes such simple mental actions from other non-actional mental
events. As such, Ginet concludes, it is the best analysis of action.
As he clarifies in later work, Ginet does not claim that all action is uncaused. Rather, he
claims that an event is an action by virtue of non-causal factors, namely the actish phenomenal
property that all simple mental actions possess. Furthermore, he claims that since all action
begins with a volition, all action either is or begins with a simple mental action. Hence, he claims
that:
S’s V-ing at t designates an action if and only if either (i) it designates a simple mental
occurrence that had the actish phenomenal quality or (ii) it designates an event consisting
in somethings’s being caused by a simple mental occurrence with the actish phenomenal
quality. (p. 20)
Although Ginet does not claim that all action is or must be uncaused, he does think that in order
for an action to be free it must be uncaused (2007; 2014). But this does not rule out unfree
actions from still counting as actions. Ginet (2002) states, “I have not argued—and I see no good
reason to believe—that these sufficient conditions [for an event counting as an action] rule out
the possibility that the actions was caused either by factors that include the intention or desire
cited in the reasons explanation or by something else” (p. 403). Thus, the following picture of
action emerges: an event counts as an action because it intrinsically possesses the actish
phenomenal quality—its seeming to the agent as if she directly has done it—or it is caused by an
event possessing this quality. But, this is compatible with the action being causally produced. On
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Ginet’s account although we would still act in a completely causally determined world, our
actions would not be free.
2. McCann
McCann (1998, 2012) argues that all action is grounded in the basic and simple mental
activity of volition, which is itself intrinsically practical.7 Furthermore, he argues that to be
intrinsically practical such simple mental acts are essentially intrinsically active and—on these
grounds—they are experienced by us as uncaused. McCann argues for these claims by exploring
the relationships between decisions, intentions, and what it means to act for a reason. This
argument involves two stages: First, he argues that since our experience of deciding is
intrinsically practical then, insofar as we take this experience to accurately represent its nature,
we can justifiably believe our actions are uncaused. Second, he argues that the challenges for
such non-causal theories are on par with the difficulties for causal theories, hence non-causal
theories are not any worse off. McCann concludes that though these arguments are not decisive,
they do show that we are justified in believing our actions are uncaused.
McCann argues for this first claim—that deliberation is intrinsically practical—by considering a
typical instance of practical reasoning written as a syllogism:
(1) Would that I have an enjoyable trip to the airport.
As we saw in Ginet’s analysis, a simple action is an act with no internal causal structure. In contrast, a basic action
is an act that is done not by doing another action. These distinctions are different, but they coincide extensionally in
McCann and Ginet’s work. Though McCann mostly speaks in terms of basic actions I use Ginet’s terminology of
“simple mental acts” to maintain consistency, since it is clear that on McCann’s view mental acts like volitions are
both basic and simple. An interesting further question is whether causal complexity is the only kind of complexity
that matters when discussing simple vs. complex actions. I do not here take up this question in any detail but I do
think that, on McCann’s account, there might be other kinds of relations that could make actions complex. For
example, assume McCann’s conclusion that essentially intrinsically practical actions are uncaused. Now, consider
the mental act of reaching a novel conclusion through a complicated logical syllogism. To my ear, it would be
strange to say that we are passive with respect to mental occurrences like “drawing an inference” or “working a
proof”, therefore such mental occurrences are to be counted as actions. If so, then the mental act of “reaching a
novel conclusion” is a complex mental action comprised of many acts of “drawing an inference.” But, if we are
assuming McCann’s conclusion, then all of these mental acts are essentially intrinsically practical and thus
uncaused. If so, then on McCann’s view it is possible to have a complex action where that complexity does not
consist in causal complexity but instead in complex rational relations.
7
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(2) I will have an enjoyable trip if I go by the rural route.
Therefore:
(3) I shall go to the airport by the rural route
According to McCann (2012) it is a mistake to understand such a syllogism as a theoretical
process of reasoning about how to get to the airport that then becomes practical by the output
becoming an intention (p. 247). McCann’s central suggestion is that when we engage in practical
reasoning leading to an action or an intention to act, the premises are not about our own mental
states. It is the premises’ content that matters. Speaking metaphorically, McCann (2012) says
that our practical reasoning takes places within those mental states (rather than about them) and
thus proceeds in terms of their content, not in terms of the events themselves (p. 248). The major
premise is the content of the agent’s desire, its optative element, not merely a propositional
description of the agent’s desiring mental state.
As such, McCann (2012) argues that “decision making is itself a matter of reasoning on
my part, not just a movement of the mind that has reasoning in its background” (p. 251). Put
differently, deciding is intrinsically reasoning and does not make reference merely to the
occurrent mental states that uphold reasons, which he also calls reason-states. For this reason—
namely, that decision-making is intrinsically a matter of reasoning—McCann argues that we are
justified in believing that decision making is an uncaused act.8 This follows because, McCann
argues, from the agent’s intrinsically practical perspective, causation is not relevant for
explaining the movement from reasons to intention through deciding. The movement between
the content of reasons to the forming of an intention is not, at least at first glance, a causal

The sense of “reasoning” McCann uses here does not require detailed deliberative processes. Even if we decide to
do something without any explicitly occurrent reasoning process we still act for reasons and those reasons explain
our decision. For more on this and how it relates to the problem of “acting on a whim” for rationalists views of
action like McCann’s, see chapter 3, §5, fn 33 of this dissertation.
8
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relation. Put roughly, McCann (2012) says to speak of deciding as caused is to suggest that it is
brought about but from the agent’s perspective deciding is not something brought about; it is
something they do (p. 251).9
This sense of the deciding as a doing rather than something brought about, which is to
say as active rather than passive, is not only intrinsic but also essential to the act of deciding. As
McCann (1998) says, deciding is “by its own nature a purposive exercise of voluntariness—
something that is essentially action in the fullest sense” (p. 173). It is conceptually impossible,
McCann says, to decide involuntarily. When we decide we mean to decide and our decisions are
within our control. Hence, according to McCann (1998) “there are no decisions that fail to be
exercises of agency . . . none that lack the phenomenal character that leads us to think they are
our doing, something we control” (p. 173).10
At first glance McCann’s initial conclusion is too hasty. At most he shows that causation
is irrelevant to our act of deciding, however, this does not thereby show that our deciding is
uncaused. As Ginet pointed out, even if non-causal features make it the case that personal events
are actions that does not preclude them from being caused. The fact that they are caused might

9

As I discuss below, there may be reasons to doubt this move from our experience to metaphysical claims about
causation. However, I give a note of interpretive caution from the outset: McCann’s fundamental perspective is one
that takes our so-called practical experience “seriously”, where this means (I believe) a kind of presumption in favor
of realism regarding the validity of our experience. This presumption is, mostly, unargued for by McCann.
Regardless of what, ultimately, we think of his arguments it is important that we recognize when McCann ignores a
worry not because he didn’t think of it, but because he found it to be a methodological non-starter.
10
According to McCann (1998) in many of the instances where we think of our deciding as “compelled” we should
understand that this compulsion is completely rational not nomic or causal. If I put a gun to your beloved pet bunny
and then ask you to give me your jewels it is not a matter of “force” in the literal sense. Instead, I am using the
persuasiveness of reasons. I am dramatically shifting your options for what counts as the most rational choice in that
situation. McCann thinks that when you call such an act “involuntary” what you mean by this was that the available
reasons presented to you were out of your control and had it been your choice the reasons would have been different.
We do not mean that the decision itself was involuntary, after all, you could have chosen to trade the bunny’s life for
your money. McCann goes even further to suggest that many instances of psychological compulsion fit this model
as well. On his view, psychological compulsion, like kleptomania, is a situation where in deliberating one option
overshadows all the others as the most rational or valuable. Again, it is not that the deciding is itself forced, only that
circumstances outside of the agents control limit the available reasons for that voluntary choice. This is very similar
to Goetz’s (2008) discussion of teleological determinism (p. 9).
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just be irrelevant to their status as an act. McCann is aware of this concern and addresses it by
emphasizing the essentially active nature of these intrinsically practical acts. His argument
depends on two claims: (i) that our experience of simple mental acts, like deciding, is a good
guide to their essential nature; and (ii) that there is a deep conflict between our conception of
causation and the essentially active nature of mental acts. If both claims are true, then claiming a
simple mental act could both be caused and also be an action by virtue of some non-causal
feature, would be the same as claiming that an act could have a conflicting essence, which is
absurd.
The first claim—that our experience of simple mental acts, like deciding, is a good guide
to their essential nature—is not argued extensively for in McCann. He does, however, provide
some reasons why we should take the practical perspective seriously. McCann (1998) argues that
we only have a conception of what we are trying to explain in action by reference to our
experience of deciding. In attempting to explain such mental acts without experiential guidance,
as in a theoretical syllogism, one is unable to capture the very phenomenon of deciding.11 He
supports this claim by first noting that the concept of acting for a reason and acting intentionally
are often interchangeable (p. 148). This is because our reasons for acting are also, in most cases,
our intentions for so acting (p. 156). McCann speculates that this is why many philosophers
suggest that intending simply consists in the mental states of desire and belief that we cite in our
reasons (p. 149). McCann argues, however, that there is a significant difference between
intending to do something and merely having a reason to do that thing. To highlight this, he
This argument moves, in a compressed fashion, from the agent’s perspective regarding the act of deciding to a
claim about the intrinsic nature of this action. McCann, like Ginet, takes seriously the intrinsic perspective of the
agent. McCann’s argument, however, is also quite dissimilar from Ginet’s in the strength of its claims. Ginet
concludes that whatever makes an event an action cannot be a cause, but he does not conclude that actions must
thereby be uncaused. In contrast, as we shall see below, McCann is arguing for a stronger conclusion, namely that
simple mental acts, like decisions, must be uncaused if they are to count as action, at least in our traditional sense of
action.
11
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examines the act of deciding whereby, paradigmatically, reasons are made into intentions.12
Again, consider the practical syllogism discussed above:
(1) Would that I have an enjoyable trip to the airport.
(2) I will have an enjoyable trip if I go by the rural route.
Therefore:
(3) I shall go to the airport by the rural route.
Now, compare this to a syllogism that cites the reason-states rather than the content of those
states:
(1) I desire to have an enjoyable trip to the airport.
(2) I believe that I will have an enjoyable trip if I go by the rural route.
Therefore:
(3) I shall go to the airport by the rural route.
According to McCann, the first practical syllogism more closely approximates our experience of
deciding. This is because the second syllogism could, in principle, model a form of reasoning
that never issues in an intention. I could theoretically describe my mental states or descriptively
predict my actions using the second ‘reason-state’ syllogism but neither of those theoretical
results are instances of “deciding.” As McCann (1998) says, what is reported in premise (1) of
the reason-state syllogism is merely a fact about my psychology—that I have a certain desire;
this is to not yet endorse anything as worth doing. Hence, it cannot be an accurate description of
practical deliberation (p. 157).
In contrast, part of what makes the first syllogism intrinsically practical is that it does not
just descriptively report the states that the agent has. Rather, it attempts to capture both the
optative (i.e. the hopeful, wishful, and motivating modes of these states) and propositional (i.e.

12

McCann (1998) thinks that deciding is ubiquitous, occurring whenever we form an intention prior to acting and
even in many cases where we merely act suddenly without forming a prior intention. It does not imply, on his view,
an extended instance of deliberation, though such instances do provide clear examples for us to come to understand
the nature of such intention formation.
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their rational structure) nature of these attitudes that, in fact, form our intentions. As McCann
(1998) says:
The practical syllogism does not present my decision as inevitable, logical or otherwise.
Rather it offers a purported justification for my decision, by citing the considerations I
entertained in reaching it, and presenting the decision as called for in virtue of them . . .
unlike causal explanations, therefore, this argument deals not in mental states but in their
content. Its “reasons” are the optation and proposition in light of which I made my
decision; its conclusion, rather than reporting my act of deciding, reports what I decided.
(p. 153)
This, then, is partly why McCann thinks our experience of deciding is a good guide to the nature
of such acts.
This, however, only shows that experiential reflection is a necessary guide to the essence
of our acts, it does not yet show that it gives sufficient access to their nature. It is possible,
McCann (1998) admits, for both the reason-state view and the intrinsically practical view to coexists. After all, it could be that when I decide to go to the airport by the rural route my reasonstates cause me to decide while the content of those states justifies the intention formed by that
decision (p. 154). McCann attempts to resolve this question first by examining which model of
explanation we utilize when we offer reasons for our decisions. Some of those arguments are
discussed already above. In brief, McCann thinks our practice of reason explanation appeals to
the intrinsically practical conception rather than the reason-state conception.13

13

I also think that, at least implicitly, McCann thinks our experience of mental acts is a good guide to their nature
because there is nothing for them to essentially be except what we experience of them. He has no explicit argument
for this, however, I think attention to the details of McCann’s account shows that we can construct an argument like
Kripke’s (1973) famous pain arguments in philosophy of mind. In chapter 2, I consider this possibility and argue
that, ultimately, this style of argumentation fails to establish non-causalists claims. Roughly, this is because even if
non-causalists are right and our experience of simple mental acts is a good guide to what constitutes action, the
question of whether or not they are caused is not a question of constitution. This claim is more important for other
non-causal theories of action—particularly Goetz (2008)—so I refrain from examining it in detail until chapter 2,
which concerns objections to non-causal theories.
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This is still not decisive but McCann thinks that inadequacies with causal attempts at
explanation make the non-causal view a more desirable alternative. This means that, ultimately,
the focus of McCann’s argument is the second claim I mentioned above.
The second claim— that there is a deep conflict between our conception of causation and
the essentially active nature of mental acts—is grounded in his account of causation. According
to McCann causation is an extrinsic relation that relates events, hence it is not able to adequately
explain our essentially intrinsic voluntary control over simple mental actions. He gives several
different arguments to support this claim. The first, and most direct, is that the phenomenology
of deciding shows that our decisions are essentially intrinsically active and hence a causal
explanation, which makes extrinsic features causally efficacious, is inadequate. McCann argues
that if such a causal account were true then, assuming that our experience of simple mental acts
is a good guide to their nature, we should expect our actions to be experienced as something that
happens “from the outside.” This, however, is not the case.
This direct argument comports with the experiential evidence discussed above, however,
it is unlikely that it would persuade a causalist. McCann (1998) thinks a better argument for his
second claim is the problem of causal deviance. Since causal theories typically posit a causal
relation between reasons and actions without reference to any intrinsic features of agency, then
this causal relation cannot be sufficient for explaining why certain events count as actions (p.
115). For example, Davidson (1973) considers the case of a mountain climber who wants to get
rid of the extra weight and danger of holding another climber on a rope and believes that
loosening his grip will do this. The desire and belief so unnerve him that they cause him to
loosen his grip (pp. 154-155). In this case, the desire and belief are reasons to perform the action
he does in fact perform and they in fact cause him to perform that action, however, we would not
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count this as a genuine case of action. Hence, causation, at least by the belief/desire model that
McCann considers, is not sufficient for explaining what makes it the case that events are
actions.14
The problem of causal deviance is even more apparent when considering the simple
mental act of deciding. According to McCann (1998), if our reason-states cause our decisions
then it should, in principle, be possible for instances of causal deviance within the process of
intention formation (p. 159). So, to use the example from before, suppose besides having reasons
to go to the airport by the rural route I also have reasons to visit Seattle with my brother (i.e. ‘I
believe it would make a nice vacation for me and my brother’ and ‘I want to spend time with my
brother on vacation’). Suppose now that by a wayward causal chain, the mental states, of which
my desires and beliefs about vacationing in Seattle are the content, cause me to form the
intention to go to the airport by the rural route. In such a case, McCann asks, did I go to the

14

Of course, McCann is narrowly targeting a simple desire/belief causal theory with these examples. Most causalists
believe that deviance cases only show that simple causalism is inadequate for defining action. More sophisticated
causalist responses to the deviance problem include: Mele’s (1992) account of “proximal intentions,” Schlosser
(2007) discussion of “content causation,” as well as more recent discussions of “control conditions” such as
Aguilar’s (2012) reliablist account of control or Shepherd’s (2014) counterfactual dependence account of control. In
chapter 2, I expand on McCann’s discussion and explore in more detail his version of the deviance argument and its
plausibility. I do not, however, give questions of deviance the sustained attention that they deserve. In part, this is
because my dissertation is, for the most part, presupposing the dialectic between causalists and non-causalists as a
given and instead asking what a more plausible version of non-causalism would be. As such, certain traditional
debates between causalists and non-causalists are only glossed. I should, however, say a few words about how a
non-causalist might respond to some more sophisticated causal theories. I think that most attempts to avoid deviance
by more carefully specifying the causal relation are prone to counter-examples. For example, I find the counterexamples raised by Sehon (2005; 1997) against Mele’s proximal intentions persuasive. Very roughly, Sehon argues
that there is no principled way to distinguish between deviant proximal causes and genuine “proximal intentions”
without appealing to notions that seem irreducibly non-causal (i.e. “teleological guidance”). In like manner,
Schlosser (2007) argues that deviant causal chains happen when the content of a reason-state is not causally salient
to the resulting bodily movement, thus the causalist can avoid the deviance objection by appealing to a content
requirement. However, Davidson’s climber nervously let go because of the content of his reason-state (i.e. “ridding
myself of the weight of another person is desirable”), yet this is paradigmatically a case of causal deviance. In
contrast, causalist response which focus on specifying a control condition are more successful, however, there is
nothing particularly causal about them (e.g. counter-factual control, or reliability conditions). If the solution to the
causal deviance problem requires adverting to requirements that are, strictly speaking, non-causal or at least causally
irrelevant this suggests, by my lights, that what matters for action’s definition might also be non-causal or causally
irrelevant. The failure of causal specification for solving deviance counter-examples and the relative success of
control accounts suggests that another lesson to be learned from causal deviance cases is the irreducibility of
agential control to sub-agential conditions, hence my preference for an agency-first account of action.

22
airport for the reasons that spoke in favor of vacationing in Seattle? He thinks that such a
proposal would be absurd, but there is nothing in the causal view to block such a scenario.
A causalist could attempt to avoid this objection by positing that we only act for the
reason presented in our reason-states when the content of our decision matches the content of our
reason-states. McCann says, however, that this response is almost ad hoc. If causation is what
matters for explaining our actions, McCann asks, why should the content of those reason-states
be involved? But even more telling, he points out that we never hear of such cases of causal
deviance. With complex actions it is commonplace for causal failures (i.e. clumsiness,
inattentiveness, muscle twitches, etc.) to make actions not match the reasons for acting. In
contrast, to even imagine deciding to not track my reasons for deciding sounds absurd. To repeat
an earlier point, decisions do not befall us. As McCann (1998) summarizes:
If the causal account of decision making were true, however, there ought to be such
[causal-deviance] cases. For on that account the crucial relation in virtue of which a
decision occurs for one set of reasons rather than another is an extrinsic one, grounded in
a process that could in principle go awry. That there are no such cases indicates that
reason explanations are not even undergirded by causal ones: that what makes it the case
that I decide for the reasons I do is something intrinsic to the act of deciding. (pp. 159160)
Again, McCann (1998) thinks that these considerations are not decisive in establishing his noncausal view (p. 170). Instead, he argues that non-causal theories of agency should be considered
on par with causalist theories, insofar as non-causalism’s problems are no more daunting than
causalism’s. He does admit that such parity arguments do not prove that in fact our actions are
uncaused. McCann (2012) says, however, that if our decisions are caused then “in our decision
making we labor under a systematic and thoroughgoing deception—that our practical lives are
conducted within a mental apprehension that presents us to ourselves as the exact opposite of

23
what we are” (p. 261).15 Thus, insofar as non-causalism remains at least as plausible as causal
theories, we should endorse a non-causal theory of action to avoid such a dramatic revision of
our practical lives.
McCann considers several causalist responses to his claims. All of these
counterarguments say that non-causalism fails to adequately explain actions. First, a common
complaint is that if actions are uncaused then they are random and random events are outside of
an agent’s control, hence they cannot adequately explain action.16 McCann (1998) says that
these arguments usually assume that causation is necessary for making something nonaccidental
(p. 179). McCann (1998) argues that this objection, in part, turns on a confusion between senses
of “accidental” (p. 168). By ‘accidental’ we might mean the event is unforeseeable and
unaccountable from an observer’s point of view. Insofar as this is true McCann concedes that
being uncaused may be sufficient for something being accidental, a concern that he will return to
later. However, there is a practical sense of accidental that is sometimes conflated with the
unforeseeable conception.
In the practical sense of accidental an event is accidental just in case it is out of our
control. A theory that made actions into such accidental events would, rightfully, be undesirable.
McCann argues, however, that there is no reason to think that merely being uncaused implies

McCann claim about “deception” is ambiguous: Is it that we were deceived about the nature of agency (e.g.
decisions are something radically different from what we thought) or is it that we were deceived about whether
agency exists at all (e.g. decisions, if caused, are mere illusions and thus in a causally determined world we would
not decide). In McCann’s earlier work (1998) he seems to endorse the stronger view, at least insofar as he argues
that the intrinsic actional nature of simple mental acts is essential to the act of deciding and this is inconsistent with
them being caused. In his later work (2012), however, he seems to have softened his view such that we would still
decide even if there was a radical change in our concept of deciding. I believe in both cases the most salient point for
understanding McCann’s view is that causalism would, by his lights, undermine any sense of agency that was
‘worthy of the name.’
16
This is similar to (perhaps even a species of) the so-called “Mind Argument” against indeterministic theories of
free will. The classic source for this criticism is Hume (1772) when he claims that if we act by chance rather than
causation we cannot be held responsible since we had no control (pp. 158-164).
15
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such a lack of control. Again, McCann claims that our experience undermines the plausibility of
this causalist assumption. It is absurd to say that we accidently decide to do anything.
Furthermore, we do not control events by merely controlling the causes of events, such a view,
McCann (1998) argues, would lead to a regress and no one would control anything (p. 168).
Instead, what allows us to exert control in the world is simply that some events, like deciding, are
intrinsically exercises of control.
Instead of resting on the assumption that control requires causation the causalist could
instead claim that when we decide to do something we decide for reasons and the only way to
make sense of the “for” is for it to mean that reasons cause our decisions. According to this
causalist line of thought interpreting the “because” relation in action explanation as a causal
connection is the only way to make sense of how reasons explain actions. The event of coming to
have a reason-state causes the action and that event is your reason for acting.
McCann (2012) responds to this more nuanced objection in two ways. First, he claims
that it is a matter of controversy whether or not our decisions are caused.17 But, he says, we know
the reasons for which we decide to do something. If this is true, then it cannot be the case that
this knowledge is knowledge of a causal relation because then there would be no controversy.
McCann (1998) puts it differently in his earlier work saying that if our reasons did cause our
decisions “we could not know what my reason was [for deciding], since the question of whether
decisions are nomically caused is at best moot” (p. 181). His reasoning here is compressed.
There are, I believe, two closely related arguments one from McCann’s (1998) earlier work and

17

Of course, most philosophers, in fact, think that decisions are caused. I suspect that McCann is thinking about the
wider populace. Indeed, since by “causation” McCann almost always has nomic causation in mind (since, by his
lights, agent-causation is a metaphysical non-starter) one might read him as claiming that it is a matter of
controversy whether or not our actions are determined by laws of nature (either deterministically or
indeterministically construed). If so, his claim is not as odd as it first sounds.
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one from his later (2012) paper. The first argument that McCann (1998) mentions is, roughly, as
follows:
(1) If our reasons caused our decisions then we could not know what our reasons
were for deciding
(2) We (often) know our reasons for deciding.
Therefore:
(3) Our reasons do not cause our decisions.
This argument is interesting but still unsatisfying since it does not explain what reasons justify
the crucial conditional in premise (1). If, however, we flesh out justification for premise (1) we
get the following argument:
(1) Assuming our actions are caused, we do not have introspective access to the causes of
our actions.
(2) Reasons cause our actions.
(3) So, we do not have introspective access to our reasons for acting [from 1,2]
(4) BUT, we do (often) have introspective access to our reasons for acting.
Therefore:
(5) Reasons do not cause our actions [from 1, 3, 4]
This is a better argument and it exemplifies the kind of reasoning McCann is attempting,
however, it is too strong. McCann has not given us reason, yet, to think that moving from a lack
of introspective access warrants a claim about whether reasons in fact cause or do not cause our
actions. In his more recent article (2012), however, the argument is more carefully worded.
Roughly, he claims that:
(1) When we act voluntarily something intentional, with intentional content, is done.18
18

McCann believes this because of his account of volitions. According to McCann volitions, or willings, are the
basic and simple mental activity that stands at the source of all our overt actions. Volitions are, on his view,
intrinsically intentional. This is because when we will actions it is not possible to do this “without both intending to
will them, and intending thereby to produce the changes willed” (McCann 1998, p. 141). This is the best
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(2) Intentional content is always formed by deciding.
(3) Decisions are always made for reasons.
(4) SO, our intentional content is formed for reasons [from 2-3]
(5) SO, we voluntarily act for reasons. [from 1, 4]
(6) We (often) know our reasons for acting.
(7) We do not know the causes of our actions.
Therefore:
(8) Our knowledge of our reasons for acting is not knowledge of causes. [from 5-6]

McCann claims that introspective knowledge of our reasons for acting is the norm for all
voluntary action, as indicated by our ability to report our reasons for acting. But, if our ability to
correctly discern what our reasons were depends on which reason caused our actions then we
should have knowledge of a causal relation. We do not, however, have such knowledge.
In this argument McCann recognizes that these considerations do not yet establish that
our actions are uncaused. At most it shows that our knowledge of the reasons that explain our
actions does not make reference to the notion of causation. However, it is consistent with this
epistemic claim that, in fact, our reasons do cause our actions. Perhaps our reasons are only

explanations, thinks McCann, for why actions taken with very little deliberation are still considered intentional
actions. This intrinsic intentionality is not just a feature of volitional activity, but also the other mental activities that
guide our behavior (p. 141). For example, it is impossible to make a decision without also intending to decide or to
attend to a step of deliberation without intending to deliberate (p. 141). This does not mean that intentions are
reduced to a mere feature of volitional activity. According to McCann (1998) intentions as such are a kind of mental
state rather than a mental activity. Of course, if all volitions are intrinsically intentional then, we can ask, what is the
function of states of intending? For McCann (1998) such states allow us to execute complex plans and maintain
states of intending across time for the sake of long-term goals, when we act from a prior intention one of the
hallmarks is that we aware of our prior intention and this very awareness presents us with the plan upon which we
acted. In such cases the intrinsically intentional activity of volition does not replace our prior intention as presented
in our state of intending, rather it “ratifies” it by transforming its content into the content of our willing (pp. 143144). Thus, on McCann’s view when we say we have voluntarily acted unintentionally what we mean is that we
have done something unintentionally but with an intention. In such cases the result or consequence of our action was
unintended even though the actual act of willing must have had intentional content.
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knowable by virtue of being the cause of our actions and we merely do not have introspective
access to this further fact. McCann is aware of this limitation and leverages this first argument to
ground his second, more decisive, argument.
McCann (2012) asks: What explains the fact that we know our reasons for acting, given
that this knowledge is not knowledge of causal connections? He claims that, in light of the
intrinsically practical nature of deliberation, we can conclude that we know our reasons for
acting because the content of these deliberative mental states are our reasons. Recall that he
argued for this claim earlier by contrasting an intrinsically practical syllogism with a reasonstate syllogism. McCann claimed that focusing on the reason-states that are involved in our
deliberation is inadequate because they could equally be understood as merely explaining
descriptive or predictive claims. Capturing the distinctively practical nature of our deliberation
requires referencing the content of those states because only they explain the optative mode of
thought that underlies action. If this is so, then what explains our distinctive knowledge of our
reasons is, in like manner, our epistemic access to the content of these mental states. Were this
not the case and instead we only knew the reason-states involved in deliberation, then our
knowledge would be insufficient to differentiate practical deliberation from mere descriptive
claims about our deliberating.
For example, suppose knowledge of our reasons was knowledge of mental states it would
follow that our knowledge of our own reasons for acting would be inferential. We would know
that we had certain mental states, observe ourselves acting, and then infer that these mental states
were our reasons for acting. This is, surely, a false picture of how our practical knowledge
operates. We know our reasons for acting “from the inside” by virtue of their uptake in our
intrinsically practical deliberative process. But, since knowledge of their unique practical
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character is a feature of their content and the way it is held it must be that our knowledge of
reasons is explained by knowing the content of mental states. Thus, McCann makes the
following argument:
(1) The content of our mental states are our reasons for acting.
(2) The content of our mental states are abstract entities.
(3) All abstract entities are causally inert.
(4) Our reasons are causally inert. [from 1-3]
Therefore:
(5) Our reasons cannot cause our actions.
Put conversely, most causalist believe events are what cause. Events, however, are by definition
concrete not abstract. Insofar as McCann’s earlier argument regarding the intrinsically practical
nature of practical deliberation implies that the content of practical premises are what actually
explains our decisions, it seems the event of coming to have a certain mental state is disqualified
from explaining our actions.
Instead, McCann claims that the “for” relation is best understood as a teleological
relation. The agent constructs this relation by making the content of her optative state into her
reason for deciding by taking that content and making it the content of her intention. This
operation is not causal but rather something intrinsic to practical deliberation. As McCann (2012)
claims:
[It is] an exercise, as it were, in information processing: of investing the contents of a pair
of occurrent thoughts with a new modality of thinking, the modality of intending, and of
this being accomplished in and through a new occurrent thought, namely the agent’s act
of deciding. (p. 252).
This language of “modality” is meant to indicate that all thought has two elements: its content
and the manner or mode in which the content is held. So, in believing that it is raining outside
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my thought has both the content (it is raining) and the mode (belief) in which that content is held.
What McCann (1998) means then is that in the activity of deciding we take the content of our
reason-states and hold it in the new mode of intending (p. 89, pp. 134-136). McCann, admits,
there is a necessary causal condition for the conscious occurrence of such mental states, but
nothing about their mere existence explains the act of deciding itself. So much for the second,
more nuanced, causalist objection.
A third causalist objection directly challenges this teleological view. Though reasons can
teleologically explain why I did a certain course of action, they cannot explain why I performed
the action for those reasons rather than others. Davidson (1963), in arguing for the claim that
reasons are causes, highlights this kind of concern. As Davidson (1963) notes, we might have
many reasons, r1 . . .rn, for a given action, A, and we might, in fact, perform that action. But the
question remains what does it mean to act for reason r3 rather than r1? Davidson (1963) says that
unless we can explain what it means to act because of r3 we have not fully explained the action
(pp. 691-692).
McCann (1998) thinks that while there is a legitimate concern behind this demand for
contrastive explanations, it is not decisive (p. 182). He first makes the point that there is a
contrastive problem for the causalists as well. McCann (1998) says that we can similarly ask why
does this chain of causes exist rather than some other chain of causes (p. 182)? McCann (1998)
argues causalists have no contrastive explanation for why this world with the causal chain that
leads me to choose to A because of r3 exists rather than the world with the causal chain that leads
me to choose to A because of r1 .
McCann (1998) does admit, however, that causal theories of action are better situated to
explain the origination of action-events in the world. A causally structured world is a “seamless
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fabric: every transformation of things, all that occurs, may be seen to emerge in a law-governed
way from what already exists” (p. 184).19 As such, there are no explanatory gaps, at least within
the world. In contrast, McCann’s non-causalism does have such explanatory gaps and thus,
insofar as we want the world to be an intellectually comprehensible place, it is unsatisfactory.
McCann (1998) says the non-causalist has no complete response to this objection (p. 186).
Elsewhere, he (2012) argues that this objection can be understood as a conflict between our
theoretical and practical understandings of the world (pp. 259-261). From the theoretical
perspective there is no way to make sense of the origination of uncaused actions; such actions
would be interruptions in an otherwise seamless causal story. Conversely, McCann says that
from the practical perspective we must conceive of our simple mental acts as uncaused since
only then would they be essentially intrinsically active.
McCann’s conclusion is that, on balance, we are justified in believing that our actions are
uncaused. First, McCann’s arguments show that the non-causal view better fits with our
experience of volitions as essentially intrinsically active and thus would not require dramatic
conceptual revision. Second, that there is parity between causal and non-causal theories. Yes,
non-causalist cannot adequately explain the origins of uncaused actions. But, causalists cannot
adequately explain the origins of a causally structured world Again, these arguments do not
show—nor does McCann (2012) intend them to show—that our actions are, in fact, uncaused.
Only that if our experiences of acts are a good guide to their nature they must be uncaused. As
McCann (2012) repeatedly says, we might be deceived regarding our experience of action. But
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It is worth noting that McCann (1998) seems most sympathetic with the process model of causation as advocated
by Salmon (1984) (pp. 189-190). Furthermore, McCann (1991) has argued elsewhere for an occasionalist
understanding of this causal process. These views contribute, though only implicitly, to his conception of our
“causally structured world” as a “seamless fabric” rather than, for example, a collection of interrelated causal
powers. This also features in his critiques of agent-causation, which I have not discussed.
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insofar as the non-causal view best captures our pre-analytic notions of action and insofar as it is
no more objectionable than causalist theories, we are both justified in believing it to be true and
have more pre-analytic warrant to do so.
3. Goetz
Goetz (2008), like McCann, focuses on the mental act of deciding (or as he says,
choosing) as the paradigmatic example of non-causally generated simple and basic action. Goetz
(2008) explicitly says that his account is grounded in two “fundamental datum” of experience: (i)
that as an agent we have the experience of making uncaused choices and (ii) that these choices
are ultimately and irreducibly explained teleologically (p. 4). This experiential data, says Goetz
(2008), serves to ground his belief in non-causal libertarianism in much the same way Plantinga
argues that experiences can ground properly basic beliefs (p. 4).20 As such, Goetz’s
argumentative strategy is to first posit a certain ontology of powers and then show how this
ontology is an adequate explanation for the two pieces of experiential data that he takes to be
fundamental to agency.
He defends this kind of non-causal explanation in two ways. First, he claims that most
causalist responses simply beg the question against the non-causalist. Second, he claims that
many causalist objections are equally devastating for causal theories of action. He concludes,
like McCann, that while there are no decisive proofs for non-causalism it is reasonable to hold
this view since it is no worse off than causalist theories and it better comports with the
fundamental data of our experience.
As noted above, Goetz frames his argument around a certain ontology of mental powers,
which are meant to explain fundamental features of our experience of agency. According to
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For more on properly basic beliefs see Plantinga (1981). Roughly, a belief is properly basic if it is justified but not
on the basis of any further propositional belief.
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Goetz (2008), we can distinguish between those mental events we experience as active and those
we experience as passive (p. 8). Things like choosing and focusing fall in the former category,
while beliefs and desires fall in the latter category. This distinction, Goetz says (2008), is
grounded in two kinds of mental properties: powers and capacities. He thinks that these
properties are inherently different and each is an “ultimate ontological category” (p. 8).
These properties give rise to two distinct mental event types, the “exercising of a mental
power” and the “actualization of a mental capacity” (p. 8). Like the properties themselves, these
two types of events are intrinsically different from each other. Thus, any instance of the eventtype “exercising of a mental power” is also intrinsically different from any instance of the eventtype “actualization of a mental capacity.” It is this intrinsic difference that grounds Goetz’s
(2008) non-causal explanation. As Goetz (2008) states, “because an agent’s exercising of a
mental power is essentially intrinsically active, it is essentially uncaused or not produced” (p. 8).
This then informs where he places ‘choosing’ in the ontology. Since choosing is an exercising of
our mental power to choose, it is “intrinsically active and, thereby, essentially uncaused” (p. 9).21
This non-causal account of agency is pressed into service for the sake of libertarian arguments.
But Goetz (2008) is quick to note that this is not ad hoc because the non-causal nature of choice
follows from a more general ontology of powers (p. 9). It merely follows from his account of
mental powers and mental capacities that no exercising of a mental power can be causally
determined because no exercising of mental power can be causally produced at all. This
conclusion should not be overstated. In Goetz’s account only causal determination is explicitly
ruled out as a matter of conceptual analysis. As such, if one defines determinism, roughly, as the

Interestingly, Goetz does not speak much of “focusing,” one of his examples of an event-type that is brought
about by our mental powers. I suspect that insofar as “focusing” is some sort of mental action it would also be
uncaused according to Goetz.
21
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claim that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future,” (van Inwagen, 1983, p.
3) or as “a kind of conditional necessity” (Kane, 1996, p. 8), then determinism is compatible with
Goetz’s view. Neither of these understandings of determinism require that causation be the
mechanism of determination and as such Goetz can allow for such determination.
As mentioned before, Goetz (2008) thinks that this ontology of causal powers can explain our
experiences of agency. He argues for this by considering in detail how the first fundamental
datum of experience—that our choices are uncaused—is explained by his ontology of powers. In
particular, he considers how this ontology (i) explains the nature of choices and (ii) explains our
epistemic access to our choices.
With respect to the first of these explanatory claims, Goetz (2008) contends that our
experience of the nature of choice is not phenomenal. Mental acts, says Goetz, do not have a
certain feel or quality, instead they consist solely in “being the exercising of a mental power” (p.
11). As such, it is “simply immediately apprehended or experienced by its agent as intrinsically
active in nature and, thereby, as uncaused” (p. 11).22 This is a puzzling claim. Goetz wants to
hold both that our mental actions like choosing have no feel and yet are “experienced” by us as
intrinsically active. I struggle to make sense of what it would be to “experience” something that
has no feel. In attempting to clarify what Goetz means by this claim it is helpful to first recognize
his motivations for making this statement.
Goetz (2008) brings up non-qualitative experience to differentiate himself from Ginet (p.
11). Goetz thinks that merely saying mental acts have a certain “feel” that makes them
intrinsically active and distinguishes them from passive mental events does not adequately

This distinction depends on one’s understanding of the scope of qualia and phenomenal experience. I, for one,
think that it makes more sense as a matter of terminology to say that all conscious experiences are phenomenal
though the might not all have qualia. It is unclear to me how Goetz is parsing up the terminology.
22
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capture our experience of acting. Though we might have feelings that accompany mental acts,
like my feeling tired after pondering a difficult question, these feelings are not intrinsic to the
mental act itself and thus do not make it what it is. Mental acts have no feel. Apparently, Goetz is
thinking that the phenomenal quality Ginet describes is akin to sensory qualities, like my
experience of redness, or pain, or the note middle-C. If by “phenomenal quality” Ginet means to
narrowly indicate only those things that have “felt qualities” where that “feeling” is meant to
indicate sensory or quasi-sensory experiences then Goetz’s response is plausible. There are,
however, good reasons to think this is not Ginet’s view.
Ginet explicitly says that the “actish phenomenal quality” is not qualitative in the same
way as pain, seeing redness, or hearing sounds. The quality, according to Ginet (1990) has more
to do with “the manner in which the [mental act] occurs in my mind and is not a distinct
phenomenon” (p. 13). Ginet (1990) describes the quality as feeling “as if I directly produce” or
“directly make it occur” or “directly determine” some mental action (p. 13). Clearly, the feeling
of “directly determining” is not anything like a felt quality. As such, I believe Ginet’s view is
actually akin to Goetz.23 Why then did Goetz (2008) take such pains to differentiate his view
from Ginet’s? The answer lies in his defensive claim that since mental acts have no felt quality
“it is a mistake to argue against the kind of noncausal view that I am defending by claiming that
a choice might be caused even though it phenomenologically feels uncaused” (p. 11).
Goetz wants to link our experience of mental acts directly to his ontology of mental powers such
that there is no room for a skeptic to suggest, as O’Connor (2000) says, that “seemings are not
sufficient for realities” (p. 26). According to Goetz (2008) there are no “seemings” with respect
to our experience of mental acts, we instead “immediately apprehend” them as intrinsically
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Goetz (2008) seems to realize this in an endnote where he reveals that Ginet has elsewhere indicated that the term
“actish phenomenal quality” is metaphorical in nature. (p. 11, fn 8).
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essentially active and thus essentially uncaused. This renders his central argument for how his
ontology of powers explains our experience as follows:
(1) If an event is essentially intrinsically active then it is essentially uncaused
(2) We apprehend the event of exercising mental powers as intrinsically essentially active
(3) If we apprehend the event as intrinsically essentially active, then that event is intrinsically
essentially active.
Therefore:
(4) The event of exercising our mental powers is essentially uncaused.
But both premises (1) and (2) require support. Why should we accept the conditional in premise
(1) as true? Surely an intrinsically essentially active event could also be caused. In like manner,
we might wonder why, according to premise (2), our immediate apprehension of the event of
exercising mental powers avoids O’Connor’s objection. This second question is particularly
pressing if, as I argued above, Goetz’s view is actually similar to Ginet’s, for then the objection
can just be rephrased to claim that “experiences” are not sufficient for realities. A further
explanation for why such experiences can be trusted as veridical is needed. Goetz does not offer
an explanation. I, however, believe some support can be given that is consistent with his overall
view and implicitly figures in his explanations. I discuss each premise in turn.
Why should we accept the claim that if an event is essentially intrinsically active then it is
essentially uncaused? The plausibility of premise (1) is connected to Goetz’s other assertion that
if an event is intrinsically essentially passive it is essentially caused or produced. In particular, it
turns on his claim that such events are essentially intrinsically uncaused. These two concepts,
intrinsic and essential, are distinct. Not all intrinsic properties are essential and, perhaps
surprisingly, not all essential properties are intrinsic.
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Recognizing this, we can see that Goetz (2008) does have an argument for his position,
resting on two key claims. First, that instances or tokens of one’s “exercising of a mental power”
are essentially intrinsically active. Second, that a caused event, such as the actualizing of a
mental capacity, is essentially intrinsically passive (p. 8). Regarding the second claim, Goetz
(2008) in the cited passage only mentions actualizing a mental capacity as an example of an
essentially intrinsically passive event. In Goetz (1997), however, he claims more generally that
any entity that is the subject of an efficiently caused event is essentially passive with respect to
that event (p. 197). We can now reconstruct an argument implicitly suggested by Goetz’s claims.
By Goetz’s lights, to say that a choice could be caused but still intrinsically active to the subject
as long as it did not posses its intrinsically active character by virtue of being caused amounts to
saying the same event could be both essentially intrinsically active and essentially intrinsically
passive. This is absurd. Goetz’s claim about their essentiality shows that he thinks these events
are what they are by virtue of this property, and to suggest that the same event could possess
conflicting essential properties makes no sense. We can now present the following reductio style
argument in support of premise (1):
(1*) Suppose for reductio that the event of exercising our mental powers is essentially
causally produced.
(2*) If we experience the event of our exercising of a mental power as being a certain
way, then it is that way.
(3*) We experience the event our exercising of a mental power as essentially intrinsically
active.
(4*) If an event is essentially intrinsically passive to the subject then it is essentially
causally produced.
(5*) SO, the event of our exercising of our mental powers is essentially intrinsically
active and essentially intrinsically passive [1-4].
(6*) But a single event having conflicting essential intrinsic properties is absurd
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Therefore:
(7*) The event of exercising our mental powers is not essentially causally produced.
This argument supports premise (1) in Goetz’s original argument by showing that since
the truth of the antecedent in premise (1) entails that a necessary condition for the falsity of the
consequent does not hold, we are therefore justified in accepting the truth of the conditional. I
think this is the best argument for supporting Goetz claim in premise (1). It must be noted,
however, that the necessary and sufficient conditions I propose in premise (2*) are not explicitly
held by Goetz. I believe this is a plausible extension of Geotz’s claims regarding mental passivity
and activity, however, it is also the weakest premise of my supporting argument. I consider the
implications of this weakness in the next chapter. I now turn to support for premise (2) in Goetz
original argument.
Premise (2) claims that we immediately apprehend or experience the event of exercising
our mental powers as essentially active. Why think that our apprehension or experience of these
events is trustworthy or veridical? As noted above, Goetz tries to avoid this question by claiming
that our experiences are not phenomenal “seemings” that allow us to raise the objection that we
might be deceived. But given the similarities between Ginet’s account and Goetz it is far from
obvious how experiences, even if they do not have a felt quality, avoid the criticism that they are
a bad guide to the nature of the mental events. This premise is heavily criticized by causalists.
Given that our experience of our mental actions as uncaused is one of the two fundamental
datum of Goetz’s argument, it is important for him to defend this claim.
Goetz (2008) considers two such objections, one from Dennett (1984) and one from
Sellars (1966, 1962). Roughly, Dennett’s argument turns on the claim that the microphysical
processes that underlie our actions are opaque to us as agents. We are only aware of the
“surface” level of our mental lives, if there are causes to our actions they would be beyond our
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ability to introspectively access. As such, we cannot infer from our lack of awareness of causal
factors to their non-existence. In like manner, Sellars famously distinguishes between the
“manifest image” and the “scientific image.” In the manifest image we find our everyday
awareness of things like choices, reasons, and desires. It may be true, Sellars says, that in the
manifest image the notion of our choices being caused makes no sense. Just because uncaused
actions make sense within the manifest image, however, we should not infer that our actions are
categorically uncaused. For the truth of these claims are image specific, so while it is true that
within the “manifest image” our choices are uncaused, the deeper “scientific image” posits a
causally structured world even for our choices.
Goetz’s (2008) responds to both objections similarly. Regarding Dennett’s criticism,
Goetz claims that his argument is not that we fail to experience the causes of our actions and then
infer that they are uncaused. Goetz (2008) agrees with Dennett that such an argument would be
unjustified, for the agent has no way of knowing that their actions are uncaused from the mere
fact they are aware of no causal sources (p. 16). Instead, Goetz (2008) claims that individuals
know they are choosing, and it follows that they are thus aware of exercising a mental power
whose nature entails that it is an essentially uncaused event. That is, his argument is not a
negative argument from our ignorance of causal sources to their non-existence but instead a
positive argument from our awareness of choosing to the conceptual fact of their uncaused nature
(p. 16).24 Goetz (2008) primary response to Sellars is the same (p. 18).
But these responses do not adequately support premise (2). Goetz is arguing that both
Sellars and Dennett misunderstand the scope of the experience to which he is appealing,

It is worth noting that Goetz’s response to Dennett and Sellars lends credence to my modified argument in support
of premise (1), for the positive awareness of our actively choosing only counts against causalist responses if one
thinks there is something incompatible with a single event having both active and passive essential properties.
24
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however, even if that is an accurate criticism it still does not answer why we should think that
any experience is to be trusted as an accurate guide to the nature of the event experienced. Once
again, I do not think Goetz provides further support. This is in keeping with his methodological
claim that there are no non-question begging arguments for non-causalism. Instead, he takes the
experience of our choices as intrinsically essentially active and thus uncaused to be basic in an
analogous way to Plantinga’s conception of how experiences can justify properly basic beliefs.
Hence, most of his argumentation focuses on how non-causalist presuppositions are at least as
justified as the causalists’ assuming that you have the same experience of acting as Goetz.
These essentialist arguments support Goetz’s first claim regarding the explanatory
effectiveness of his ontology of powers—namely, that it explains the nature of choices. Next I
consider his second claim—that it explains our epistemic access to our choices. Ultimately Goetz
thinks that these epistemic argument function as support for his central essentialist claim.
Elements of Goetz’s epistemic argument have already been raised in defense of premise
(2) in the argument sketched above. More directly, Goetz (2008) argues that it is an
epistemological feature of agents that when they perform mental actions they know they are
performing this action while they are performing it. One natural way to explain this is to claim,
as Goetz does, that we are aware of the choice we are currently making. Furthermore, this
awareness must be of an intrinsic difference between a mental action like choosing and mere
happenings or passive events. According to Goetz (2008) this presents a problem for causal
theories of action, since in such theories there is nothing intrinsic to the mental event that
distinguishes them from passive mental occurrences (p. 12).25 On a causal theory the distinction
between active event and passive event lies in their causal histories, but these causal histories are
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Goetz argument is similar to McCann’s (1998) claims regarding our practical knowledge.
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extrinsic to the event in question. As such, if causalism were true then we would know when we
were choosing only by being aware of something external to the event itself (p. 12). But when
we act we are aware of the choice directly and it is intrinsic features that distinguish it from mere
passive events.
One objection is that the intrinsic features by which we know that we are making a
simple mental action could be a phenomenal sign of the unique causal histories that produce our
mental acts. There is nothing about the mere fact that we know we are choosing because of
intrinsic features that precludes their also being caused. Goetz does not address this criticism
directly. This may be because, as noted earlier, Goetz does not believe that our mental acts have
any phenomenal feel and thus whatever intrinsic features differentiate them they cannot be mere
phenomenal signs of an underlying cause.26 Instead, these intrinsic features are their active
nature. If so, then Goetz can deploy his earlier argument regarding how essentially intrinsically
active events must thereby be essentially uncaused.27
Having discussed both the essentialist argument and the epistemic argument in support of
the first fundamental datum of our experience of acting, Goetz now turns to the second
fundamental datum—that when we perform simple mental acts for reasons, they are explained
teleologically. This is important for Goetz since, by his lights, causal explanations are not
available for our acts he must provide a plausible alternative. For Goetz, like McCann, action
explanation is teleological.

26

Ginet (1990) considers a similar objection. He claims that the problem with making the intrinsic awareness of
actions only a defeasible phenomenal sign of the real causal relation underlying our simple mental acts is that it does
not adequately explain what makes the difference between veridical and non-veridical instances of that awareness.
As he puts it, “what makes it the case that the impression is not illusory (when it is not)?” (p.13).
27
I believe this relationship between his epistemic argument and his earlier essentialist argument is why he
explicitly claims that the essentialist argument is “bolstered by an epistemological datum of mental action” (p. 12).
The epistemic argument is only meant to be supportive.
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Goetz (2008) argues for this by focusing on the criticism that uncaused actions are
random occurrences. If he can show that by acting for a reason we act rationally, and that insofar
as our actions are rational they are non-random, then he has bolstered the plausibility of
teleological action explanation. He first considers a simple case of choosing. Suppose a
businesswoman is rushing to an important meeting that will further her career, on the way she
observes an assault happen in a nearby alley. She now has a choice. She can either continue on to
the meeting or decide to stop and help as she is able. Let R1 stand for her reasons for doing what
she believes is morally right and R2 stand for her reasons for furthering her career ambitions.
Even if neither reason is sufficient for the occurrence of her choosing, either choice will be
consistent with her current psychological state. Hence, her choosing will be non-random by
virtue of being made for a particular reason, either R1 or R2.28
An agent chooses in order to accomplish or bring about the purpose described in her
reasons for choosing. As such, these rational explanations are teleological. Such explanations
involve three parts: (1) conceiving of or representing in the content of a propositional attitude the
future as including a state of affairs that is a purpose to be brought about or produced for the sake
of its goodness; (2) conceiving of or representing in a belief the means to the realization or bring
about of this end, where the means begin with the agent performing an action; and (3) making a
choice to perform that action in order to bring about, or for the sake of, that purpose.29
Goetz highlights, as does McCann, that conceiving of reasons as propositional states or
mental events does not do justice to their explanatory direction. According to Goetz (2008),
while causal explanations have a past-to-present direction of fit teleological explanation have

Once again, there are similarities between this argument and McCann’s distinction between two different senses
of accidental events. Goetz is addressing the what McCann would call the second sense of accidental events.
29
This is, roughly, Goetz’s version of the intrinsically practical syllogism described by McCann.
28
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future-to-present character (p. 20). This future-to-present type of explanation is better suited to
explain choosing. Choosing, Goetz says, involves acting in order to achieve or bring about some
purpose. This means, according to Goetz, that our reasons for choosing are “optative conceptual
entities”, which are entities expressing the idea that the world might be a certain way that is good
or in relationship to something else that is good (p. 20). If so then they are about some future
state of the world or future value that the agent is working to realize, hence the future-to-present
direction of explanation intrinsic to teleological accounts is better suited to making sense of
choosing for such reasons.30
Furthermore, according to Goetz, the causalist’s central motivations to doubt such
teleological explanations are not persuasive. For example, he notes that many causalists justify
their claim that a choice must be caused on the grounds that everyone is committed to the
principle of universal causality—the principle that every event has a cause (p. 21). Goetz argues
that this claim rests on a confusion. It is plausible to believe that nearly everyone is committed to
something like universal explanation—the principle that every event has an explanation—but
this does not entail universal causal explanations. There is no reason, Goetz claims, to believe
that every event has a causal explanation.

Goetz (2008) describes such reasons for choosing as reasons to “produce” or “achieve” some future state that is
seen as valuable. Goetz argues that since reasons are optative conceptual entities they are not propositional attitudes
as such. This is akin to McCann’s argument that reasons are the content of desire and belief states and not identical
with the states themselves. Brewer (2009) is another important critic of such propositionalist understandings of
action. Brewer (2009) approaches the topic as an ethicist and as such highlights the failure of propositionalist
understandings to adequately make sense of certain kinds of valuable activities both because these activities have a
future-to-present direction of fit and because engaging with their value is essentially non-productive (e.g. when we
engage in friendship we do not aim to produce friendship, such a conception of friendship is wrongheaded) (pp. 1267). As such, Brewer would say that Goetz, though correct in denying our reasons must be propositional in structure,
still concedes too much to the propositionalist by claiming that we aim to “produce” or “achieve” some future state.
By Brewer’s lights some values are not producible or achievable and are not even best understood as states of affairs
to which these relations could apply. Though I do not take up such issues here, I do agree with Brewer on these
points.
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This teleological account of reason explanation faces two difficulties: first, it does not
provide an adequate contrastive explanation of an agent’s choice; second, it does not provide an
adequate explanation for instances where we act for no reason. Goetz responds to the first
criticism by presenting a more detailed account of the rational structure by which agents make
decisions. When an agent chooses to perform action A for reason R1 there is also action B that
the agent had reason R2 to perform. Goetz claims that if the agent performs A the explanation for
this is R1. However, the contrastive question concerns why the agent performed A rather than B.
One might appeal to another higher order reason, R3, that explains why the agent choose to
perform A for R1 rather than B for R2.
For example, consider again the case of businesswoman S who can either do A (help the
person being assaulted in an alley) or B (go to an important meeting). She has reasons R1, that it
is morally right, to perform A and R2, that it would further her career, to perform B. If she
performs A for R1, we might think there must be a further reason R3, that she always do what is
morally right, which explains why she choose to perform A for R1 rather than B for R2. This
however will not do. As Nagel (1986) points out, even if further reasons are given there is a point
where this reason giving will have to stop lest a vicious regress begins. After all, if there is a
second order reason R3 (that she always do what is morally right), which explains her actually
acting for R1, then there must also be a second order reason R4 (that she do whatever maximizes
her immediate well-being), which would explain why she choose B for R2 if she had. Thus,
merely positing second order reasons only pushes the demand for contrastive explanations back a
step.
Goetz (2008) responds to this critique considering a third order reason, R5, doing what is
all things considered most reasonable (p.29). Goetz thinks that this reason answers the demand

44
for contrastive explanations. For, if we ask why ultimately S performed action A for R1 and R3
rather than B for R2 and R4, we can appeal to R5 and say that S believed by performing A she
would be doing what was all things considered most reasonable. There is no danger of regress
since there are no contrasting reasons to R5. A natural objection is that if S chooses B instead of
A then it would still be inexplicable why S chose against R5 since it is all things considered most
reasonable. Goetz, however, thinks that there is a kind of explanation. When S chooses B rather
than A she still chose for reasons R2 and R4. This means that her action was not nonrational
(since she did choose for R2 and R4) merely irrational or akratic (since she acted against R5).
This can still ground a contrastive explanation since when asked why did S do B rather than A
we can answer, because she acted akratically for R1 and R4.
Even if this account of teleological contrastive explanation succeeds, it still does not
address the concern regarding agents who act without a reason. Sometimes we choose without a
purpose, goal, or aim and we need some explanation for this occurrence. At first glance, the
simplest way to do this is to say that such actions are caused either directly by the agent or by
some other appropriate agent-involving event. Goetz (1988) disagrees, claiming that it is unclear
whether positing a further cause actually does any explanatory work (p. 309).31 Goetz (1988)
asks us to consider a case where an agent causes her action and there is neither a reason why she
acted nor a sufficient condition or necessary causal chain that makes her act that way (p.309).
We can ask, why did she cause her action? Goetz argues that by the causalists own criterion the
causing of the act is random or chancy. However, if this is so then the positing an additional
cause does not actually explain reasonless choices, it merely postpones the explanation one step
further on the causal chain. Thus, a causal account is not explanatorily preferable to the
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Goetz (1988) is primarily addressing other libertarian agent-causalists here, but I believe his point can be
generalized.
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teleological account, since either way such actions are random or chancy occurrences. Hence, the
teleological account of action explanation can adequately address the most salient features of
agency and is not any worse than the competing causalist theories.
Goetz (2008) concludes that non-causalism offers the best explanation for the two
fundamental datum of experience—making uncaused choices and those choices being
teleological explained by reasons—as such, it is a plausible explanation of human action. Goetz
does still concede, like McCann, that these arguments are not a demonstrative proof of the
conceptual truth of non-causalism (p. 35). Goetz thinks, however, that these arguments do
provide substantive support and reveal that insofar as we have similar experiences of agency as
Goetz we should consider non-causalism a viable explanation for those experiences.
4. Conclusion—An Important Similarity?
These three non-causalist views each articulate a picture of human agency that fits well with
our pre-theoretical experience of action. This chapter avoids extensive criticism or comparison,
however, in the next chapter (chapter 2) I examine in detail causalist objections as well as
important contrasts between the three non-causalist accounts. I end by noting a similarity
between all three views. Ginet, Goetz, and McCann all emphasize, though to varying degrees,
that what makes an event count as an action must be something intrinsic to the event.
Furthermore, in all three accounts actions originate in simple mental acts, like volitions. The
conjunction of this intrinsicallity requirement with the mental origination of action leads all three
theories to, in subtly different ways, appeal to experiential data as our best guide for explaining
action.
I suspect this similarity is because a clearly intrinsic feature of mental events is how those
events are experienced by their subject(s). I do not want to overstate these parallels since each
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non-causalist uses experiential claims in different ways; however, I do claim that it is this similar
feature that makes all three accounts most vulnerable to causalist objections. In chapter 2, I
bolster this claim by showing that while these accounts are more defensible than causalists
believe they are still weak in this crucial respect. This, then, will set the stage for my own noncausal theory, presented in chapter 3, of action as essential metaphysical dependence.
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CHAPTER 2: CHALLENGES FOR NON-CAUSALISM
In this chapter I criticize contemporary non-causal accounts for two, reinforcing, reasons.
First, I argue that when responding to some causalist objections, non-causalists utilize defensive
strategies that lead to dialectical stalemates, which are themselves undesirable. I call this the
“dialectical stalemate objection.” Second, I argue that the reason these defensive strategies are
unsuccessful is that non-causal accounts engender an explanatory gap, for various reasons,
between their claims about internal experiential data and extrinsic features of the world. I call
this the “incomprehensibility challenge,” since from the perspective of their causalist critics it
makes the mechanism of action opaque and incomprehensible. I agree with non-causalists that
contemporary causal theories of action are inadequate. But the standard positive arguments for
non-causalism also fail or give rise to dialectical stalemates.
I argue for this in §1.1 by considering several standard causalist objections to noncausalism and non-causalist responses to these objections. I claim while most non-causal
responses succeed there are still causalist objections that remain unanswered. In §1.2, I consider
the debate between strong and weak non-causalists and argue that strong non-causalism does not
provide adequate support for its position. In §2.1 and §2.2, I argue non-causalist responses to
these arguments lead to dialectical stalemates by relying on internal experiential data that leaves
explanatory gaps. Finally, I conclude by briefly canvasing desiderata for an adequate non-causal
theory of action, thus laying the groundwork for my account of non-causalism as essential
metaphysical dependence in chapter 3.
1. Causalist Objections and Non-causalist Challenges
I examine various objections to the three non-causal theories presented in chapter 1. Some
of these criticisms already arose in chapter 1, but in this section I focus on the criticisms
themselves. I first consider causalist objections and present the non-causalists’ replies. Second, I
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examine challenges that arise between the non-causalists. In particular, I consider arguments
between the “strong” non-causal accounts of McCann and Goetz, which claim actions must be
uncaused, and the “weak” non-causal account of Ginet, which claims actions can be caused though
they count as actions because of non-causal features.
1.1 Causalist Objections: Randomness, Rational Explanation, and Origination
Many causalist objections I presented in the previous chapter. There is wisdom, however,
in returning to a few of these in detail. In what follows I discuss again three objections that
causalists raise against non-causal theories. I aim to both highlight non-causalists’ responses that
I find most persuasive, as well as indicate where I think causalist objections succeed or succeed
once modified.
i. Randomness Objection
The randomness objection is traditional and takes several forms. Both McCann and Goetz
claim this objection concerns explanatory adequacy. The critic claims that without causal
explanations, our actions are inexplicable, random, or chaotic.32 For instances, Taylor (1963)
argues “suppose that my right arm is free, according to this conception; that is, that its motions
are uncaused . . . There will never be any point in asking why these motions occur, or in seeking
any explanation of them, for under the conditions assumed there is no explanation. They just
happen, from no causes at all” (p. 47). Here is one way to clarify this general line of thought:
(1) An event is random only if it lacks a salient explanation
(2) Events are saliently explained only if they are caused
(3) Simple mental actions are uncaused events

This use of “randomness” is following terminology used by both non-causalists and their causalist objectors. It is
worth noting that “randomness” can also be used in a highly technical manner that does not always track the
ordinary usage within action theory.
32
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Therefore:
(4) Simple mental actions are random
This line of reasoning, however, depends on premise (2), which is controversial.
A non-causalist should reject premise (2), while causation is one type of explanation,
there are other kinds of explanation too, and types that are non-causal in nature, which suitably
apply to events. The most obvious example is rational explanation. As Ginet, McCann, and
Goetz note, agents act for reasons and these reasons explain their actions.33 Why not only appeal
to rational explanation to explain actions? Of course, perhaps leaving room for agents to perform
actions for no reason at all is desirable; however, admitting that there might be action
explanations that are non-rational does not undermine the non-causal theories described above.
Admitting that some actions can be rationally explained, apart from any causal explanation,
undermines the most direct form of the randomness objection.
To bolster the randomness objection a causalist might try to undermine the noncausalists’ appeal to rational explanations of action. If the causalist makes a strong case that noncausal rational explanation is insufficient to explain action then they undermine the noncausalists approach and perhaps rehabilitate a form of the randomness objection.
ii. Rational Explanation Objection
The reasons-as-causes challenge to the non-causalist position has its roots in Davidson’s
(1963) paper that, arguably, revived causalist interpretations in action theory. Davidson (1963)
claims that the primary reason for performing an intentional action is whatever pair of proattitude (desire) and belief causes the action that they also rationalize (pp. 685-686). He then
asks, given that an agent may have multiple reasons, R1, R2, R3, etc., for a single action, A, what
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Goetz points out that even causalists, like Taylor, recognize that merely saying the agent causes the action, though
necessary, is not sufficient to explain the action. What then, we can ask, is the causation adding to the discussion?
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explains that the agent acted because of R1 rather than, say, R2? According to Davidson
appealing to rationalization alone does not adequately answer this question. If one builds this
‘because’ into the notion of justification itself, then the rationalization thesis becomes
explanatorily weak, since there is no way to distinguish between the reasons for which the agent
acted and the reasons which merely rationalize the action but are not acted upon (p. 691).
Davidson’s challenge has been interpreted two ways. First, it has been interpreted as a
challenge to explain the link, if it is not a causal link, between reasons and actions. Second, it has
been interpreted as a call for contrastive explanation. Davidson does not explicitly frame this
argument as a request for the best contrastive explanation, however, many subsequent theorists
have interpreted it in this way. Indeed, this kind of objection appears as an independently
reoccurring causalist challenge to the explanatory adequacy of any non-causalist theory that
appeals to rational justification as sufficient for action explanation. I examine both
interpretations below, starting with the contrastive interpretation. I conclude that while noncausalists successfully address calls for contrastive explanations, the “linkage” objection is much
more difficult.
To understand the contrastive interpretation of Davidson’s challenge, we first must clarify
exactly what a request for contrastive explanation is asking for. Dickenson (2007) argues that
Davidson’s challenge to the non-causalists is a challenge to provide the best explanation of an
action (p. 2). In this way Davidson stands in line with the early 20th-century debates regarding
rational explanation, best exemplified by the debate between Hempel (1942) and Dray (1957).
As D’Oro and Sandis (2013) explain, these early 20th-century debates turn on methodological
questions rather than ontological ones (pp. 16-17). The question of whether rational explanations
could be assimilated to causal explanations mattered because it concerned the explanatory
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methodology of the natural sciences as opposed to the “human” sciences. For Hempel there is
explanatory unity to the sciences, hence we are justified in thinking that reason-explanation is a
type of causal explanation. In contrast, Dray thought that the “human sciences” are
distinguishable from the natural sciences precisely because they have different goals and
different methodologies and in the human sciences these goals and methodologies exclude causal
explanations. Davidson (1963) started the ontological turn that would dominate the mid-to-late
20th-century debates about action explanation by, more broadly, crafting a theory of action that
sees actions as events. According to Dickenson (2007), however, Davidson’s explanatory
challenge is still primarily a sophisticated development of Hempel’s causalist methodological
arguments (p. 4).
Davidson’s argument depends on multiple-reasons cases, as noted above, but the point
could be made with competing action cases as well. Either way the question is: given that the
agent has competing reasons (for either the same action or different actions) what explains why
the agent acted for this reason rather than another? These kinds of contrastive questions are
common. It is often obscure, however, what exactly is at stake in contrastive explanations.
First, I note that contrastive explanations, as with all explanations, are context sensitive.
Whether we should consider a contrastive explanation as, in fact, informatively adequate is
partly a function of the explanatory interests of the inquirer. So then, clarifying what counts as
the best explanation requires clarifying the relevant scope of the explanatory question. Given
this, consider a schematic request for contrastive explanation: Why is A the case rather than B? I
follow Dickerson’s (2007) terminology and call A the “fact” and B the “foil.” For this question
to make sense there must be a salient connection between the fact and the foil. If I ask, for
example, “why is it the case that Frodo is a literary protagonist rather than the Andromeda
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galaxy being 1.1 billion light years closer?” it is hard to see this as a sensible question since there
is no salient relationship between fact and foil.
What then, makes a salient connection between the fact and the foil? A traditional
proposal (Ruben, 1987; Temple 1988) is that the fact and the foil are related by being
incompatible with each other. If it cannot be the case that both A and B then there is some sense
to asking, “why A rather than B?” This proposal, however, does not track our explanatory
practice adequately as both Dickerson (2007) and Lipton (1991) argue. This is because,
sometimes, when we ask for a contrastive explanation we are puzzled not because the fact and
the foil are incompatible, but instead because the conditions for their existence seem symmetrical
and so we expect them to both be the case, yet they are not. For example, “both me and my
brother have been exercising and eating a healthy diet, why is he gaining muscle mass rather
than me?” Dickerson (2007) notes that sometimes this connection is made obvious by “given”
clauses. These are contrastive questions that take the following form: “Given that . . ., why A
rather than B” (pp.7-8). According to Dickerson this highlights that explanatory salience in
contrastive explanations rests on an inclusive disjunct: (1) finding a feature that A has and B
lacks or (2) explaining why similar features did not entail similar outcomes for A and B.
Dickerson (2007) makes these claims more precise by formalizing it into two rules of
contrastive explanation:
Basic Rule- In order to explain the contrastive phenomena the explanation must address
the ‘foil’ by citing an explanatory item for the ‘fact’ and the absence or failure of the
corresponding item for the foil.
Given Rule- ‘Given-contrastives’ (contrastive requests that have the form “given that . . .
why A rather than B?”) are only satisfactorily explained when the information in the
given clause is addressed. (pp.8-11)
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With this we can see more clearly that what Davidson is asking for is a given-contrastive
explanation. Given that both R1 and R2 are present, and can both rationalize action A, what
explains the agent doing A for R1 rather than A for R2? Davidson’s answer is simple; the only
adequate explanation is that R1 is the reason that caused A, which explains why it is cited
(correctly) as the explanation for the action rather than R2, even though R2 was present.
How can a non-causalist respond to this concern? First, a non-causalist might highlight
that Davidson’s challenge is fundamentally a challenge to forge the relationship between a
reason and the action it is supposed to explain. Davidson’s challenge gains traction because the
rationalization relation is not strong enough nor specific enough to forge this relationship. It
cannot explain the connection between a reason and the action it explains, since this same
relation applies to many reasons that an agent might have even though they do not explain the
action. Given this, it is important to note that many of the non-causalists are pointing to more
than mere rationalization as the relationship between reasons and actions.
Consider the following examples taken from McCann, Ginet, and Goetz as paradigm
cases of these explanatory relations. First from McCann (1998):
“Our real test for determining whether an agent decided for a supposed reason has to do
not with nomic causation but with the replicative relationship between reasons and
intentions noted earlier: that is, with whether the content of the reason-states in question
is reflected in the agent’s intentions.” (p. 156)
And again from Ginet (1990):
“Our anomic [non-causal] sufficient condition for such an explanation was (C3).
(C3) (a) Prior to V-ing, S had the intention to U, and (b) concurrently with V-ing, S
remembered her prior intention and its content and intended that by this V-ing she would
carry it out.” (p. 148.).
Finally, from Goetz (2008):
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“Contrary to what Davidson would have us believe, the distinction between justifying
[rationalizing] a choice and explaining a choice to which he has drawn our attention can
be preserved when ‘because’ is understood teleologically . . . Teleological explanation of
a choice makes reference to a future telos, goal, or end of an agent with respect to which
she sees her chosen action as a means.” (pp.41-42).
All three of these non-causal accounts attempt, in different ways, to forge a connection between
the reasons that explain action and the action itself. By their lights, Davidson is mistaken because
he fails to recognize that there is a salient non-causal distinction between merely having a reason
and acting for a reason. These examples show a difference between McCann and Ginet, on the
one hand, and Goetz on the other hand. McCann and Ginet tend to focus on the relationship
between our reasons (or at least the content of those reasons) and the intentions that underlie our
actions. In contrast, Goetz focuses on our reasons as referencing future goals that teleologically
explain the action. Either way, these accounts directly address Davidson’s challenge.
The non-causalist might press further here and challenge the adequacy of Davidson’s
own account with respect to contrastive explanation. For, we might wonder what the relevant
distinction is between being a rationalization and rationalizing and being a cause and causing? A
given-contrastive explanation objection concerns the fact that some reasons are present while not
having any role in explaining the agent’s action. As such, responding to the objection by saying
that explanatory reasons cause the action they explain does not actually address the question.
After all, the other reasons are also a potential cause and also possessed by the agent, in the same
way that they are also a rationalization and also possessed by the agent.
As Dickenson (2007) points out, what is needed, even in the causalist account, is an
explanation that explains how a reason can be present and yet not efficacious in producing the
action (p.15). Dickenson (2007) argues that the most sensible move for a Davidsonian causalist
is to appeal to variance between the weights or strengths of different reasons to explain the
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causal efficacy of R1 even though R2 is present and potentially a causal explanation. But,
Dickenson says, once the causalist has concedes this point the game has been surrendered to the
non-causalist (pp. 19-20). After all, the non-causalist can also appeal to a non-causal conception
of motivational strength—appealing to it as a purely non-causal property of reasons. This
undermines the plausibility of the contrastive construal of Davidsons challenge since part of its
appeal was its simple claim to explanatory superiority.34 Instead, to be explanatorily superior, the
Davidsonian causalist must also show how her account of motivational strength is more adequate
than a non-causal alternative, which is a much more complex endeavor.
The causalist does have another avenue of interpretation. The linkage interpretation of
Davidson’s challenge provides a better ground for undermining non-causal accounts. Clarke and
Mele among others have contended that the non-causalist response fails to adequately address
this difficulty. To see why, consider the following case:
Paige’s Pleasure Reading: Consider Paige, who starts to perform an action to get a book
she had left in her office at work for pleasure reading. She wants to get an enjoyable
book, but she has not decided which book, and she believes that all her enjoyable books
were left in her office: call these reasons (desire/belief pair) R1. With these reasons she
forms the intention to walk to her office to collect a book. It is also the case that a
powerful neuroscientist, Sinead, has developed a ‘neural-ray’ (or N-ray) that allows her
to hijack Paige’s brain. Unbeknownst to Paige, as she opens to the door to her office and
makes a choice to get book A for reason R1, Sinead fires up the N-ray so that it causes the
neural (and subsequent motor) responses that lead to Paige’s choosing of book A. From
Paige’s perspective, she forms the intention to selected book A, and acts on that intention,
for reasons R1.
This is a slightly modified version of Mele’s Martian manipulator cases.35 The point of the case
is to now ask, what explains Paige’s action? According to the causalists, the criterions given by
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For another argument in favor of non-causal weighting of reasons, see Palmer (2016), (pp. 105-106).

35

Clarke (2010) has an analogous objection involving auctioneering that I consider later.
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the non-causalists would entail that Paige’s reason, R1, non-causally explains the actions, but this
is clearly false, it is Sinead’s intentions that explain why Paige acted as she did.
To see why the non-causalist is vulnerable to this objection, consider again the accounts
given by McCann, Ginet, and Goetz. By McCann’s lights Paige has decided in the presence of
certain reasons and by deciding to so act, since deciding is intrinsically intentional, Paige does so
for the goals cited in the reasons. In like manner, Goetz is committed to saying that Paige’s
choice (1) represented the content of a propositional attitude about the future as including a state
of affairs that is brought about for the sake of its goodness; (2) represented a belief that about the
means to the realization or bringing about of this end; and (3) made a choice to perform that
action in order to bring about that purpose. Finally, Ginet’s account of rational explanation has
two requirements: (1) that prior to opening the door to her office, Paige acquired a desire to
obtain an enjoyable book, and (2) that concurrent with opening her door Paige remembered that
desire and intended of her arm-raising that it contribute to satisfying that desire. On all three of
these accounts Paige’s action, apparently, meets their criterion for a sufficient non-causal
explanation, but (so the objection goes) in fact they do not explain the action adequately since
the real explanation for Paige’s action is Sinead’s use of the N-rays to produce her choice. The
reasons and intentions cited in the non-causal accounts are explanatorily inert.
How can a non-causalist respond to this, more substantive, interpretation of Davidson’s
challenge as regarding the link between reasons and causes? There are three different responses
by the non-causalists addressed earlier: Goetz claims that this kind of objection begs the question
against the non-causalist. He thinks that deciding is essentially intrinsically active and thus
uncaused by virtue of being an exercise of our mental power to choose. Hence, Goetz (2008)
would say, it is not possible for Paige’s choice to be caused by Sinead in the first place, since it
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is not possible for a caused event to be a choice (p. 44). It might, of course, look like a choice
externally and it might even feel like she is choosing to herself, but it would not be a choice. I
find such “question begging” defenses to be rather unsatisfying; moreover, I argue below that
this kind of defense gives rise problematic dialectical stalemates.
McCann (1998) does not address this modified kind of causalist response directly. He
does reject causal theories of action, however, by presenting a similar objection to them. This can
function as a tu quoque style response to the linkage objection. McCann argues that causal
theories of rational explanation face an analogous series of counter-examples regarding deviant
causal chains. Just like Clarke and Mele’s objections, McCann aims to undermine the sufficiency
of causal explanation by positing conditions that meet causalist requirements for reason
explanation, while clearly being unexplained by the reasons themselves.
To see how consider the following examples. First, consider Davidson’s (1973) classic
climber case:
Davidson’s Climber: A mountaineer wants to rid himself of the weight of holding another
climber on a rope, and knows he can do this by loosening his grip. The desire and belief
are so unsettling to him that he is unnerved, which causes him to loosen his hold. Hence,
he drops the other climber. (p. 78-79)
In this case even though the desire and belief cause an action it is not sufficient to explain
intentional action. The action fails to be intentional precisely because it is caused. The causalist
would, rightly, respond by claiming that the act was caused in the wrong way. As such, a causal
theory just needs to specify what the right sort of causal pathways are to avoid this sort of
counter-example.
McCann (1998) points out that the causalist has a clear diagnosis available to them, in
cases like the mountain climber the subject’s reasons effect a bodily action through their
autonomic nervous system, rather than via voluntary processes. Thus, a causalist could specify
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that reasons causally explain actions in the right way if they go through voluntary neural
processes. McCann raises two potential objections. First, the causalist needs to explain in more
detail why it is the case that such neural pathways are the “right” pathways rather than the other
pathways. Answering that question, McCann claims, reveals that there is no causal reason why
one is preferred over the other, rather the causalist must appeal to intrinsic features of choosing,
deciding, or intending to highlight why one of these pathways is the “right” sort of causation. If
this is the case, however, why not appeal directly to the non-causal features of the reason states
as most explanatorily salient? Second, if voluntary choosings were caused by reasons, even if it
was (by stipulation) restricted to the voluntary nervous system, then it should be (in principle)
possible for wayward causal chains to cause an inappropriate reason to cause an action.
For example, I have both a reason, R1, to eat lunch (“I’m hungry and desire food and I
believe that eating my lunch will satisfy this desire”) and a reason, R2, to go to a music festival
next month (“I want to enjoy good music and I believe that going to the festival will satisfy this
desire”) thus it should be (in principle) possible for a wayward chain to make it the case that R2
causes me to decide to eat my lunch. Notice that this does not appeal to a causal process outside
of the voluntary nervous system. This raises two objections to causalist theories. First, the
causalist is committed to the claim that R2 rationally explains my eating lunch. But, if anything,
we might think that my eating lunch is rationally unexplainable. Second, if the causalists deny
being committed to this absurdity, then they must explain why we never see such rational
mismatches. It is, for the causalist, mysterious why our reasons match our intentions. McCann
thinks these causal deviance arguments are decisive in showing that the reasons-as-causes
accounts are insufficient for explaining actions. Thus, even if McCann’s view does not have an
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adequate response to the linkage objection neither do the causalists to McCann’s version of the
linkage objection—tu quoque indeed.
Ginet (2008) responds by claiming that all this objection shows is that his non-causal
requirement is not necessary for action explanation. It might be the case, Ginet argues, that some
actions have either overdetermined explanations (both the intentions and the causal sources
explain the action) or are explained by the causal connection. It does not, however, imply that a
concurrent intention while acting is insufficient for the truth of the reasons-explanation (p. 236).
A reason fails to explain action if it is neither presented as an appropriate concurrent intention to
the acting agent nor the case that the reason caused the action (p. 237).
Clarke (2010) claims that this response does not appreciate the full force of the linkage
objection. Clarke presents the following case:
Painting Auction: Laura wants to acquire a certain painting at an auction and believes
that by raising her arm at the appropriate time she might enter a successful bid.
Concurrently with raising her arm, Laura remembers that desire and intends of her armraising that it contribute to satisfying that desire. Unbeknownst to her, Damien, a
powerful scientist who wants her to bid, has implanted a chip in Laura’s brain that allows
him to take control of the motions of her limbs and even produce in her the volitional act
of deciding by manipulating her brain. In fact, it is Damien who causes her to will to
actively raise her arm and makes sure that her so willing causes—in the way
characteristic of action-production—her arm to rise. Laura bids on the painting.
As Clarke points out, this seems to be a case where Ginet’s conditions are met but it is
insufficient to explain the action. The intention that accompanies the action remains
unimplemented. As noted above, Ginet’s general strategy is to claim such cases are
overdetermined. Clarke (2010) argues that this fails. Consider this parallel case where the agent
does not even act:
Involuntary Painting Auction: Laura wants to acquire a certain painting at an auction
and believes that by raising her arm at the appropriate time she might enter a successful
bid. Concurrently with raising her arm, Laura remembers that desire and intends of her
arm-raising that it contribute to satisfying that desire. Unbeknownst to her, Damien, a
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powerful scientist who wants her to raise her arm, has implanted a chip in Laura’s brain
that allows him to take control of the motions of her limbs independently from any
volitions. Damien causes her arm to rise. Laura bids on the painting.
Crucially, the arm’s raising is caused by Damien without an accompanying willing on the part of
Laura. Here it seems that both Ginet and Clarke agree that an action has not even occurred and,
in fact, the event of her arm’s raising is rationally explained by the intentions of Damien. Clarke
then asks, what makes the difference between this case and the case where Laura’s willing is
caused?
Clarke (2010) argues there is no difference between these cases. If the intention is
explanatorily disconnected in the second case (Involuntary Painting Auction) then it is also
disconnected in the first case (Painting Auction). As he puts it, “In the [first case], unlike the
rising one, the event to which [the concurrent intention] directly refers is an action. But that
intention is no more connected to the explanandum event in this last case than it is in the rising
one. The change in the character of the explanandum event cannot itself make the difference in
whether the intention that refers demonstratively to that event figures in an explanation to it” (p.
30).
Ginet (2016) responds to Clarke by doubling down on his claim that the action is
explanatorily over-determined. He clarifies a point obscured by Clarke, noting that the volition
that the neuroscientist causes is not a further intention but rather the most basic part of Laura’s
action of raising her arm (p. 223). This does not directly address Clarke’s concern, as Ginet
himself admits, but it does lend intuitive support to Ginet’s view that there is a close connection
between the volition and the action that follows from this volition. Ginet, when considering the
heart of Clarke’s argument, claims that Clarke’s reasoning is unclear (p. 223). According to
Ginet, Clarke merely asserts that it is implausible to say that Laura raised her arm in order to
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contribute to satisfying her desire to bid for the painting—an assertion that Ginet denies. Ginet
(2016) speculates that Clarke might assert this because he cannot see how the desire can have
anything to do with why Laura raises her arm “unless it figures in a causal explanation of the
action” (p. 224). Ginet points out that this cannot be a premise in an argument against a noncausal account of action explanation without being blatantly question-begging.
Moreover, Ginet notes that when Clarke speaks of an action “implementing” or “carrying
out” an intention he does not explain why that matters for action explanation, or even how
“implement” might be different from “cause.” As he notes, “I would have thought it sufficient
for [implementation] if the action accomplishes what is intended, whether or not the action is
explained by the intention or desire the intention refers to” (p. 224). That is to say, the language
of “implementation” is too weak to pick out the relationship that Clarke needs. The real question
for Ginet is whether the agent performed the action in order to satisfy the desire to which their
reason or intention refers and, thus, that reason or intention explains the action. Ginet’s
conclusion is that Clarke has not given sufficient reason to think Laura’s action is not so
explained.
This response, as stated, is unsatisfying. It is very difficult to explain why it is
unsatisfying without merely reporting contrary intuitions. Some progress, however, can be made
by focusing on what Ginet means by saying that the agent performed the action in order to
satisfy their desire. This locution, “in order to,” indicates a link between the antecedent desire
and the resulting action. But, what does this mean exactly? In what sense does the agent perform
the action in order to fulfill that intention? I contend that Clarke’s argument remains plausible
because this “in order to” cannot link intentions and actions without being a thicker concept than
Ginet’s theory allows. To see why, I turn again to Clarke’s cases.
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Consider again Clarke’s involuntary painting auction case. Here, both Ginet and Clarke
agree that the agent did not perform an action. Ginet (2016) points out that if Laura believes that
she has raised her arm then she must have experienced her arm’s moving as if she is raising it,
rather than her just experiencing the arm’s rising without it seeming to her as if she is doing the
raising (p. 222). This experience, as if she is doing the raising, contains the simple mental act
that Ginet calls a “volition.” The belief that she forms on the basis of this experience can be
false, but only if Damien’s interference causes her arm to rise independently while
simultaneously causing the volitional aspect of her experience. If Damien merely causes the
arm’s rising then it would not be experienced as if it was done by Laura. Conversely, Ginet
(2016) argues that if Damien causes the arm’s rising via causing the volition, which then causes
the bodily exertion as it normally would, then Laura’s belief is not false. She believes that she
raised her arm and she did (p. 222).36 Put another way, if Damien severs the link between
Laura’s volition and her arm’s rising then, by Ginet’s own lights, her arm’s rising is no longer
her action and is no longer explained by her desire or intention to so act.
With these features of the examples clearly in view, Clarke’s objection becomes
significantly more plausible. It depends on a parallelism between the involuntary and voluntary
versions of the case. In the involuntary case, Ginet (2016) grants that the agent has a volition,
that is to say, she has the simple mental event that is the most basic part of any action (p. 222).
Moreover, this volition contributes to their experience as of raising their arm; however, the belief
they form on the basis of this experience is false. The arm rises but the volition in no way
contributes (causally or otherwise) to its rising. To appropriate Clarke’s phrase, the arm’s rising
does not “implement” the volition, in this case because they are not causally connected.

Of course, on Ginet’s (2016) account Laura would have the further false belief that she acted freely, without her
volition being subject to causal antecedents.
36
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Remember, the debate concerns Ginet’s account of rational explanation, in particular, how
intentions (or desires) explain actions. Ginet claims that the following two conditions are
sufficient for the truth of an action explanation, following Clarke (2010, p. 28) I apply them to
Laura’s case:
(i.)
(ii.)

Prior to raising her arm, Laura acquired a desire to obtain the painting; and
Concurrently with raising her arm, Laura remembered that desire and intended of
her arm-raising that it contribute to satisfying that desire. (Ginet 1990, p. 143)

As Ginet clarifies, the intention mentioned here accompanies the action and refers to it directly
and the prior desire explains the action by being referred to by the accompanying intention. All
of these relations, according to Ginet (1990) are non-causal (pp. 142-143). But, we might
wonder, what makes the difference between the possessed yet unimplemented intention in the
voluntary case, and the possessed yet unimplemented volition in the involuntary case? Ginet
agrees that in the involuntary case Laura’s arm’s rising is neither an action nor is it explained by
Laura’s prior intention. Why not also say in the voluntary case that though the volition causes
the bodily movement the intention is still not implemented by that action? The intention is no
more connected to the bodily movement in the first case than in the second. Put more directly,
since the accompanying intention is related to the bodily movement in the exact same way in
both cases, what we need is an explanation for why a change in the volition’s relationship to the
arm’s rising changes the accompanying intention’s explanatory status. Ginet does not provide
such an explanation.
This objection can be framed from the other direction as well. If merely possessing the
intention that her arm-rising contribute to the satisfaction of her desire is sufficient in the case of
her volitionally caused arm raising to explain the action, then why not also in the involuntary
case? In the involuntary case all three elements of action, according to Ginet, are present. The
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intention, the volition, and the bodily movement are all there, however, the volition and the
bodily movement are causally disconnected. The force of Clarke’s objection comes from the fact
that changing the link between the volition and the bodily action makes no clear difference with
respect to the intention. By Ginet’s own lights, there is no change in the relationship between the
intention and the volition/bodily action in either case. Given this, an explanation is needed for
why the mere fact that in one case there is a causal link between the volition and the bodily
movement should matter with respect to the intention’s contribution to explaining the action.
How does this fact constitute the agent’s performing a bodily movement in order to fulfill that
intention?
These considerations show that the linkage objection is devastating for weak non-causal
view, like Ginet’s. Additionally, part of the strength of Clarke’s position is that it is the more
explanatorily parsimonious theory. Before moving on to consider the final causalist objection I
offer a potential counter-example to Clarke’s claim of explanatory parsimony. My aim here is to
highlight that, at the end of the day, we are in a dialectical stalemate with no clear path forward.
At first glance, this reduces all non-causalist strategies to those pursued by the strong noncausalist—namely, tu quoque style responses and accusing the causalist of question begging.
Here is a final case that is meant to run parallel to Clarke’s case. The force of Clarke’s case in
part comes from the fact that it shows that the causal story is the more explanatorily salient one.
That is, it doesn’t just show that the alternative view is insufficient it also shows that his view
has explanatory teeth. For that reason, it would be useful to craft a parallel case for the noncausalist. This example turns on a distinction, already raised by McCann, between reason-states
(i.e. either the mental types that are reasons or their physical realizers) and the content of reasonstates (i.e. the abstract entity that specifies what the reason is about).
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Opera Outing: Suppose reason-states can cause actions. Gillian is aware that a local
community opera company is putting on an overly ambitious production of Percival and
she is about to decide if she wants to attend. If confronted with a reason that involves
pleasing her friends, Gillian is disposed to attend Percival despite its almost guaranteed
aesthetic flaws. The reason-state she currently has regarding the opera, however, makes
no mention of her friends in its content, instead it is about the aesthetic qualities of the
opera. Her neuroscientist friend, Shannon, has developed a special device that projects
mental-rays—beams that change the content of mental states without changing the states
themselves. Right as Gillian is about to decide Shannon uses the m-rays to change the
content of her reason-state to involve pleasing her friends. Gillian decides to attend the
opera despite her aesthetic misgivings and her reason-state causes her to do so.
We can ask, what explains Gillian’s choosing to attend the opera? By the causalists lights it is the
reason-state which caused her to perform that action. But, this is surely false. The only reasonstate on offer was causally inert until the content of the reason changed by virtue of Shannon’s
intervening. Furthermore, this is not an issue of deviant causal chains, for nothing was causally
amiss about the processes by which the reason-state was formed and in turn caused Gillian’s
action. This is a case where what explained her going, rather than not, was the non-causal change
in content. The causal structure remains fixed.
A causalist might protest that this case begs the question against a causalist by assuming
that the content can change (non-causally) and then be causally efficacious because of that
change. I believe there are two plausible responses to this concern. First, if this style of case is
question begging to the causalist then it seems open for the non-causalist to claim the Clarke and
Mele’s analogous cases are question begging to non-causalist positions. The cases stand or fall
together. Second, it is unclear to me why such a view would be question-begging for a causalist. I
take it to be the case that most action theorists, who are not epiphenomenalists, are committed to
the straightforward claim that reasons are reasons for or reasons against an action of mine
precisely because of their content. As such, to deny that shifting the content of a reason-state can
be efficacious or to deny that one can even metaphysically do this without changing the identity
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of the reason state would be to smuggle in controversial thesis in philosophy of mind regarding
either reduction or epiphenomenalism. Insofar as we resist making these further concessions, the
causalist has an analogous problem regarding the sufficiency of causal action explanation.
Where do the above considerations leave non-causalism overall? Weak non-causalism is
subject to counter-examples that highlight its inability to explain the link between reasons and
actions. Strong non-causalism avoids this, but only by acquiescing to argumentative tactics that
undermine the productivity of the dialectic. Strong non-causalists tend to utilize tu quoque style
responses or claim that their causalist opponents beg the question. These are, of course,
legitimate argumentative strategies, however, they lack persuasive force. They are purely
defensive and mostly amount to burden shifting.37 This leads to the final causalist objection I will
consider, for it is an objection that cuts to the heart of even the strong non-causalist response.
iii. Origination Objection
I believe, along with McCann, that the randomness objection consists of two different
concerns: (1) The agent’s actions are accidental or do not have the required explanation to count
as an action of hers. (2) There is no explanation for the coming into being of the agent’s actions.
They do not have a sufficient ontological explanation, thus they appear out of nowhere. I
discussed (1) while discussing the randomness objection above. I left concern (2) undiscussed in
part because I think it is best framed as a worry not about randomness but about origination.
Where do actions come from, metaphysically speaking, if they are not part of the causal nexus? I
take this language of “origination” from McCann (1998) who clearly recognizes this as a
difficulty for strong non-causalists. McCann claims that his view only “address(es) the rational
grounds for decisions, not their ontological underpinnings” (p. 186). Because of this, according

37

Again, these are legitimate strategies. Indeed, I suspect that most of philosophy involves determining where the
burden of proof lies. They are, however, also easy ways of obscuring more productive avenues in a dialectic.
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to McCann, strong non-causal accounts of the will “represent discontinuities in the world, and
their provenance is as hidden from us as that of the world itself” (p. 187). As noted in the
previous chapter, McCann thinks that this is a reasonable critique of his style of non-causalism.
He offers two responses. First, causalists are subject to a similar objection (tu quoque), insofar as
they have no explanation for why the causal nexus exists in the first place (pp.183-190). Second,
this discontinuous world just is the world of our experience. Thus even if we do not have a full
explanation, we are justified in positing its existence as necessary for our conception of agency.
That just is what it means to take the “practical perspective” seriously.
McCann himself recognizes that the first response is weaker than he would like, for even
if the causalist lacks an overarching explanation it seems that the strong non-causalist has left
many more entities ontologically unexplained. As such, the core of his response is to suggest that
the balance of reasons is on the side of the strong non-causalist. Even though his non-causal
account leaves somethings unexplained, the practical perspective is central enough to our lives to
warrant holding this view despite its inelegancies.
I am unsure this argumentative gambit works. It requires sacrificing our theoretical
reason for the sake of the practical. Perhaps our pre-theoretic concept of practical agency is
incompatible with our theoretical attempts to wholly explain events in the world. If so, then it is
open for a causalist to respond by simply saying, “so much the worse for our conception of
practical agency.” In a manner similar to other strong non-causalist responses, McCann’s
response though useful as a mere defensive measure is unlikely to push the dialectic forward.
Leaving the particularities of McCann’s account aside, the question of origination is
troubling for other non-causal theories. In the context of free action, even Ginet’s weak noncausalism falls victim to a similar concern. Ginet claims that free actions are uncaused. As such,
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it is puzzling how such actions come into being. Ginet (2007) contends that this supposed puzzle
is itself ungrounded. He states, “it seems evident to me that, given that an action was uncaused,
all its agent had to do to make it the case that she performed that action was perform it” (p. 247).
Ginet (2014) has maintained this position elsewhere, further claiming that such a view is, in
principle, compatible with the natural order by virtue of not causally producing but merely
“limiting” the choices available to the agent (p. 25). While Ginet (2007) recognizes the
origination objection, at least in the guise of a randomness objection, he contends that causalist
have yet to explain adequately why such ontological “randomness” entails that actions cannot be
“up to the agent” (p. 248).
At least with respect to free action, this response places Ginet’s weak non-causalism in
the same camp as McCann. It is primarily a burden-shifting response that serves to, obliquely,
accuse his causalist opponents of begging the question. Again, as I noted with McCann, while
such a response is a useful defense I believe that it is inadequate for moving the dialectic
forward. Goetz’s (2008) response to this origination concern is similar. Goetz (2008) attempts to
ground his reply to the origination objection in the mental ontology that he posits, which entails
that our exercising of the power to choose is essentially intrinsically active and therefore
uncaused. He then claims that, since we know that we choose via our experience of choosing, we
are justified in believing that this is an expression of our active power to choose that must
therefore be uncaused. Thus, by Goetz’s lights, to answer the question how do uncaused choices
originate we appeal to the mental power of choosing, which is in turn supported by our
experience of choosing as the best explanation for the active nature of choice. Though this
response does have more going for it than Ginet’s or McCann’s I think, at its heart, it is still a
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“begging the question” style response. Goetz does not give us much reason to accept his mental
ontology other than appealing to the very experiences the ontology is meant to explain.
Of course, while these responses are thin that does not mean that they are wholly
inadequate. In section 1.3 and section 2, I offer a more complete account of why this style of
response is inadequate. Furthermore, it is worth noting that while Ginet’s account gives a thin
response to the origination objection it is still open to him as a weak non-causalist to maintain
that an event is an action by its phenomenological non-causal features but that the existence of
such events is ultimately causally explained. That is, Ginet could give up on the nomological
possibility of free action if the dialectical cost of maintaining a non-causalist response to the
origination objection becomes too high.
At this juncture we see a split among non-causalists. While non-causalist have many
adequate responses to causalist objections, there are two criticisms that deserve more
consideration: First, Ginet’s weak non-causalism is subject to the linkage version of the rational
explanation objection. That is, it cannot adequately respond to counter-examples, such as those
given by Mele and Clarke, which show that there is no explanatorily salient link between
intentions and the actions they non-causally explain. Second, Goetz’s and McCann’s strong noncausalism is fragile with respect to the origination objection. Though both authors have
responses, these responses are decidedly thin and this raises the larger concern that strong noncausalism is, ironically, dialectically weak. By relying too often on tu quoque and “begging the
question” counter-responses McCann and Goetz hamper their ability to participate in a
philosophically productive dialectic with their causalist opponents. This naturally leads us to ask,
between the two non-causalist strategies—strong and weak—which is to be preferred? These
debates among non-causal views are useful both for clarifying the views themselves and more
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clearly understanding their plausibility in the overall debate. In the next section I turn to these
non-causalist challenges with the aim of adjudicating between weak and strong non-causalism.
Afterward, in my final section, I offer my own criticism, which syntheses the best elements of
causalist objections—the linkage and origination objections—with a larger concern about
dialectical stalemates and incomprehensibility. This, then, clears the way for my own non-causal
account in chapter 3.
1.2 Non-causalist Challenges: Strong vs. Weak Non-causalism
McCann and Goetz are “strong non-causalists,” they both argue that simple mental
actions must be uncaused. This contrasts with Ginet’s “weak non-causalism”, which claims that
such simple mental acts may be caused though they are not actions by being caused. Ginet
believes that only free actions must be uncaused. McCann, for one, does not seem to entertain
the free action/unfree action distinction. He insists that insofar as we choose at all we are free, at
least from causal determination. Goetz entertains the possibility that our choosing could be
teleologically determined, however, direct causal determination of our actions is not possible on
his account either. Thus, for McCann and Goetz, a causally determined world would be a world
without action.
I agree with Ginet that actions can exist in a world wholly causally structured they just
would not be actions by virtue of anything causal.38 I argue for this by first, taking Goetz as a
paradigm example, reconstructing the strongest argument for the claim that all simple mental
acts must be uncaused. I then defend this strong non-causalism from objections raised by Palmer
(2016), which I believe are inadequate. I then raise my own objections to the view, again
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Moreover, though it is not important for the main point of this dissertation, I agree that actions must be completely
uncaused if they are to be free.
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paradigmatically held by Goetz, ultimately siding with Ginet that actions could exist in a
causally determined world though they would not be free.
Goetz (2008) argues that all simple mental acts are uncaused because they are each
instances of the kind “being the exercising of a mental power” and “because an agent’s
exercising of a mental power is essentially intrinsically active, it is essentially uncaused or not
produced” (p. 8). This, according to Goetz, follows because to be caused is to be intrinsically
passive with respect to the cause. McCann (2012) echoes similar considerations, saying that
“what befall me are events in which I am passive rather than active, things that happen to me
instead of being done by me. None of this pertains to deciding” (p. 254). What are we to make of
these arguments? At first blush they seem to be versions of the argument I constructed in the
previous chapter on behalf of Goetz:
(1) Intrinsic features of a mental event type (or kind) ontologically define it, and
differentiate it from other mental event types (or kinds)
(2) An entity cannot possess ‘contradictory’ intrinsic properties at the same time and in
the same manner
(3) If simple mental events are caused then they are intrinsically passive with respect to
their cause.
(4) Simple mental acts are experienced as intrinsically active
(5) Simple mental acts cannot be caused [from 2-4]
Therefore:
(6) Simple mental actions must be uncaused [from 1 and 5]
This argument captures, roughly, the reasoning deployed by Goetz and, to a lesser extent,
McCann; however, it fails to prove its conclusion. Premise 3 and premise 1 are the two weakest
premises in the argument and ultimately, I argue, that premise 3 is false. But it is tempting to
dismiss this strong non-causalist argument too quickly. To understand, fully, the reasoning
behind this position I turn first to an inadequate critique and defend Goetz’s version of strong
non-causalism against this critique.
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Palmer (2016) argues that Goetz non-causal view is inadequate, and instead a revised
non-causal theory should leave space for choices to be caused even if free choices must
ultimately be uncaused. Palmer’s critique rests on two considerations: First, Palmer challenges
Goetz assumption that choices must be uncaused. By contrast, Palmer thinks that while it might
be necessary for free choices to be uncaused it is not clear that all choices have this constraint.
Second, Goetz’s view, according to Palmer, leads to three implausible consequences, (i) it
follows that all choices are ipso facto free; (ii.) it follows that causal determinism rules out any
kind of choice whatsoever, and (iii.) it follows if causal determinism is true then deliberation can
never be successfully concluded by way of choices.
While, as I noted above, I ultimately agree with Palmer’s conclusion I contend that his
argument against Goetz has errors that obscure the important underlying issues at stake in the
non-causalist debate. I focus primarily on Palmer’s first concern and the argument he uses to
support it. This is because I believe it is the most interesting and substantive argument and
whatever plausibility Palmer’s second set of concerns has comes from the success of his first
argument.39
Palmer’s first claim, that actions do not have to be uncaused, rests on the following case.
Consider Jane who is deliberating about whether to stay at home or go to the movies. She has

If one assumes, as I eventually show, that Palmer’s first challenge is ineffective then the second set of concerns
that Palmer raises can be briefly dismissed: (i) it does not follow from Goetz’s account that choices are ipso facto
free, Goetz (2008) only argues that they cannot be caused but as he carefully points out there are, for example, other
kinds of determination. In fact, though he does not discuss this possibility directly (and I’m sure he would think it
false) it is at least consistent with his view that our choices could be teleologically determined by virtue of the
physical universe being causally determined, where this “by virtue of” indicates some sort of non-causal grounding
relation. (ii) that causal determinism rules out any kind of choice and (iii) that if causal determinism is true then
deliberation can never be successfully concluded by way of choice are both accurate descriptions of what is entailed
by Goetz’s position, but it is unclear to me how these claims are supposed to undermine his argument. It strikes me
that Palmer’s concerns in (ii) and (iii) are both examples of burden shifting. Of course, burden shifting can be
justified, but I take it that what justifies it in this case is the success of Palmer’s first challenge, which I think is, in
fact, inadequate as argued above.
39
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both the desire to stay at home and a desire to go to the movies. After some deliberation she
chooses to go to the movies. By stipulation her desire to go to the moves causes her to make that
choice (p. 100). Palmer claims that in this case it is almost undeniable that Jane has made a
choice. Perhaps it could be argued that her choice, because it was caused, was unfree and thus
she should not be held responsible for it. But, says Palmer, this surely does not undermine the
simple claim that she made a choice.
This is not yet an argument. It is a judgement in a case in which Palmer stipulates that
event of her choosing can be caused. Though, I take it, Palmer hopes that this case primes our
intuitions to question the strong non-causal view. To support these nascent intuitions Palmer
offers further support for his considered judgement. He notes that from Jane’s perspective she
certainly believes she is choosing and one could plausibly imagine that if we brought to her
attention that her choices was caused she would still think she had chosen. Though this reaction
is natural Palmer notes that Goetz might respond that Jane is just mistaken. Instead, Goetz would
highlight the conceptual foundations of his argument noting that according to him it is a
conceptual truth that choosing is an essentially intrinsically active event. Further, Goetz states
that events which are efficiently caused are produced by that cause and as such they are
occurrences that a subject is passive towards. To this Palmer responds:
This claim is not self-evident and Goetz provides no support for it whatsoever. Goetz
does argue that choices are intrinsically active, which follows from his claim that choices
are the exercise of a of a person’s mental power to choose, and a person’s exercising a
mental power is an intrinsically active event . . . perhaps it follows that if something is
intrinsically active, then it cannot derive its active character from its relationship to any
antecedent event . . . [but] it does not follow that this thing cannot be caused. (p. 101).
Though the active nature of choosing must be intrinsic to the action it is, by Palmer’s lights, still
completely open that there are other extrinsic relations to which the event may be subject. Thus,
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Goetz has given us no reason to accept his view, especially considering the intuitively plausible
understanding of Jane’s case wherein she chooses though perhaps not freely.
I think the best argument we can attribute to Goetz is more nuanced than Palmer gives
him credit for, though I admit that Goetz’s reasoning is quite compressed. The main problem
with Palmer’s critique is that he glosses over a key concept that Goetz deploys in his description
of our experience of choosing. Palmer frequently cites Goetz (1998) as saying that our choosing
is “intrinsically active.” This is true but incomplete. Throughout, Goetz (2008; 1997) states that
our choosing, and more broadly any mental event that counts as an exercising of a mental power,
is an essentially intrinsically active event. This difference is subtle but important for the
plausibility of Goetz’s overall argument. To make sense of Goetz’s argument, we must first
understand how these terms are being used and their possible combinations.
Intrinsic properties are generally understood to be those properties that are “proper” to
the entity. As Lewis (1983) states, “a thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that
thing itself, and nothing else, is. Not so for extrinsic properties, though a thing may well have
these in virtue of the way some larger whole is” (p. 111). This is sometimes mistakenly conflated
with essential properties. Essential properties, as opposed to accidental properties, are generally
understood as those properties that an entity must have, where “must” indicates a kind of modal
necessity. In contrast, accidental properties may or may not be predicated of an entity, they are
merely modally possible. Though this view is the dominate one, it is worth noting that there are
compelling arguments from Fine (1995a, 1995b, 1994) among others that suggest that a modal
account of essential properties is too weak to sufficiently characterize the phenomena.40

For example, it entails that my property of “being such that if I exist there are infinitely many primes” is an
essential property of myself. This seems strange for that property has nothing to do with me at all. Fine (1995a)
advocates supplementing the modal definition with something more directly related to the entity under
consideration. In particular, Fine suggests that it would be better for essential properties define the entity. This is
40
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Regardless of the proper characterization of essential properties the most important features for
my purposes is (i) that they can be distinct from intrinsic properties and (ii) they characterize the
entity that they predicate.
As I mentioned in chapter 1, once we recognize this we can see that Goetz (2008) does
have a kind of argument for his position. For he makes two claims. First, that instances or tokens
of one’s “exercising of a mental power” are essentially intrinsically active. Second, that an event
that is caused, such as the actualizing of a mental capacity, is essentially intrinsically passive (p.
8).41 We can now see how Palmer’s attempted counter-argument falls short. Again, as I noted in
Chapter 1, Palmer’s claim that a choice could be caused but still intrinsically active as long as it
did not possess its intrinsically active character by virtue of being caused, amounts to saying the
same event could be both essentially intrinsically active and essentially intrinsically passive.
According to Goetz, this is absurd. Goetz thinks these events are what they are by virtue of this
property, and to suggest that the same event could possess contradictory essential properties
makes no sense.
Palmer might respond that Goetz has given us no reason to agree with his claim that
caused events are essentially intrinsically passive and thus he has given no reason for think that
an event cannot be both caused and intrinsically active in character. This response is effective
because Goetz does fail to provide a clear argument for this claim. I do think, however, that there
are enough indications in the text for us to recognize and reconstruct a kind of argument.

puzzling for those who think of definition as primarily about words or concepts not objects or other natural entities.
It is likely that Fine is appealing to an older conception of definition such as that, plausibly, advocated by Aristotle
in Metaphysics. I do not, here, take up the task of explicating this alternative conception of essence, though I note
that I find it plausible.
41
In the cited passage from Goetz (2008) he is taking explicitly about actualizing a mental capacity as an example of
an essentially intrinsically passive event. In Goetz (1997), however, he also mentions more generally that any entity
that is the subject of an efficiently caused event is essentially passive with respect to that event (p. 197).
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First, it is noteworthy that Goetz allows that an event might be dependent on antecedent
factors and that we can distinguish between this dependence relation and the active character of
the event. As Goetz (1997) states, “while it is true that a choice occurs in the context of and is
dependent upon the occurrence of antecedent events (e.g., the coming to have reasons to act and
thinking about means to an end), it is plausible to think that a choice does not derive its active
character from these events” (p. 198). This is notable because, as Palmer (2016) argues, such a
position is compatible with the claim that active events are caused since an active event could be
caused without deriving its active character from that cause (p. 101). We should charitably
speculate that since Goetz recognizes this distinction he also recognizes its compatibility with
causal production, as such it must be something about the nature of the event’s active character
that led him to the conclusion that a mental event like choosing cannot be caused.
Goetz is unpersuasive here. He claims it is a conceptual truth that the exercising of a
mental power is essentially uncaused and that this is a something we know because of our
experience of the essentially intrinsically active nature of choosing. I do not see how these
considerations support Goetz’s essentialist claims. I think, however, that there is a nearby
argument that Goetz could deploy that would better support his contention. Furthermore, as I
alluded in the previous chapter, this nearby argument bolsters McCann’s view as well. As such, I
present it in some detail though it is more of a friendly addition to Goetz’s (and McCann’s)
arguments, rather than a strict explication of his ideas.
Why might our experience of choosing as intrinsically active gives us reason to make the
further claim that they are essentially intrinsically active? The answer lies in mental events. The
argument is analogous to Kripke’s argument regarding identity theories in philosophy of mind.
According to Kripke (1972), there is an important disanalogy between the following two types of
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identity claims: (i.) heat is molecular motion and (ii.) pain is c-fibers firing. Kripke argues these
kind of identity claims are necessary. Once we name a natural kind we rigidly designate the
entity under discussion. Certain elements of our sense experience might serve to fix the entity we
are rigidly designating, but these descriptive properties are not to be understood as the entity
itself or as an essential property of that entity. We can, therefore, give an error theory for why
someone might mistakenly think the heat might not have been molecular motion. As Kripke
(1972) says, “When someone says that heat might have turned out not to be molecular motion,
what is true in what he says is that someone could have sensed a phenomenon in the same way
we sense heat, that is, feels it by means of its production of the sensation we call ‘the sensation
of heat’ . . . even thought that phenomenon was not molecular motion” (p. 150). The converse is
also true. Given the necessity of identity, what someone means by saying “heat might not have
been molecular motion” is something more like “creatures might have been such that they did
not feel the phenomenon of molecular motion (that is, heat) by experiences the sensation of
heat.” Put briefly, the sensation and the entity that the sensation indicates are two different
things, heat is the name we just so happen to give to the entity that it was fixed by the contingent
sensation of heat.
In contrast, the identity relation of pain does not seem to admit to this kind of error
theory. If pain is c-fibers firing, and we wanted to explain the possibility of c-fibers firing
without us feeling the sensation of pain we would be at a loss. Pain just is the phenomenal
experience in a way in which “heat” is not. The sensation does not merely fix some other entity,
the sensation is the entity. Again, as Kripke states, “in the case of molecular motion and heat
there is something, namely, the sensation of heat, which is an intermediary between the external
phenomenon and the observer. In the mental-physical case no such intermediary is possible,
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since here the physical phenomenon is supposed to be identical with the internal phenomenon
itself.” Pain is picked out by its own essential property, the property of being pain itself. As such,
if it is even possible for c-fibers to fire without someone having the sensation of pain then pain
must not be identical with c-fiber firing.
I believe that a similar argument supports Goetz’s (2008) claim, implicit in premise (1.),
that our experience of mental activity is a good guide to their nature. Though he does not think
that our choosing has a felt quality he does think we experience it as active. Consider again his
statement that:
Though a choice, unlike an experience of pain, lacks any qualitative feel, I think the view
that it too has a nonrelational, intrinsically active nature that is introspectively accessible
to its agent is bolstered by an epistemological datum of mental action . . . If [the agent]
knows in this way that he is choosing, then it seems to follow that choosing is
intrinsically different from a mere happening or passive event and that he is aware of this
difference. (p. 12, my emphasis).
Any other attempt to explain such simple mental actions other than the agent’s direct experience
of choosing directs attention away from the very event being explained. There is nothing for the
simple mental event of choosing to be other than our experience of it as an intrinsically active
event, hence it is also essential for it to be an intrinsically active event. Just like pain, the simple
mental act of choosing is epistemically picked out by its own essential property of “being
intrinsically active.” The same reasoning would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the intrinsically
passive simple mental acts, which are caused.
If my generous reconstruction of Goetz argument is plausible, then it seems he does have
an argument for why we should think that our experience of choosing is essentially intrinsically
active and thus must be uncaused, because caused mental states are essentially intrinsically
passive, and the same mental even cannot possess conflicting essential intrinsic properties.
Hence, Palmer’s criticism is insufficient to address Goetz argument.
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How then do we adjudicate between the strong non-causalism of Goetz or McCann and
the weak non-causalism of Ginet? Though Palmer’s critique is inadequate I think there is another
path to rejecting strong non-causalist arguments. Though my reconstruction of Goetz’s argument
does more than merely assert that our actions are intrinsically active, it still has several flaws.
Recall the modified argument given in chapter 1:
1. Intrinsic features of a mental event type (or kind) ontologically define it, and
differentiate it from other mental event types (or kinds)
2. An entity cannot possess ‘contradictory’ intrinsic properties at the same time and in
the same manner
3. If simple mental events are caused then they are intrinsically passive with respect to
their cause.
4. Simple mental acts are experienced as intrinsically active
5. So, simple metal acts are uncaused [from 2-4].
Therefore:
6. Simple mental actions are uncaused [from 1 and 5].
As we have seen, Goetz has given us some arguments for why we should believe that mental
events, like choosing, possess their essential properties intrinsically and that these essentially
characterize them. Further, once this is accepted, it is clear how Goetz moves from the intrinsic
passivity of caused mental events, through the claim that a single entity cannot possess
‘contradictory’ intrinsic properties, to the conclusion that choosing must be uncaused. But
though we now understand the plausibility of Goetz’s argument—in particular premise (1)—we
have not yet considered the plausibility of his crucial premise (3), namely, “if simple mental
events are caused then they are intrinsically passive with respect to their cause.” What
recommends the conclusion that caused mental events are essentially intrinsically passive? I
suggested above that one possibility for Goetz is to appeal to parallel reasoning as that for active
mental events using Kripkian style argument. This strategy, however, fails to provide adequate
support for premise (3).

80
To see why, consider again how Kripke argues for the claim that the property of pain
which is phenomenally accessible to us is also the essential property of pain. It is because he is
arguing with a type-type theorist that this kind of move is available to him. Because identity
relations are necessary, conjoined with the fact that pain could be nothing other than its
phenomenal features, we can conclude that the phenomenal features we experience are also its
essential features. A crucial element of the argument is that it is a claim about identity. The typetype theorist is saying that pain is c-fibers firing, however, if that is true then that theorist needs
to explain the seemingly contingent relationship between the phenomena and the material
substrate of the phenomenon. This makes the question of pain very different from the question of
simple mental actions.
The causalist is not asking constitutive questions or a question of identity. To ask, “are
actions caused” is not the same as asking, “are actions identical with effects.” To see why
consider pain again from a Kripkian perspective. Pain is, as far as we know, caused. When I
accidently hit my head on a doorframe that impact causes my pain. Put roughly, pain is the effect
of my head hitting the doorframe. It would, however, be misleading to say that pain is
constituted by its being an effect. Pain is, essentially, a certain kind of phenomenal experience
that, in beings like us, is caused by neural pathways that can be activated by hitting our heads on
doors, among other things. All this highlights a straightforward point—the causal relation is not
the same as the constitution relation. To ask questions about the former is not, necessarily, to ask
questions about the latter. Furthermore, recognizing this distinction emphasizes something that
the non-causalist already admits, namely that the causal relation is extrinsic not intrinsic. But if
this is true then premise (3) is on weak ground. Goetz’s claim that the effects of efficient
causation are passive is ambiguous. Its plausibility trades on the true claim that an effect is
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always passive with respect to its cause. That claim, however, concerns a property of the
extrinsic relation between an effect and a cause. Thus, while it is absurd for an entity to possess
two ‘contradictory’ essential intrinsic properties, it is possible for an entity to, at the same time,
possess an intrinsic property and an extrinsic property that are in opposition.
I think Goetz would respond to this by pointing out that all of those mental events that we
know are caused are also intrinsically passive, like our believing or perceiving. Hence, we have
reason to conclude that it is likely, given our evidence, that if something is caused it is also
essentially intrinsically passive. I have framed this as a probabilistic claim to avoid presenting
Goetz as affirming the consequent. But I note that in his work he seems to present this
conclusion with more certainty than is warranted. Regardless, it is manifestly clear that the
essentially intrinsically passive nature of such caused mental events would have to be a
necessary a posteriori discovery not a conceptual truth, as he originally claimed.
If so, then it seems we have a potential response to Goetz and any strong non-causalist
who benefits from similar considerations. It is false that if a mental event is caused it is
essentially intrinsically passive. It might be necessarily extrinsically passive with respect to its
cause, just as all effects are. But it is conceivable for a necessarily extrinsically passive property
to be essentially intrinsically active. Thus, I concur with Palmer and Ginet that the strong noncausalists have yet to give us a compelling positive argument for holding that position.
2. Dialectical Stalemates and the Incomprehensibility Challenge
Above, I considered three important causalist objections to the non-causal views I
introduced in chapter 1—(i) the randomness objection, (ii) the rational explanation objection, and
(iii.) the origination objection. I showed both how non-causalists respond to these objections and
where those responses are weak or unavailable. Finally, in the previous section, I examined the
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debates between weak non-causalists and strong non-causalists; my conclusion was that the best
argument for strong non-causalism fails and thus there is little reason to hold such a difficult
position. I now turn to present what I take to be the lesson learned from all these considerations,
namely, that both strong and weak non-causalism have difficulties that render them undesirable
positions, despite their effective criticism of causalist rivals. This conclusion will leave space for
a new non-causal argument, that takes the strengths of Ginet’s weak non-causalism but avoids
the general difficulties that non-causalism faces.
Ginet’s weak non-causalism failed to address the linkage objection and raised concerns
about unparsimonious radically disjunctive explanations. Strong non-causalists avoid these
problems by holding a more radical view. They deny the very grounds that allow for the causalist
criticisms of Ginet. After all, both the linkage objection and the unparsimonious concern gain
purchase on Ginet because he agrees that unfree actions can be caused. The strong non-causalist
denies this, and instead claims that all actions are uncaused.42 This, however, requires the strong
non-causalists to establish that the burden of proof is on the causalist. This is the spirit of the
causalists’ origination objection. The origination objection challenges the strong non-causalists
to explain how it can be the case that such uncaused events appear in the world if there is no
causal explanation for their existence. That is, it claims that the burden of proof is on the strong
non-causalist. Though this objection primarily targets the strong non-causal theories, it is worth
noting that since Ginet thinks that free action must be uncaused, the origination objection would
still apply to his account of free action.

42

Many strong non-causalists also claim that, because all our choices are uncaused, many, and perhaps all, of our
voluntary actions are free. This broadminded libertarianism, if you will, is a distinctive feature of both McCann and
Goetz’s views, however, we should be careful not to state it too strongly. For example, Goetz still thinks that actions
can be determined, however, it is on non-causal teleological grounds that they are determined. In general, I have
avoided discussing the different libertarian views of the non-causalists since this needlessly complicates my central
project of examining the nature of action as such.
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As I showed above, there are basically two positive strategies pursued by the strong noncausalists at this point. First, they can motivate a sharp dichotomy between our “practical” and
“theoretical” perspective. Since, by their lights, the practical perspective is not explainable in
causal terms and since we are very committed to the practical perspective, we are thus justified
in believing that our actions are uncaused. This is the strategy that McCann utilizes. Second, they
can try to argue from independent reasons that we should accept that our actions have a unique
uncaused character as a matter of their essence. Hence, any theory that attempts to do justice to
the phenomenon human action would have to be a non-causal theory. This is the strategy that
Goetz deploys.
Again, as argued above, these strong non-causalist arguments do not adequately address
the burden shifting requirement. I focused on Goetz’s attempt to ground this argument in a
certain ontology of mental powers and how this was supposed to provide evidence that our
actions must be uncaused. This argument failed to provide the support that Goetz proposed. The
strong non-causalist could, however, dig in their heels at this point and maintain that their
positions are not unreasonable. Even if they do not have a full non-question begging argument
for their starting assumptions that does not, by itself, undermine the viability of their theory.
Indeed, at various places both McCann and Goetz do exactly this, adverting to tu quoque
responses as well as claiming their opponents “beg the question.”
I noted these responses with an unfavorable tone throughout the above discussion, but it
is important to clarify why I believe such responses are inadequate. This gets to the central
problem with many contemporary non-causal responses and how they fit into the overall
causalist/non-causalist discussion. I contend that such responses contribute to a “dialectical
stalemate” that undermines the development of the action theory debate as a whole.
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2.1 Dialectical Stalemates
The term “dialectical stalemate” was made popular by Fischer (1994; 2006), who used it
in the context of discussing the free will debate. Fischer (2006) says a dialectical stalemate is a
situation in which some argument or family of arguments cannot be given further support
without begging the question against an opponent of that argument. Any decisive evidence either
for or against the argument would presume the very thing under disagreement.43 Fischer
concludes that, “one of the most salient characteristics of a perennial philosophical problem is
that it involves a Dialectical Stalemate. Further, it seems that the free will problem is a true
philosophical classic in part because it is an environment rich with in Dialectical Stalemates” (p.
84).44
The philosophical debates concerning the nature of action and causation’s relation to it
are a good example of just such a “perennial philosophical problem.” Furthermore, the strong
non-causalist strategies described above are examples of the kind of strategies that lead to
dialectical stalemates. After all, Goetz explicitly admits that there are no strategies for defending

Fischer considers, as an example, the claim—implicit in Van Inwagen’s famous consequence argument—that if
both the past and the laws of nature are not up to us then if they jointly entail a unique future that future is also not
up to us. This is an instance of a more general principle called the Transfer of Powerlessness principle, which states,
roughly, that if X is not up to us, and X entails Y, and X’s entailing Y is not up to us, then Y is also not up to us.
Fischer imagines that someone might attempt to decisively undermine the principle by pointing to an ordinary
context, like S mows the lawn at t2, and determinism obtains. The opponent to Transfer then alleges that it is obvious
that S can at t2 refrain from mowing the lawn. Though this example, if plausible, provides a decisive reason to reject
Transfer it does so by begging the question against the incompatibilist. One cannot simply assume that although
determinism obtains S is able to refrain from mowing the lawn at t2 no matter how obvious the proposed example is
supposed to be.
44
There is a related dialectical impasse that is not vicious, though perhaps more frustrating. It is sometimes summed
up with the dictum “one philosopher’s modus ponens is another philosopher’s modus tollens” often attributed to
Putnam (1994, p. 280). When this happens the proponent of conclusion, C, might argue. If P then C, obviously P,
therefore C; in contrast the opponent of C might agree that If P then C, but obviously not-C, therefore not-P. This is
not flatfootedly question begging, but it can still lead to a stagnation of the dialectic as people debate the
obviousness of the truth of premises. Further, one might worry that at this point a true dialectical stalemate will
follow. For, it is hard to see how one could establish the obviousness of one of those premises without begging the
question for the opponent.
43
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his view that are not question begging. The deeper question here, however, is whether this is a
problem.
Goetz (2008), as a representative strong non-causalist example, seems to think that such
stalemates are no great loss. As he claims, “any philosophical position must start somewhere,
and in the case of views about [non-causal] freedom, that somewhere is with certain fundamental
experiences of being an agent of a particular kind” (p. 5). He explicitly calls this a kind of
“stalemate” but contends that the best one can do is provide the relevant defensive arguments.45
McCann (2012) suggests a similar response. He claims that non-causalist like him take the
practical perspective seriously, despite the inability of reconciling it with our best causal
understanding of the natural world (pp. 255-261).
There are two reasons to consider dialectical stalemates an undesirable outcome for any
philosophical debate: (i.) they undermine the ideal goal of philosophical debate and (ii.) they
require us to posit an error theory for why there is a stalemate. First, the idealized goal of
philosophical debate is to arrive at an intersubjective, stable, and reflective judgment about the
phenomenon under consideration, which by its very intersubjectivity, stability and reflectiveness
is most likely to be true. Put in less technical terms, the ideal aim of philosophical debate is to
arrive at truth via reflective consensus building among the various parties of a philosophical
dispute.46 If this is the ideal then the dialectical stalemates are, as such, non-ideal and bad for that

45

This penchant for burden shifting is even more clear is his discussion of Davidson style objections to noncausalism, in particular those offered by Mele. In that discussion Goetz (2008) says, “before proceeding further, it is
important to make clear that my treatment of Davidson’s argument is strictly defensive in nature. In other words, it
is not my point to prove or argue for the view that the reasons that explain choices cannot be causes of those choices.
I cannot provide such a proof, but this inability is not relevant, after all, it is Davidson who has claimed that unless
one accepts a causal understanding of reasons, one cannot account for the distinction between having a reason and
choosing with it and having a reason and choosing because of it” (p. 45).
46
These two sentences make enormous claims regarding the nature and purpose of philosophical methodology that I
recognize are controversial. I am without space to argue in detail on behalf of this approach, as such I hope their
intuitive plausibility as at least one viable articulation of the ideal goals of philosophical argument is useful. I frame
philosophical method in this way by drawing on Rawls’ reflective equilibrium methodology as well as his claim that
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reason. It is possible, however, that this badness is merely a feature of some intrinsic limitation
in the subject matter of this particular debate, rendering it non-ideal in a less pernicious way. For
example, it is in some sense non-ideal that we cannot ensure that we never make a mistake in our
reasoning, however, this badness is merely an intrinsic limitation of our status as human
reasoners and thus not a matter to lose sleep over. As such, when evaluating the dialectical merits
of arguments that entail stalemates it matters why and how a debate has arrived at that point.
Given the above considerations, there are at least two options: (1) fundamental
experiences, which ground the starting premises between these two views in action theory, are
irreconcilable because one side is fundamentally deceived. (2) both sides have a partly veridical
understanding of the phenomena under discussion and because of this they are reticent to let go
of their views in the face of potential counter-examples. If so, then the stalemate indicates that an
alternative view that synthesizes the successful bits of each theory is to be preferred.
Both possibilities are, in a sense, bad. But, scenario (1) is tragically bad, because it means
that the most justified response is merely to provide the best defensive arguments for your view
and hope that you are not the one who is fundamentally deceived. Notice, this is analogous to the
intrinsic limitation discussed above, since there is nothing that can be said to the agent that does
not have that experience. Unlike the intrinsic limitation, however, this is still tragic because it is
not evenly distributed across reasoners. In my intrinsic limitation example, we assume that all
agents are non-ideal in the sense that they might make mistakes in reasoning. In contrast,
scenario (1) claims that only some agents are fundamentally deceived.
political philosophy can be understood as a kind of “reconciliation.” In addition, I was motivated by Lloyd’s
discussion of the relationship between intersubjectivity and objectivity in science. For readers interested in exploring
these methodological concerns further I recommend Lloyd (1995) and Rawls (1951; 1971, pp. 19-22, p. 580; 2001,
pp. 1-5) as a starting place. To repeat what I said in the Introduction, I am not sure this is the only appropriate
philosophical methodology. Indeed, since this is an idealized conception, certain non-ideal circumstances might
require different methods. Furthermore, there might be debates that involve philosophy that are not themselves
“philosophical debates” in the technical sense and thus require different methods.
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If this is indeed the proper explanation for why the debate is in a dialectical stalemate
then a response like Goetz would be justified. The stalemate would be intractable and thus,
though non-ideal, the best we could do is provide defensive arguments and hope we are not the
deceived reasoners. Again, this is analogous to the intrinsic limitation problem discussed above
since it makes the dialectical stalemate a necessary feature of the debate and therefore to be
accommodated rather than resolved, however, it differs with respect to its badness—it is
tragically bad.
In contrast, scenario (2) is tractable. The difficulty can be resolved precisely because the
stalemate results in a certain philosophical dead-end that is psychologically difficult for the
proponents of the various views to exit. On scenario (2) what is required is not resignation but
philosophical creativity. Fischer seems to think most instances of dialectical stalemate are like
scenario (2); however, I agree with Goetz that scenarios like (1) are possible. Given this, we
must ask, what does this tragic badness of scenario (1) consist in? How is it different from mere
non-ideal limitation? By answering these questions, we can begin to determine if we have
reached a point in the given dialectic wherein we are justified in accepting the stalemate as
inevitable.
Roughly, scenario (1) is tragically bad because it requires doubt in two directions. First, it
requires that one fundamentally doubt the status of your opponent as a knower. You must assume
they are fundamentally deceived and thus the philosophical ideal of intersubjective, reflective,
consensus is unavailable as such. Furthermore, it requires you doubt your own view. By this I do
not mean the normal doubt that you might be in error and must be corrected. Instead, you must
consider that you are fundamentally deceived. Again, like your philosophical opponent your
status as a knower might be fundamentally flawed. Thus, if we are in this situation with respect
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to a dialect stalemate then the very possibility of arriving at truth via argument—since as I
claimed earlier truth just is arrived at via stable, intersubjective, and reflective, judgement—is
undermined. Put differently, if our view is, in fact, true we come to its truth (in some sense)
accidentally and we justifiably hold it to be true only because all views so situated, even
contradictory views, could also be justifiably held.47
This state is undesirable and, as such, it puts pressure on any claim that the dialectic is
intractable because of such a fundamental difference in starting premises. If one can achieve the
desideratum of your position without contributing to such an intractable stalemate then it is both
reasonable to prefer this outcome and, furthermore, the norms of philosophical dialectic require
that one pursue such a theory.
This, then, is the first reason why the strong non-causalist contribution to dialectic
stalemate should motivate us to seek an alternative view that still captures what is appealing
about non-causalism but does not undermine the philosophical dialectic itself. There is, however,
a more mundane reason. The strong non-causalist view requires establishing an error theory for
why their initial premises, that the causalist beg, are not as self-evident for their causalist
opponents. All the strong non-causalist offer something like this, with McCann’s attempt being
the most nuanced. Error theories, however, are both difficult to produce and are generally
thought to be justified only as a last resort. Furthermore, one might deploy a “parsimonious”
objection. If one could explain why we’ve arrived at a dialectical stalemate and then resolve the
stalemate all without adverting to an error theory this solution would be simpler then crafting
both a theory and an error theory for why your opponent does not share your initial premises.

47

This is assuming again that we are in the situation described by Goetz where all contradictory entailments are
avoided or resolved and all that is at stake is a fundamental premise that cannot be argued for.
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To summarize, the strong non-causalist response is undesirable because the sort of
dialectical stalemate it entails both makes its philosophical defense unparsimonious and, more
seriously, because it undermines the ideal of philosophical dialectic as such. Of course, as noted
above, it is possible that this undesirable position is, in fact, the correct one and our situation is
just tragic. However, the above considerations should motivate us to only accept this conclusion
after we’ve attempted to (a) provide an alternative account of the dialectical stalemate and (b)
provide an alternative synthetic theory that attempts to resolve the stalemate without losing what
is desirable in current theories.
My task, then, is to establish (a) and (b). In the remainder of this chapter I argue for (a)
by showing that the dialectical stalemate between causalists and non-causalists is endemic to
current non-causal theories because of their reliance on experiential premises that necessarily
obscure and thus plant a seed of incomprehensibility that can only be addressed by adverting to
the tragic stalemate described above. This incomprehensibility objection identifies the ground of
dialectical stalemate and thus provides a clue to how this situation might be resolved.
Furthermore, Ginet stands as an outlier among the non-causalists I consider, insofar as his weak
non-causalism seems to avoid the central thrust of the incomprehensibility objection. I argue,
however, that this actually highlights why the objection works against other non-causal theories
and in turn reveals that Ginet’s own attempt has similar flaws that avoid the objection only
accidently. Having established (a) I then turn in the next chapter—chapter 3—to the project of
(b), establishing an alternative account that avoids the dialectical stalemate while simultaneously
maintaining the strengths of the current accounts.
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2.2 The Incomprehensibility Challenge
Why, then, do these strong non-causal views lead to dialectical stalemates? I contend,
first, that all the proceeding strong non-causals accounts share an argumentative structure that is
crucial for their positive accounts. They all depend on, what I call, experiential arguments to
support the conclusion that our simple mental acts, or decisions, or choices, are uncaused.
Consider again, for example, the following passages from McCann, and Goetz:
It is self-contradictory for me to assert that I inadvertently or accidentally decide
anything, or to pretend that I am ever passive in deciding . . . The positive marks of this
are two. First, deciding has in our phenomenal experience an inherent spontaneity. When
we decide we feel that we are doing rather than being done to, that we are being active
rather than passive. Second, deciding is intrinsically intentional: when we decide we
mean to be deciding, and we mean to decide exactly as we do. (McCann 2012, p. 254.)
[A choice] is simply immediately apprehended or experienced by its agent as intrinsically
active in nature and, thereby, as uncaused, because what is intrinsically active is
essentially uncaused . . . Though a choice, unlike an experience of pain, lacks any
qualitative feel, I think the view that it too has a nonrelational, intrinsically active nature
that is introspectively accessible to its agent is bolstered by an epistemological datum of
mental action . . . it is an epistemological feature of an agent who knows that he is
making a choice that he knows this while he is choosing . . . if he knows in this way that
he is choosing, then it seems to follow that choosing is intrinsically different from a mere
happening or passive event and that he is aware of this difference. (Goetz 2008, pp.1112)
These passages offer key defenses of non-causal positions against a causal skepticism. In them,
the authors appeal to experiential data as crucial evidence for their non-causal account. Our
simple mental actions are experienced as intrinsically active and this provides evidence that any
causal account must be inadequate.
From this general frame we can see two important claims affirmed by all strong noncausalists. First, the nature of a mental event is introspectively accessible to us. This claim,
though bold, is in line with other common claims in philosophy of mind, particularly in the
discussions of qualia. Of course, simple mental acts do not have qualia in this same sense of
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pain but I take the non-causalist to be making a similar point. Simple mental acts are known or
are referred to by reference to our experience of them in acting and any theory that attempts to
abstract away from this detail is, in the words of Frankfurt “[directing] attention exclusively
away from the events whose natures are at issue, and away from the times at which they occur.”
(Frankfurt, cited in Goetz). It is constitutive of simple mental acts that they are active and this
active nature must be considered.
Second, the strong non-causalists rule out, indiscriminately, all extrinsic relationships as
a possible explanation for the essence of simple mental acts. Though the target of their
arguments is causation as understood by causalists, even non-causal relations, if extrinsic, are
unsuitable candidates for explaining simple mental acts by the lights of these considerations.
Furthermore, the non-causalists have implicitly suggested that there are no other intrinsic
features that could define these acts other than their active nature. Hence, theorist like McCann
are left with the experiential features to wholly define the nature of such actions, whereas Goetz
tries to say a bit more by positing it as a conceptual truth that exercising a mental power entails
such active experiences.
Before examining how this contributes to the dialectical stalemate, it is important to note
that Ginet makes similar claims. Though Ginet’s weak non-causalism allows for extrinsic causal
relations to explain the existence of our simple mental acts, he too believes that such relations are
not sufficient for explaining the nature of action. Indeed, his claims regarding what makes an
event an action similarly appeal to intrinsic and experiential features of agency (consider his
extended discussion of mentally saying the French word peu rather than having it come unbidden
to your mind). Again, as he states:
The mental act has what we may call (for lack of a better term) an actish
phenomenal quality. This is an extremely familiar quality, recognizable in all mental
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actions . . . This quality is intrinsic to and inseparable from the occurrence of the word in
my mind when I mentally say it. It belongs to the manner in which the word occurs in my
mind and is not a distinct phenomenon that precedes or accompanies the occurrence of
the word. (Ginet, 1990 p. 13)
This means that even though there is an important difference between Ginet’s views and those of
the strong non-causalists there is a commonality as well, one that I consider again below.
First, returning to the strong non-causalists, I claim that their reliance on experiential premises
contributes to the dialectical stalemate between causalist and non-causalist theories. If an
approach depends on experiential datum that is disputable, there is a sense in which such a view
is required to move to a “begging the question” style response. If one of your premises is not,
really, open for debate this pushes the dialectic into a position where the real point of contention
is whether the relevant experiential datum is what is experienced or how such datum might be
illusory. From this argumentative dead-end there is no easy way out—a genuine dialectical
stalemate.
McCann (2012) articulates this worry well by recognizing a fundamental divide between
the, so-called, “theoretical perspective” and the “practical perspective” exemplified in the noncausalism debate (pp. 251-253). He admits, it is unclear how experientially grounded views
could fit with our causally informed understanding of the natural world in a manner that was
explanatorily satisfying for someone who didn’t share the non-causalists’ experience. I call this
gap in explanation the incomprehensibility challenge. It is important to note that this is not a
counter-example nor is it a strong objection in the logical sense. Rather, the incomprehensibility
challenge is a worry about explanatory mysteriousness and how this mysteriousness engenders
the philosophical dead-end of dialectical stalemates. My claim is that the strong non-causalists’
very retreat into an unarguable “begging the question” style defense is made rational by the
experiential heart of their arguments—how else might you defend one’s experience if it diverges
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from your opponents? Thus, the road to dialectical stalemate is, though not entailed, at least
endemic to strong non-causal views.
I return now to the weak non-causalist position. As I’ve shown above, the strong noncausalists arguments against the possibility of some actions being caused are ineffectual because
they support their key and most controversial premises by Kripkean style reasoning that doesn’t
hold-up under scrutiny. In responses to this the strong non-causalists can still retreat into purely
defensive arguments that accuse their opponent of begging the question. I also argued above that
this strategy is undesirable because of how it contributes to dialectical stalemates, furthermore,
these stalemates are an endemic feature of the strong noncausalist argumentative strategy
because they rely on experiential datum to ground key claims regarding action—this last claim is
what I call the incomprehensibility challenge. With this in mind, how does weak non-causalism
fair?
I follow Ginet and Palmer in thinking that the weak non-causalist position is defensible
against many standard causalist objections. I do, however, think that Ginet’s version does not
have an adequate response either to Clarke’s version of the linkage objection or worries about
parsimony. At first glance, it seems that Ginet at least avoids the charge of dialectical stalemate
that I raised before. Once one examines many of the standard criticisms of Ginet’s view,
however, it becomes clear that underlying worries about the obscurity of experiential premises
remain. These kinds of criticisms come from two directions. First, as in the criticisms examined
above, Ginet’s opponents sometimes focus on how the phenomenal quality he describes is too
thin to provide an adequate explanation for what makes an event into an action. Second, insofar
as free action is uncaused on his view, opponents can raise similar concerns regarding the
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obscurity of phenomenal premises and how they might explain the production of actions. In
short, the reliance on experiential evidence generates much skepticism, even in Ginet.
As O’Connor (2000) notes, “[Ginet’s style of non-causalism] is implausible, in much the
same way that phenomenalism about physical reality is implausible: seemings are not sufficient
for realities.” (p. 26). Lurking behind this claim is a concern that non-causal accounts are either
empty or unnatural. For example, though Ginet (1990) contends that non-causalists use
productive language (e.g. ‘doing,’ ‘making’ etc.) in a radically qualified manner (pp. 13-14),
causalists, like O’Connor (2000) claim that such non-causal explanations are merely parasitic on
implicit causal notions (pp. 25-26). Pereboom (2014) makes a similar point (pp. 39-43).
Further, skeptics claim uncaused events cannot fit into our causally structured
understanding of the natural world. O’Connor (2000) claims such uncaused events would, given
the assumption that fundamental physical processes are causally connected, be inconsistent with
both materialist and emergent dualist accounts (p. 27). Presumably because of how it intruded in
the “naturalistic” causal chain. Kane (1996) makes a similar claim stating that, in the case of free
action, causal explanations must be part of the story for actions to fit into the natural order (p.
174). Ginet (2014) responds to these concerns by pointing out there is no a priori reason to hold
that kind of skepticism (p. 25). While I agree with Ginet’s sentiment, I note that his response
comes close to the kind of “question begging” defensive strategy pursued by the strong noncausalists. As noted above, this defensive strategy is undesirable, all other things equal, because
of how it contributes to dialectical stalemates.
The fact that Ginet’s views are not as obscure as the strong non-causalists does point us
towards a potential solution. Ginet’s weak non-causalism allows for the possibility of extrinsic
relations—in this case causal relations—for bringing about actions. This means that, minimally,
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there is no explanatory mystery regarding how an (unfree) action is brought about, even if what
makes it an action appeals to something experiential. This explanatory power partly explains why
the causalist responses to Ginet must be more nuanced (e.g. Clarke, Mele, etc.). It becomes
obscure precisely where Ginet starts to rely on experiential datum to do philosophically
explanatory work regarding the nature of action and production of free action. Hence, if a noncausalists wants to avoid the charge of incomprehensibility they should avoid relying on
experiential datum as the primary explanatory feature and consider the possibility of non-causal
extrinsic relations.
The experiential premises used in non-causal theories of action are obscure and merely
relying on contrary intuitions is unlikely to persuade many philosophers. Since it is in actions
that agents interact with our causally structured reality explaining actions with something
incomprehensible from this theoretical perspective is especially unsatisfying. So, given the
incomprehensibility challenge’s force, it is important for non-causalists to craft a more plausible
positive account. This establishes (a), which—as I mentioned above—is an alternative account of
dialectical stalemates that shows how non-causal theories contribute to their existence. Now the
ground is clear to establish (b), which is a theory that resolves the dialectical stalemate without
losing what is valuable in current theories. In chapter 3, I argue for such a view at length. I
propose that non-causal theories ought to embrace extrinsic non-causal metaphysical relations,
like essential metaphysical dependence, to explain how uncaused actions can both belong to the
agent and be part of our causally structured understanding of the world.
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CHAPTER 3: ACTION AS ESSENTIAL METAPHYSICAL DEPENDENCE
Let me briefly take stock of where the argument stands before turning to my essential
metaphysical dependence account of action. What makes the event of my walking around the
block an action of mine rather than merely an event I am the subject of or, more impersonally, a
mere happening in the world? I distinguish this from the related question, “what does it mean to
act for reasons?” The first sort of question is about defining what an action is and the second sort
is about understanding what it is to act for a reason. In many accounts of action these questions
collapse together. For example, on many standard views reasons, conceived as causes, both
provide action explanation (e.g. answer the question, “why did you do x?”) and reveal what
makes an event count as an action (e.g. answer the question, “what defines x?”).48 A further
question regarding action is , “what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for x?”, this is a
broader question than the definitional question though they are related.
In this chapter, my primary goal is to provide a unique non-causal answer to the question
“what makes an event count as an action?” First, in §1, I review the traditional accounts of action
from chapter 1 and chapter 2 and my reasons for rejecting them. In §2, I present my initial
account of action as essential metaphysical dependence and clarify the mental ontology that my
account presupposes. I then turn, in §3, to explain key concepts used in my definition, including
dependence, essence, grounding, and their relationship with causation. Once these things are
clarified, I articulate in §4 the final version of my account. In §5 I argue first that my account
successfully meets non-causal desideratum and then defend it against causalist objection. Finally,
in §6 and §7 I consider three significant criticisms of my account—the circularity objection, the

48

I note that the sense of definition I am appealing to here is not merely semantic or conceptual. I follow Fine in
thinking that there is a more metaphysically laden sense of definition (owing to Aristotle) that involves coming to
terms with what an entities essence or identity might be.
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control objection, and doubts about its compatibility with causation—and provide arguments to
show that they are unsuccessful.
1.

A Brief Recap
What sorts of events are the appropriate target for defining actions? As noted in chapter

1, mental events, which always underlie our overt physical actions, are the basic events that we
are attempting to understand. As argued in previous chapters, there are four different ways to
answer the definitional question regarding action:
(1) Extrinsic Causal Accounts: Event, e, is an action of an agent, S, iff e is caused (in an
appropriate way) by some other appropriate state, s1 (e.g. desire and belief, or
intention).
(2) Intrinsic Event-mediated Causal Accounts: Event, e, is an action iff S is the subject
of an agent-involving event, e1, and e1 causes e, such that e consists in S causing
something via e1.
(3) Intrinsic Agential Causal Accounts: Event, e, is an action iff S directly causes e as a
substance rather than as the subject of an event.
(4) Non-causal Accounts: Event, e, is an action iff e has an intrinsic non-causal feature
or arises from an appropriate non-causal power. (e.g. e has an actish phenomenal
quality; e is a non-causal result of an agent’s active power to choose, etc.)
I pause to re-emphasize that the difference between extrinsic causal accounts (e.g. 1) and
intrinsic causal accounts (e.g. 2, and 3) lies in how the causal relation explains why an event
counts as an action. Extrinsic theories say that an event is an action because it is caused by S in
an appropriate way; in contrast, intrinsic causal theories claim that an event is an action because
it consists of S’s causing something. Thus, extrinsic accounts are so named because what makes
an event an action is something external to the act—namely, how it was caused. In contrast,
intrinsic accounts are so named because what makes an event an action is internal to the act—the
action itself consists in S causing something. In my discussion, in chapters 1 and 2, I considered
reasons to reject all of these proposals.
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Again, to briefly recap: definitions like (1) are subject to counter-examples, in part
because of how difficult it is to specify the “appropriate” causal relation between the desire and
belief or intention and the mental event it is supposed to make into an action.
On proposal (2) the event described in this analysis is described either as a desire-belief
pair or as a neural event. If it is a desire-belief pair then familiar counter-examples regarding
acting without the relevant desire or belief or intention arise.49 If it is a neural-event then there is
a dilemma. On the one hand, since neural events are opaque to the agent, they would be
unjustified in claiming they acted since they have no knowledge of the event that makes a mental
event into an action. On the other hand, claiming that neural events are identical with occurrent
mental events that initiate action leads to a regress. In attempting to define action, we would have
merely said that mental events are actions just in case they are caused by agent-involving neural
events that are also actions (for, to try to act is to act, as Ginet points out). Either way, the
proposal fails.
Definition (3) does better by ascribing to the agent a direct causal link that then makes
the mental event, e, into an action. These agent-causal views, however, are inadequate for several
reasons. First, it is unclear how agent-causal views can successfully respond to the explanatory
challenges raised by Broad, among others. More directly, the obtaining of an agent-causal
relation is not explainable in causal terms on pain of a regress. But, if the relation stops at some
point then it seems the ultimate explanation for agential control is non-causal, the very thing the
agent causalist is attempting to avoid.
Definition (4) is, I believe, on the right track. What makes a mental event an action must
be non-causal. There are two reasons for this: first, because the distinctive practical character of
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Such counter-examples, I note, would also undermine proposal (1).
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mental acts does not imply or require causal explanations and instead is in tension with such
explanations; second, because the counter-examples to causal accounts of what makes a mental
event into an action are compelling and wide ranging.
Current non-causal proposals, however, are inadequate. In chapter 2 I argued that noncausal views assume a dialectical position that typifies what Fischer (1994; 2006) calls a
“dialectical stalemate.” This problem is worse for strong non-causalism. Strong non-causalists
assume that the perspective of agency is unreconcilable to our causally informed understandings
of the natural world, thus, criticisms of their view amount to mere question begging. Goetz
admits this strategy, noting openly that all his defensive arguments involve either accusing his
opponent of begging the question or a tu quoque response. These sorts of responses are
unsatisfying and causalists are rightly suspicious that the non-causalists are merely avoiding and
not addressing their criticisms.
In contrast, weak non-causalism attempts to find common ground with the causalist by
conceding that the non-causal features that define action are compatible with the “causal nexus”
of nature. Such weak non-causal views, however, are undermined by arguments that show noncausalist explanations are superfluous. For example, in chapter 2 I argue that Ginet’s account
does not adequately address criticisms raised by Clarke regarding the explanatory connection
between intentions and actions. Moreover, even when discussing free action Ginet’s attempts to
articulate a response to the “unnaturalness” objection is at best a sketch. Still, his sketch is
suggestive, as he says:
“Nature has held many surprises. I see no a priori reason for thinking it impossible that
one surprise nature might hold in store for us is that some events are not caused, that
empirical investigation will persuade us that the best account of the laws of nature
dictates for some kinds of events that their antecedents do not causally produce them but
only limit what the ensuing event will be to one or another of a certain proper subset of
these metaphysical possibilities.” (p. 25)
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My argument fills the gap Ginet gestures towards. I explain, more adequately, what these
“limiting” conditions might be and how they interact with the causal structure of the world. I
argue these conditions are best conceived of as metaphysical dependence relations and they
provide the best explanation for what makes mental events into actions. Moreover, I argue that
the phenomenal or experiential evidence utilized (in different ways) by McCann, Goetz, and
Ginet provides evidence for this underlying dependence relation and is not, by itself, sufficient
for defining action.
2. Action as Essential Metaphysical Dependence
My view is motivated by two primary concerns. First, there is something correct about
the agential focus of agent-causal views. Regardless of the inadequacy of agent-causal accounts,
tying action directly to the agent is important for both explaining the nature of action and
maintaining morally substantive agency. Second, the non-causal arguments against wholly causal
explanations of action are insightful and offer the best explanation for the distinctive character of
our practical lives. My theory provides a definition of action that unites these two insights. I
begin by articulating my essential dependence account in rough form. I then explain in detail the
components of my account (e.g. metaphysical dependence relations, interactive mental
properties, etc.). Finally, I consider potential objections.
Minds have mental properties. These properties are correlated with functions of the mind.
For example, plausibly, minds have properties that give rise to mental processes that involve
responding to the world, such as belief formation, perception, and desires. In like manner, minds
have properties that govern mental processes that involve interacting with the world, such as
intention formation, willing, and deliberation. These two kinds of properties, “responsive
properties” and “interactive properties,” roughly track the distinction that Goetz discusses
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between “capacities” and “powers,” I avoid using that terminology for two reasons. First, these
words connote more than is warranted. In particular, the language of “powers” has a distinct
“causal” flavor. To avoid such connotations, I speak of these properties in terms of whether they
respond or interact with the world while avoiding any suggestions about the nature of these
connections.50 Second, Goetz suggests these are exhaustive categories for mental activity. I am
not so confident that I have access, introspectively or otherwise, to the nature of all of the mental
properties that exist in minds. As such, my claim regarding mental ontology is rather limited: (i.)
there are mental properties (ii.) there are at least two types of mental properties that are
differentiated by how they relate with the external world: responsive properties and interactive
properties.51
Given this mental ontology, I return to the central question: what makes a mental event
into an action? My account, roughly, is as follows:
Action as Essential Metaphysical Dependence (version 1.): A mental event e is an
action iff e essentially metaphysically depends on interactive mental properties, P.
This means that when we have an intention, for example, there is an associated mental event
“deciding” by which we formed that intention, which counts as an action of ours by virtue of
essentially depending on the interactive property (or interactive mental properties) possessed by
minds. In like manner, my following an action plan or deciding a course of action has an
associated mental event, a “volition”, that is an action of mine by virtue of essentially depending
on an interactive property possessed by minds.

One might worry that “interaction” also has causal connotations. I do not share this intuition, it seems to me that
we have many examples of non-causal interactions in pure or abstract domains (i.e. mathematical or geometric
relationships; logical connections, etc.), however, it suffices for the reader to recognize that by “interact” I do not
necessarily mean something causal I merely mean to point out that there is a relationship of some sort between the
properties involved and the world.
51
A brief word of metaphysical caution: we should not allow our ability to conceptually distinguish between
“responsive properties” and “interactive properties” to give the false impression that these mental properties are
separable or otherwise deeply divided faculties. Clearly these properties work together in complex ways.
50
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I described these the interactive mental property by pointing to the functional role it plays
in interacting with the world. One tempting way to characterize this entire category is as the
reasons-responsive mechanism of minds. That is, to think of the “interactive mental property” as
the property that contributes to (or perhaps constitutes) the reasons-responsive mechanism of
minds. This terminology is somewhat unfortunate since “response” connotes an overly passive
stance towards the reasons that an agent is confronted with. There is a deeper reason, however,
for resisting this characterization. As I argued in chapter 2, reducing agency to some sort of
underlying mechanism leaves theories of action unable to adequately explain actions. Given this,
though there are important overlaps between my conception of “interactive mental properties”
and what some compatibilists call the “reasons-responsive mechanism,” I do not believe it is
helpful to characterize the properties in those terms.52 Instead, the properties I am discussing are
best understood as those properties that constitute our agency and they should therefore be
treated non-reductively.
Given my view, a natural criticism is that my talk of “interactive properties” is armchair
psychology at its worst. I should be able to name the kind of properties I am talking about, says
the skeptic, and if I cannot then such metaphysical extravagances are unwarranted. After all, I am
not a neuroscientist discovering features of the mind and, as such, positing something’s existence
would be ad hoc.
I concur that defining into existence novel features of the mind would be ad hoc. Hence, I
claim that these “interactive properties” are merely a specification of mental elements to which

McKenna (2013) raises a similar criticism against compatibilist views, like Fischer and Ravizza’s (1999), which
appeal to “reason-responsive mechanisms.” McKenna’s (2013) objection is that a mechanism-based account of
reasons-responsiveness requires a principled basis for mechanism individuation, but the viability of such a project is
doubtful given the level of plasticity the mechanism needs in these accounts (p. 170). McKenna goes on to propose
his own “agent-based” reasons-responsive theory, with which my “agency-first” account shares some similarities.
52
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we are already committed. I explain this, first, by noting some general features of properties that
are in the background of my discussion. Second, I examine some specific features of mental
properties that make my view plausible and in-line with our current understanding of minds.
Properties are entities which can be “predicated of” or “exemplified by” objects (or other
entities).53 So, when I say of an object that it is “blue” and “spherical” I’ve “predicated” or
attributed both of these properties to that object. Furthermore, if my claims are true then that
thing “exemplifies” those properties of “blueness” and “sphericalness”—a blue ball, for
example. Properties are not events. The exemplification of a property may be an event (e.g. my
coming to exemplify the property of “redness” is the same as the event of my being doused with
red paint) and events themselves might have properties (e.g. the event of the explosion had
properties like “bombing” or “white fire,” etc.), but properties themselves are not events. Indeed,
many properties are going to be states or state-like. For example, once the tree exemplifies the
property of “greenness” (an event) it will remain “green” (a state) until it changes to “yellow”
(an event).
Finally, it is important to note that, in general, properties can stand in relations with each
other. Consider the property of “color.” It can be predicated of an object (e.g. as in the sentence,
“that object is ‘colored’”) and it can be exemplified by an object (e.g. that object is, in fact,
“colored”). An object does not, however, exemplify the property “color” as such. Instead, to
exemplify “color” an object must exemplify one of its determinates, like “blue.” In
contemporary parlance, “color” is a determinable and blue is a determinate. Blue specifies color.

53

Of course, as with most things in metaphysics, there are deep question concerning whether properties exist at all.
And, if so, in what manner they exist. I do not engage with those debates here, preferring to instead take a
moderately realist stance.
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There are other relationships in which properties can stand. For example, the property of
being “cuboid” entails other properties. Some mathematical or logical, like “having 90 degree
angles” or “regularity”, and some physical when it’s exemplified in an object, like “inability to
roll on a flat surface” or being “stackable.” I note that these further properties are related to the
property of being “cuboid” by entailment or dependence on that property. This makes it different
from the “color/blue” example discussed earlier.54 Finally, many of these examples show that
properties can be complex or simple. For example, this computer has the functional property of
“being a finite Turing Machine”, but that property is itself complex and composed of other more
fundamental properties.
So then, what of the “interactive mental property” that I posit? The first thing to note is
that it is meant to relate or unify a type of mental phenomena. Namely, those mental events that
are involved in interacting with the world. As such, we should ask are mental events like
“intending,” “willing,” and “attending” unified by the “interactive mental property” in the same
way that “blue,” “red,” and “green” are unified by “color”? Or, in contrast, is it more like how
having “90 degree angles” and being “stackable” are related by an object exemplifying a
“cuboid” structure? This is important because one way to read the above objection is that my
“interactive mental property” is just an empty category that unifies the phenomenon of agential
events (i.e. “willings”) by merely abstracting out their similarities without explaining them.
To use the above example, “color” is a generic or abstract property that becomes
specified and can only thereby be exemplified. If someone—a Martian let’s say—is confused
about “blueness” it is not explanatorily helpful to merely note that it is a “color.” If the
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An additional way that properties can be related to each other is through essentially dispositional properties.
Dispositional properties just are essentially functional, causal, or logical relation to another property. For example,
the property of fragility is just the disposition for something to shatter given certain stimulus conditions.
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interactive mental property is related to simple mental events in a similar manner to the
determinate/determinable relationship, then I have not really explained anything about either
mental events or the interactive mental property.
I believe that the property of interactive mentality is not merely an empty abstraction. To
show this, I offer an analogy to another commonly invoked mental property, which will clarify
the explanatory work interactive mentality does in my account. Minds like ours have the
property of consciousness. It is by virtue of this property of consciousness (or these properties of
consciousness) that we are able to experience phenomenal properties like “pain”, “the sensation
of heat”, and “redness”, for example. It is plausible that consciousness is an intrinsic and
essential property for minds like ours.
Furthermore, more specific phenomenal properties are dependent on the property of
consciousness for their exemplification.55 Consciousness is not, however, reducible to the
various and varied phenomenal properties that it enables minds like ours to experience. I contend
that a conscious mind has both the essential property of consciousness as well as the exemplified
phenomenal properties which depend on consciousness. Crucially, though these are distinct
properties and though consciousness is the more metaphysically basic (e.g. pain properties
depend on consciousness, not the other way around), epistemically speaking, we only have
access to our own property of consciousness by virtue of having experienced the dependent and
varied phenomenal properties. This should be, I think, unsurprising. The property of
consciousness is mentally fundamental for conscious minds. As I argue below in section 6.1,
when describing fundamental entities in a given domain often their essence is definable only in

I recognize that people often mean different things by the term “consciousness,” for example as Block (1995)
notes we might mean “phenomenal consciousness,” “access consciousness,” “self-consciousness,” etc. I do not
engage with these subtleties directly, but in this context I am primarily referring to phenomenal consciousness.
55
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terms of what they metaphysically ground since such fundamental entities cannot be decomposed
into elements upon which they depend in that domain.56
If this rough ontology is plausible, then we have a direct analogy to interactive mental
properties. For, just as the property of consciousness is fundamental for conscious minds, so too
is the interactive mental property fundamental to agential minds. We experience mental events
like “intending,” “willing,” and “attending,” which can be re-described as our coming to
exemplify certain agential mental properties. These properties are unified by virtue of being
dependent on (grounded in) the agentially fundamental interactive mental property, which just is
that property in virtue of which we have mental events like “intendings,” “willings,” and
“attendings”. Again, we cannot merely collapse the interactive mental property into the specific
agential events, in part because they are too varied. Just like the variety of phenomenal properties
calls for a unifying and enabling explanation, so too do the varieties of agential properties need a
ground.57
A few final clarifications. First, these categories are meant to pick-out mental events and
relationships we are familiar with both from experience and general folk psychology, but I do not
pretend this explains how they relate to neurobiology or brain structure. A metaphysical account
of mind and agency is an attempt, to misappropriate Sellars’ evocative phrase, “to understand
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To be clear, such entities might be explainable in terms of cross-domain relationships. So, for example,
fundamental mental properties might still be dependent on physical properties and thus are not fundamental in at
least one sense.
57
There is a very similar proposal in theories of emergent minds, particularly in the work of O’Connor and Wong
(2005), which posits fundamental and general mental properties that emerge and then cause further, more specific,
emergent properties. As O’Connor and Wong (2005) note, “It is plausible that there are enduring baseline mental
states that partially underwrite more specific and often momentary mental states. (Underlying one’s visual
awareness of a computer screen, e.g., is a more general state of conscious awareness that persists when one looks in
another direction. We might plausibly conjecture that underlying our entire mental lives are certain highly general
states, themselves mental in character, disposing us towards having specific sorts of mental experiences and
cognitive states in suitable circumstances)” (p. 665). I concur with O’Connor and Wong and my discussion of
“interactive properties” as those properties that fundamentally constitute our agency is, in many ways, compatible
with their picture.
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how ‘mental things’ in the broadest possible sense of the term ‘hang together’ in the broadest
possible sense of the term.” It provides interpretation that should be compatible and potentially
provable or disprovable within our best understanding of how things work, but it is not itself
(usually) an account of the mechanics of how this is to be done. To this end, my account leaves
open what underlying physical structures support these mental properties. Second, it is important
to recognize, at least in humans, how interrelated the conscious and interactive properties are and
avoid confusing distinguishability with separability. Indeed, the first-personal or subjective
awareness we have of agential mental events like “intending,” “willing”, and “attending”
depends on consciousness. This suggests that the property of consciousness is epistemically
fundamental in a way that the interactive mental property is not. Third, and finally, we should
precisely describe minds like ours as “conscious agential minds.” This highlights that in nature
these fundamental properties might be combined in different ways. In fact, it is plausible in our
own world that some very simple creatures might have agential minds but without consciousness
(e.g. some worms, some arthropods, etc.). The opposite—conscious minds with no agential
properties—though not clearly observed in our world are at least metaphysically possible.
This at least grounds the initial plausibility of the mental ontology upon which my
account is based, however, this skeletal definition still requires clarification on several points.
Most importantly, I must explain the relationship between these mental events. What are
“dependence” relations? I consider this general question in the following section, before turning
to describe essential metaphysical dependence in particular.
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3. Dependence: An Overview
Notions of “dependence” are found throughout contemporary philosophical discussions
regardless of the domain. To give some representative examples:58
Logical/mathematical: A non-empty set, [x, x2, . . xn], depends on its members ‘x,
x2, . . . xn’. A conjunction, a^b, depends on its conjuncts, ‘a’ and ‘b’.
- Metaphysical: Dispositions of an entity, x, depends on categorical features of that
entity, x. A mental state, M1, depends on a brain state, P1, for its existence. An event
depends on its participants for its occurrence.
- Nomological/ Natural: A human being depends on some of her biological organs to
live. The fact that salt is water soluble depends on Coulomb’s Law for its realization.
- Ethical/Social: An action’s rightness depends on the aggregate amount of happiness
in the absence of unhappiness it will produce. Whether a principle is just depends on
whether parties would mutually agree to uphold it under non-coercive conditions.
I do not endorse any of these representative examples as true, but they show the breadth of the
-

“dependence” idiom in contemporary philosophy. Philosophers express these dependency claims
by relational phrases, such as “because”, “by virtue of”, or “makes it the case that” as in the
sentence “the singleton set {Socrates} exist because the person Socrates exists”, or “The fact that
Socrates exists makes it the case that the singleton set {Socrates} exists, or “The singleton set
{Socrates} exists by virtue of the person Socrates.” Though theorists often give subtly different
accounts of these claims, they are all taken to be claims about what depends on what. I focus on
the metaphysical sense of dependence.
We may ask, however, whether dependence should be analyzed in terms of more familiar
metaphysical notion. As Rosen (2010) observes, though questions of dependence are prevalent
throughout philosophical debates, there are ways in which the idiom is not taken seriously on its
own terms. He argues that the general method of argumentation treats language of dependence as
serving a heuristic function. Philosophers use dependence talk to orient readers towards their
preferred philosophical thesis, and then dispense with dependence talk in favor of difference
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This list is inspired by the examples given in Rosen (2010) and Raven (2015).
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formulations when it comes time to explain the relation in detail. The thought is, according to
Rosen (2010), that these widespread idioms are “ultimately too unclear or too confused, or
perhaps simply too exotic to figure in our first-class philosophical vocabulary” (p. 110). Instead,
Rosen says, philosophers often reinterpret dependence with modal concepts such as metaphysical
necessity or supervenience.
Schaffer (2009) makes a similar observation and gives an historical explanation of this
tendency among contemporary philosophers. According to Schaffer there is a fundamental
philosophical divide between different contemporary approaches to metaphysics. By Schaffer’s
lights, most metaphysicians follow the dominant Quinean view which holds metaphysics to be
concerned primarily with questions of existence (e.g. do properties exist?, whether meanings
exist?, do numbers exist? Etc.). Contrast this with a neo-Aristotelian view which focuses on how
things exist. What are the relationships between entities? What depends on what? Given the
dominance of Quinean style metaphysics in the contemporary era questions of dependence are
not given priority. Thus, Schaffer speculates, though there is a resurgence of dependence style
questions in contemporary metaphysics, the background methodology is unsuited to these new
concepts and so people prefer to reinterpret the concept in familiar modal terms.59
This brief historical account by Rosen and Schaffer raise three important questions
regarding dependence in general. First, can dependence be analyzed in terms of another notion
(e.g. modal necessity, essence, etc.)? Second, assuming dependence does stand on its own, then

As Wilson (2014) notes, however, this “just so story” about how metaphysical dependence is much discussed yet
undertheorized is exaggerated. Questions of dependence have been discussed in detail they just are often taken up in
specific discussions regarding metaphysical relations that bare on problems in philosophy of mind, physicalism,
reduction, and fundamentality rather than the generic question of dependence that is presumed in discussions of the
grounding relation. I partly agree with Wilson that the discussion of grounding has been, at times, too imprecise and
even historically naïve. I hold a hybrid view. I agree with the pluralists (like Wilson) that dependence relations are
specified within the context of a particular metaphysical puzzle, however, I also agree with the unitary theorists (like
Schaffer) that these specific relations are species of the genus called “grounding.” How I reconcile these things is
discussed below.
59
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what are the unique metaphysical and explanatory claims that characterize dependence and how
are they related? Third, supposing that dependence supports unique metaphysical and
explanatory claims what is their appropriate expression? That is, what is the logic of
dependence?
Both Rosen and Schaffer advocate taking seriously the language of dependence and posit
a novel metaphysical relation, called “grounding”, to make sense of the disparate talk of
dependence. Their thought is that dependence is a unique notion that is not reducible to other
concepts and thus should be analyzed on its own terms. Such a view of dependence is “robust” in
that it takes dependence to be irreducible to non-dependence talk, in contrast to “deflationary”
accounts of dependence. I too hold a robust view of dependence, however, the sort of
dependence relation I apply to action theory is only a species of grounding and so different from
the pure grounding accounts of Rosen and Schaffer. Before I turn to essential metaphysical
dependence, I first discuss the general distinctions amongst dependence relations. I begin by
considering whether or not dependence can be analyzed in terms of other metaphysical notions, I
then clarify several distinctions among dependence relations, finally I explain how grounding is
supposed to clarify dependence and compare it to closely related notions like essence.
Let me address the first question, “Can dependence be interpreted in terms of another
concept?” The most common attempt to reduce or explain away dependence is in modal terms,
and these attempts are often situated within discussions of existence and essence. These familiar
metaphysical notions correspond to two families of dependence relations, existential dependence
and essential dependence. According to Correia (2008), existentially dependent entities require
certain conditions to be met for them to exist at all, whereas essentially dependent entities require
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certain conditions to be met for them to be the entity they are. That is, their identity or essence
depends on certain other conditions (p.1014).60
There are, roughly, two approaches to analyzing dependence relations. First, one family
of approaches privileges modal considerations as the best explanation of dependence. Second, a
family of approaches that emphasizes the priority of one member of the relation over another as
the best explanation of dependence. In what follows I sketch the basic logic of these two
approaches, first regarding existential dependence and then regarding essential dependence.
3.1 Existential Dependence
An existential dependent entity requires, for its existence, certain other conditions to be
met. The specification of these other conditions is where much of the metaphysical work resides,
but first the relation must be understood. In its most simple form many philosophers interpret
existential dependence claims modally, with them taking one of the following two forms:
(1)

□(Ex→Ey).

(2)

□(Ex→∃yFy).

Where ‘□’ is a necessity operator tracking metaphysical necessity (rather than natural or logical),
‘E’ is a one-place predicate for existence, ‘F’ is a general term, and the standard logical operator
‘→’ for material implication. Following Correia, I read (i) as x cannot exist unless y exists or ‘x
rigidly necessitates y’ and (ii) as ‘x cannot exist unless something is an F’ or ‘x generically
necessitates an F.’61 Both of these interpretations are meant to track certain common
metaphysical claims of dependence. For example, it would be proper to say that “this desk
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There is disagreement regarding how independent these two types of dependence might be. According to some
views, the requirements of identity and the requirements for existence amount to the same thing and thus existential
and essential dependence collapse together. Even on views where these two types of dependence are in principle
separable there is still often overlap, with specific notions of dependence involving both essence and existence.
61
Correia uses the language of “rigidly necessitates,” even though “rigidly” can mean other things in logic. I
maintain Correia’s terminology, but readers should remember that “narrowly” or “specifically” might be an equally
viable term.
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cannot exist unless its constituting piece of matter exists” which could be read as “this desk
rigidly necessitates its constituting piece of matter”, which is all to say the desk existentially
depends on the matter that constitutes it. In like manner, we may say that “I cannot exist unless
there exists some carbon atoms, water molecules, potassium, etc., which is to say that I
generically necessitate some carbon atoms, water molecules, potassium, which is all to say that I
existentially depend on the existence of some or other entities with those properties. The generic
relation is quite weak and applies to almost any claims of existence, but it is useful for making
sense of certain global dependence claims.62
As noted above, the possible interpretations thus far considered are modal. That is, they
attempt to make sense of the existential dependence in terms of the modal covariance of the two
entities under consideration. Many philosophers are concerned that such accounts are too weak
to make sense of genuine dependence relations. For example, it is true that, necessarily, if I exist
then the fact that 2 + 3 = 5 exists. Given the above analysis, this means that my existence rigidly
necessitates the fact that 2 + 3 = 5, or that I existentially depend on the fact that 2 + 3 = 5. But is
that correct? These two things, me and the fact that 2 + 3 = 5, only modally covary because 2 + 3
= 5 is a necessary mathematical fact. It is inevitable, as a matter of logic, that any world in which
I exist is also a world in which 2 + 3 = 5, but that should not matter for questions of dependence.
Put bluntly, the fact that 2 + 3 = 5 does not have anything to do with me. Other philosophers,
however, are willing to bite this bullet and maintain that “dependence” can mean as little as
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As Correia (2008) notes, there are more precise interpretations of these simple existential dependence analysis
which take things like time into account:
(3) □∀t(Etx→ Ety)
[x cannot exist at a time unless y exists at that time]
(4) □∀t(Etx→∃u(u<t ^Euy))
[x cannot exist at a time unless y existed before that time]
These formalizations are thought to shed light on how best to interpret certain temporal dependence theories, such as
Kripkean necessity of origin arguments. For the purposes of this overview, however, I will set these aside.
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modal covariance. I agree with this criticism that mere modal covariance, as currently described,
does not count as genuine dependence.
Hence, I concur with Rosen and Schaffer that an appropriate understanding of
dependence is not reducible to modal notions such as mere modal covariance. This is because the
element of priority (i.e. that one of the members of a dependence relation has priority over the
other member) is not adequately captured by modal notions. A natural response for the
deflationist is to attempt to explain dependence in terms of a concept that already has priority
built in and essence has been commonly thought to explain dependence. On such views, essential
dependence is the primary dependence relation and, ultimately, the essences of things themselves
explain dependence in general. Essence is prior. I agree that there is a close connection between
essence and dependence, however, it is not the case that it can be wholly defined in essentialist
terms.
In order to evaluate these claims I briefly explain how robust dependence theorist explain
dependence in terms of “grounding” as well as examine the underlying logic of ground. Then, I
turn to essentialist accounts and examine what the appropriate relation between dependence and
ground is, finally I present my own taxonomy of dependence, which then will allow me to apply
the concept to action.
3.2 Metaphysical Dependence as Grounding
According to Rosen (2010), theories of “grounding” offer the best way to clarify
dependence (p.110).63 He notes that dependence, understood as grounding, is sometimes glossed
as “metaphysical causation” (Fine 2012, p. 40; Schaffer 2012, p. 122, 2016, p. 50; Wilson 2017,
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Arguments against conceiving of grounding as a unique, or primitive, or even useful, metaphysical relation are
legion; however, since I am mostly using the concept of ground as a rough tool to understand human action via
metaphysical dependence, I do not engage in detail with these skeptical worries.
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pp.1-2) this means that grounding has properties that make it analogous to causation.64 For
example, Schaffer (2016a) says grounding is a vaguely productive relation (it “generates” or
“shapes”), it is asymmetrical in direction, and it supports explanatory claims (p. 53). Further,
grounding seems to be formally characterized by strict partial ordering (Correia and Schnieder
2012, p. 17; Schaffer 2012, p. 55; Rosen 2010, pp.115-116), much like many theories of
causation. This means that its logical structure is best modeled as an irreflexive (e.g. An entity,
A, cannot ground itself), asymmetric (e.g. Entities A and B cannot ground each other), and
transitive (e.g. if A grounds B, and B grounds C, then A grounds C) binary relation. It is also,
usually, considered non-monotonic (e.g. If A grounds B, and C is any fact compatible with A, it
does not follow that B is grounded in A and C) and hyperintensional (e.g. If A grounds B then,
even if A and B have the same intensional content, it is still false to say that B grounds A).
Why have analyses of grounding developed along these lines? Discussions of ground
naturally start from how grounding relations are expressed in paradigmatic explanations of
dependence. This is because many philosophers (e.g. Trogdon 2013; Correia and Schnieder
2012; Schafer 2016, 2012, 2009; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005, etc.) think grounding is closely
connected to a certain type of explanation, perhaps by “backing” or “underwriting” such
explanations. In addition, some theorists (e.g. Dasgupta, 2017, 2014; Wilsch, 2016, 2015; Fine,
2012a; Raven, 2012, etc.) think grounding just is a type of metaphysical explanation.65
Following Raven (2015), I call philosophers who think that grounding is distinguishable yet
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The one exception is Wilson (2018) who instead argues that grounding just is a kind of causation, namely
metaphysical causation. I do not engage with this interesting proposal in this paper, but I am sympathetic with
Wilson’s arguments.
65
For an interesting argument against collapsing grounding into metaphysical explanation see Maurin (2018).
Unlike other anti-unionists, Maurin (2018) does not argue for a positive account of grounding in separatist terms,
instead providing a skeptical anti-grounding argument. She claims that once it is established that metaphysical
explanation and grounding are separable we have lost most of the justification for positing the grounding relation in
the first place.
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closely connected to explanation “separatists” and philosophers who think grounding just is a
type of metaphysical explanation “unionists” (p. 326).
There are two types of formalized interpretations of these sorts of explanations.
Expressions of ground using the ‘because’ connective (i.e. Singleton set {Socrates} exists
because the person Socrates exists) are best interpreted by a sentential operator, whereas
sentences that mention a relation (i.e. Socrates grounds singleton {Socrates}) are more naturally
interpreted as a predicate. This distinction in interpretation marks a deep division amongst
grounding theorists. Those philosophers who want “grounds” to be metaphysically neutral both
emphasize the explanatory features of ground and tend to favor the sentential interpretation (e.g.
Dasgupta 2017, 2014, Fine 2012a, 2012b; Clark and Liggins 2012; Correia 2010; etc.). In
contrast, those philosophers who instead take up the controversial task of specifying the
metaphysical relation and its relata favor distinguishing between the explanatory and
metaphysical roles of grounding and so favor the predicate interpretation (e.g. Audi 2012;
Schaffer 2012, 2009; Rosen 2010; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005; etc.).
This divide emphasizes another role that grounding plays in philosophical discussion.
Namely, the so-called “building” project of metaphysics. Grounding is a conceptual tool to help
answer the questions, “what is fundamental and how are derivative entities ‘built’ out of the
fundamental entities?” Hence, the two camps of grounding theorists are, roughly, grouped into
those who take the explanatory features of grounding to be central and those who take its
metaphysical features (i.e. its contribution to the “building project”) to be central.66
Given this divide, grounding theorists explicate the grounding relation in importantly
different ways. I do not attempt to untangle all the significant debates between these two camps.
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For an extended and insightful discussion of the so-called “building” project, see Bennett (2017).
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It is important for my project, however, that certain features of grounding are true. As such, it is
best to think of my argument as conditional upon a certain view of grounding being correct. This
view takes grounding to not be identical with an explanatory relation but rather that it
underwrites an explanatory relation.67 So, just as causation (however it is conceived) underwrites
causal explanations so too does grounding underwrite grounding explanations. Thus, by agreeing
that grounding explanations and grounding relations are, strictly speaking, separable I am more
inclined to a predicate interpretation of grounding expressions rather than the metaphysically
neutral sentential operator.
I am also motivated, in part, because I cannot stay neutral with respect to the relata of
grounding. Explanatory theorists tend to restrict the grounding relata to “facts” this is in part
because facts are thought to be the appropriate targets of explanation. As Dasgupta (cited in
Trogdon 2013) notes, something like a table cannot explain anything. The fact that the table
exists, or the fact that it is made out of wood, are the proper explanans of an explanation (p.
105). While I certainly do not deny that facts may be grounds, nor deny that facts about
grounded entities might back metaphysical explanation, I wish to be more permissive. My
account is, after all, an account of what makes an event an action. As such, I assume that
grounding can stand between entities in the world, such as events and objects.
So, then, how does the notion of ground just articulated handle paradigm cases of
dependence? Some we have already seen, but I briefly reiterate in more detail using an example
from philosophy of mind. Assume that non-reductive physicalism is correct. Suppose that a
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Of course, one might believe that if metaphysical explanation is only backed by grounding relations, we could
provide an account of such explanation without directly discussing the grounds. This claim can be further supported
by analogy to scientific explanation. After all, philosophical theorizing about scientific explanation often runs
independently from theorizing about whatever relation(s) backs scientific explanation. For an interesting proposal
along these lines, see Baron and Norton (2019).
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particular mental property, ‘m’, depends on some physical properties, ‘Γ’, where ‘Γ’ indicates a
list of physical properties ‘p1, p2, p3, . . .’. So, if grounding is the correct idiom for dependence
we would formalize this as ‘Γ//m,’ where following Schaffer (2012) ‘//’ is a two place predicate
indicating full grounding. Suppose ‘m’ is the “property of being in pain” and ‘p1’ is the property
of neuro-receptors firing, we could formalize this as p1 / m , where / indicates partial grounding.
Formally, we want to allow for the possibility of entities to have a plurality of grounds to be fully
grounded, even if the limit case might be a singular grounding relation.68 As such, in this case we
can formally define a partial grounding relation in terms of full grounding as follows: p1 / m ↔
ⱻΓ( p1∈Γ ⌃Γ//m). So then, informally we say “the property of neuro-receptors firing partially
grounds the mental property of being in pain just in case there is some list of physical properties,
the property of neuro-receptors firing is an element of that list, and that list fully grounds the
mental property of being in pain.
Does this formalization capture our intuitive notions of dependence in this case? I believe
so. Given the assumption of non-reductive physicalism, to say that mental property of being in
pain depends on the physical property of neuro-receptors firing is to say there exists an
asymmetric relationship between the neuro-receptors and the pain. The pain could not exist (or
could not have the character it does) without the neuro-receptors, but crucially this sense of
“could not” must be more than mere modal covariance. For, it is also true that for some sorts of
mental idealism the pain could not exist (or could not have the character it does) without the
neuro-receptors, but on this alternative view this is because the mental entities (or facts) give rise
to certain physical entities (or facts). Hence, to capture the non-reductive physicalist’s proposal
requires a certain asymmetric relation.

Dasgupta (2014) takes this a step further and argues that we should conceive of ground as a “many-to-many”
relation. That is, both side of the grounding relation might be a plurality.
68
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This relation is also, plausibly, hyperintensional. This means, in the context of logic,
sentence locations that are necessarily coextensive still cannot be substituted with each other
without changing the truth-value of the sentence. So, for example, suppose that the set “{being in
pain}” and the mental property “being in pain” are necessarily coextensive. It does not follow
that I could preserve the truth value of the sentence “the mental property of ‘being in pain’
depends on the property of my neural-receptors firing” by substituting it with “the set {being in
pain} depends on the property of my neural-receptors firing”. The second sentence is false.69
Moreover, statements of dependence are non-monotonic. Just because the fact or state that “my
neural-receptors are firing” is compatible with other facts, entities, or states of affairs does not
meaning that those too ground my being in pain.
This case is irreflexive as well, since the pain does not depend on itself, indeed it would
be hard to make sense of the non-reductive physicalist position if this were the case. It is also,
plausibly, transitive. Insofar as my being in pain makes it the case that I cannot focus on writing,
it seems that my inability to focus on writing partly depends on my neuro-receptors.70 Also, that
my being in pain depends on my neuro-receptors firing does not exclude the possibility that there
are other physical features on which it depends (e.g. certain neural-properties that ground
conscious-ness more generally). Finally, all of the above features, especially the
hyperintensionality and non-monotonicity, back a certain kind of explanation. By citing my
neural-receptors firing I have explained something about my “being in pain”, something about
how it depends on other features of the world.
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Though this hyperintensionality is primarily an expression in logic, there may be reasons to think this is tracking a
real distinction as well. Nolan (2014) recently argued that hyperintensional developments underwrite a
“hyperintensional metaphysics,” which mirrors the way intensional developments in logic underwrote the
revolutionary developments in possible world metaphysics during the second half of the 20 th century (pp. 149- 155).
70
There is suppressed time indexing going on in this example. These sorts of considerations raise interesting
questions about how particular instances of relations of dependence are best characterized. But, I leave these
questions to one side for now.
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Thus, the formalizations and explication of grounding models all the intuitive features
found in philosophical talk of metaphysical dependence. Hence, grounding is an accurate way to
specify what we mean by metaphysical dependence. Crucially, what is being specified in this
formalization is the notion of dependence, not how any particular entity manifests this
metaphysical dependence relation. For example, to say that my pain is grounded in my neuroreceptors firing is not yet to say how it is grounded in them firing. Perhaps it is an example of
strong emergence? Or perhaps functional realization? Further metaphysical work needs to be
done to explain how things depend. I agree, to this extent, with grounding pluralists. Though I
maintain along with the unitary theorists that there is but one notion of grounding which
specifies the “dependence” side of metaphysical dependence, I agree with the pluralists insofar
as I contend there are a plurality of ways to specify the “metaphysical” side of the metaphysical
dependence relation.
Thus, grounding is a successful specification of metaphysical dependence that captures
our use of that term more accurately than modal specifications in part because it builds into the
relation certain features of priority—like anti-symmetry—that all back metaphysical
explanations. This, however, does not yet recommend the grounding relation as the best account
of dependence as such. For, there is another related notion that covers similar territory.71
Recent work in the logic of essence has clarified that, like metaphysical dependence,
descriptions of essence cannot be merely modal. If so, however, then generic dependence might
be definable in terms of essential dependence. That is to say, perhaps all cases of genuine
dependence are either essential dependence relations or are reducible to essential dependence
relations. This account has the virtue of explaining the formal features of grounding in terms of
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It is also, often, argued that grounding is a necessary relation, especially if grounding characterizes essential
dependence relations. This consideration will be discussed in more detail later.
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the formal features of essence, which are arguably more intuitive and better understood. In the
next section I consider this possibility by first describing essential dependence in general and
then considering if grounding might be explained in terms of these essential dependence
relations. I conclude that essential dependence is not capable of defining dependence in general,
but that these notions are closely related. I thus conclude with my final taxonomy of grounding
and dependence that I turn to apply back to my original definition in section 2.
3.3 Essential Dependence
In contrast to existential dependence, essential dependence involves identity or essence.
Again, as Correia (2008) observes, this means that an essentially dependent entity is one that
would not be the entity that it is (or be the way it is) had a condition of a certain type not been
met (p. 1016). As with existential dependence the different conditions give different relations or
properties of essential dependence. For example, Correia (2006) elsewhere distinguishes between
the essential features that explain what it is to be that type of thing (what he calls the “objectual
essence”) and the essential features that explain what it is to be a certain way (what he calls the
“generic essence”) (pp. 753-754).72 In some ways, the recognition of a separate type of
dependence is related to the critiques of mere modal covariance discussed above. Fine’s (1994)
influential discussion about how modality is inadequate to model questions of essence utilizes
the same examples. As such, following Correia (2008) I choose to formalize the existential
dependence relation by turning to Fine’s (1995b) work regarding the logic of essence.
Fine (1995b) introduces an indexed sentential operator ‘□x’ for ‘by virtue of the nature of
x . . .’ or ‘x is essentially such that . . .’, so that given the sentence ‘Y’ we would read ‘□xY’ as

To give a concreate example, to answer the question “what is Socrates?” is to answer a question about the
“objectual essence”, whereas to answer the questions “what is it to be a wise person?” is to answer a question about
the “generic essence.” Correia (2006) argues that the objectual/generic distinction embodies, as it were, the
subject/predicate distinction in the realm of essence (p.754).
72
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‘by virtue of the nature of x, Y’ or ‘x is essentially such that Y’. This allows us to simply and
effectively state what is at stake in essential dependence. Once again we find complimentary
specific and generic notions. First, what we might call essential involvement:
(5) □xRxy
[for some relation, R, x is essentially related by that relation to y]
(6) □x∃y(Fy ^ Rxy)
[for some relation, R, there exists some ‘y’, y has property F and so x is essentially
related by R to something that is an F]
Second, what we might call essential necessitation:
(7) □x(Ex→Ey)
[x is essentially such that it exists only if y exists]
(8) □x(Ex→∃yFy)
[x is such that it essentially exists only if there exists some y with property F]
These formalizations set the outlines of dependence relations as understood in the contemporary
debates. The broadest disagreement, according to Correia (2008), is between “reductionist”
views, which claim that essential dependence just is a modal requirement for existence, and
“genuine essentialist” views, which claim that existential dependence does not entail essential
dependence (pp. 1018-1019). These views differ with respect to which specific relations count as
types of essential dependence. For example, reductionists will be comfortable thinking of
supervenience relations as types of essential dependence, whereas genuine essentialists will
argue that supervenience does not have the right kind of priority/explanatory asymmetry to be a
real instance of dependence. As noted above, I think the arguments against a mere modal account
of essence are decisive. Now, however, a new question reveals itself: what is the relationship
between essence and grounding?73
Many philosophers have, in developing Fine’s (1995a) early work on ontological
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For a recent overview of the historical development of these philosophical concepts and their relationship,
including recent examples, see Ó Conaill and Tahko’s (2018) introduction to the special Synthese issue on ground,
essence, and modality.
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dependence, noted that there are deep similarities between the sort of essentialist priority
relationships posited in Fine’s analysis of essence and those present in grounding relations. This
leads some philosophers (e.g. Zylstra 2018; Correia and Skiles 2017; Fine 2015; Correia 2013;
Audi 2012, etc.) to suggest that grounding might be explained in terms of essence or that both
are unified by some underlying commonality.74 It would be beyond the scope of my dissertation
to fully engage with these interesting and recent proposals; however, I briefly suggest some
reasons why the two concepts should be kept distinct in light of Wilson’s (forthcoming) criticism
of Finean ontological dependence.
Wilson (forthcoming) argues that Fine’s definition ontological dependence in terms of
essence is lacking because it cannot make sense of priority relations in plausible cases. This is
due to Fine’s (1995b) particular logic of essence which has the following principle:
x depends upon y if y is a constituent of a proposition that is true in virtue of the identity
of x or alternatively if y is a constituent of an essential property of x. (p. 275)
Put differently, according to Fine if P is true in virtue of the essence of an entity, x, then x
depends on each constituent of the proposition expressed by P. The intuitive force of this
principle comes from Fine’s methodology of “real definition”, by which the notion of one object
depending on another is analogous to the nominal notion of one term being defined by another.
Furthermore, it allows Fine to make sense of the distinction between existence and essence. By
making the essence of x be identified with the collection of propositions (or properties) that are
true in virtue of its identity, Fine explains how the essence of an object, rather than the object
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This, at least in Fine’s case, is related to an underlying essentialist project that attempts to explain most of
metaphysics in terms of essence. Fine (1994a) goes so far to suggest that necessity itself is perhaps explainable in
terms of essence, noting that “metaphysical necessity [is] a special case of essence. For each class of objects, be they
concepts or individuals or entities of some other kind, will give rise to its own domain of necessary truths, the truths
which flow from the nature of the objects in question. The metaphysically necessary truths can then be identified
with the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatever” (p. 9) For a recent argument
against assimilating modal necessity to essence, see Wildman (2018).
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itself, might depend upon another object. To give an example of this schema by utilizing the
above principle:
‘{Socrates}’ depends on Socrates, if Socrates is a constituent of a proposition that is true
in virtue of the identity of ‘{Socrates},’ or, alternatively, if Socrates is a constituent of an
essential property of ‘{Socrates}.’
Does the definition give the correct reading in this case? It seems so. The proposition “contains
Socrates as a member” is true by virtue of the identity of the singleton ‘{Socrates}.’ Further,
Socrates is a constituent of that proposition. As such, we should say that ‘{Socrates}’ essentially
depends on Socrates.
It is here, however, that Wilson notes a counter-example. Assume some sort of
physicalism where lower-level physical entities, such as quarks, compose reality. Our best
science suggests that quarks only exist in pairs or triplets, which compose non-fundamental
entities like protons. Finally, suppose that it is essential to these quarks that they compose the
very proton that they do. Now, quarks q1, q2, q3 come into existence. So, in this example, the
proposition “quarks q1, q2, q3 compose proton P1” is true by virtue of their identity and P1 is a
constituent of this proposition. Hence, by Fine’s principle, q1, q2, and q3 depend on the proton P1 ,
but surely this is false. P1 is a less fundamental entity than the quarks that constitute it, if
anything P1 should depend on them.
Of course, this shows at most that Fine’s analysis of dependence in terms of essence as a
way of explicating essential priority is incomplete or requires modification. Wilson, however,
diagnoses the problem in more detail. She claims that Fine’s central error lays in attempting to
exclude entailments that were extraneous to the essence of the object by deploying the notion of
something “pertaining” to the nature of the object and then analyzing “pertaining” in terms of
dependence. As Wilson sees it, for y to not be extraneous to the nature of an object x—for y to
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pertain to x—need not entail that x depends on y. Put bluntly, Fine seems to think that the
essence of an entity, x, refers to the things upon which it depends, however, it is equally likely
that the essence of x might refer to what depends on x. This suggests that a full account of
essence is not able to capture dependence as such, since the essences of objects covers more
types of relations than merely dependence.75 Fine himself (2012a), recognizes that though these
two concepts—metaphysical dependence and essence—are clearly related that is not sufficient to
reduce one to the other. He makes the analogy to explanations of truth and explanations of
identity, noting that though attempts to assimilate these two kinds of explanations are common,
ultimately they must be taken separately. Fine (2012a) claims, “there is a similar error—but writ
large over the whole metaphysical landscape—in attempting to assimilate or unify the concepts
of essence and ground. The two concepts work together in holding up the edifice of metaphysics;
and it is only by keeping them separate that we can properly appreciate what each is on its own
and what they are capable of doing together” (p. 57).76
3.4 Dependence, Grounding, and Causation
The above discussion introduced the notions of dependence and its grounding
interpretation, as well as some of the controversies and potential problems with these

75

Wilson herself seems to think that there might be a more general difficulty regarding how one utilizes schematic
frames for these otherwise “thick” metaphysical notions. She recommends that we be pluralists and particularist
about these notions, accepting only a minimal and nominal “family resemblance” between the concepts of
“dependence” or “essence” that then is clarified on a case by case basis by more salient notions.
76
Fine (2015), however, has recently reversed his position on this and taken on the challenge of unifying essence
and grounding. He argues, roughly, that his earlier work did not appreciate the similarity between explananda in
both essential explanations and grounding explanations. Once this similarity is appreciated, Fine (2015) argues, we
can see the tasks of essence and grounding are not tasks with “distinct explanatory aims but are merely two different
poles along a single explanatory endeavor” (p. 311). Put bluntly, Fine argues that generic explanation is more
fundamental and thus serves to unify essence and ground. I do not have space to engage with this intriguing
proposal, however, as a gesture towards a potential response: one might think that the plausibility of a kind of
Finean union depends on whether you think grounding (and essence) are metaphysically thick notions, which
involve entities other than facts, or not. Fine is more deflationary (in this limited sense) about grounding and thus
can take generic explanation to serve a unifying role for the concepts themselves—rather than merely our
methodological use of the concept. Those, like me, who are willing to bite the metaphysical bullet and accept a nonneutral ontological conception of ground (and essence), may justifiably demur.
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conceptions. Furthermore, this detailed look at the logic and nature of grounding suggests an
interesting taxonomy. Recall the progression of the dialectic: dependence is recognized as
operative in many philosophical claims, attempts to characterize dependence in purely modal
terms are found to be inadequate since they ignore priority, grounding is introduced to capture
this prioritizing feature of dependence. Leaving aside the close relationship between essence and
grounding, another similarity that came up repeatedly is the analogy between grounding and
causation. Put bluntly, grounding captures the priority feature of dependence in part by modeling
the features of causation, which also manifests a priority relation. This has been considered both
an asset and a liability for grounding. On the one hand, it makes it similar to a widely accepted
relation and thus more explicable to would be skeptics (e.g. Wilson 2018; Schaffer 2016a,
2016b, etc.). On the other hand, it raises suspicions that whatever grounding is it is too thin, too
generic, or too derivative to be a primitive relation in its own right (Bernstein 2016; Koslicki
2016; Wilson 2014; etc.).
I believe the lesson to be learned is different. Grounding and causation share the same
formal features because they are both species of dependence. In fact, dependence is the most
generic notion.77 In causation, current events depend on prior events, just as grounded entities
depend on their grounds.78 Hall (2004) recently argued that there are actually two concepts of
causation: causal production and causal dependence. Leaving aside Hall’s particular project, I
think this does capture an important insight—causation differs from other forms of dependence
by being productive. In general, the world is made out of dependences and, roughly, we can

For an interesting alternative, yet related, account see Wilsch’s (2016; 2015) account of grounding in terms of
nomological determination—that is to say, determination by “laws of metaphysics” analogous to the laws of nature.
78
I am here uncritically assuming that causation always involves a temporal priority relation such that the cause
(temporally) precedes its effect. There are reasons to doubt this, moreover, I take it that depending on how one
answers this question one arrives at a different conclusion regarding the relationship between causation and
dependence as such. I do not, sadly, have space to address the complexities of these arguments here.
77
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speak of these as metaphorically running along two axis: diachronic relations that explain how
the world “unfolds” and synchronic relations that explain how the world is “built”. Given this
taxonomy, grounding’s unique logical structure and internal relations are primarily capturing the
generic features of dependence that it shares with causation, this is why the logic of both are so
similar.79
What then makes grounding unique? This taxonomy suggests at least one unique feature
is that it is non-productive in the relevant sense. It does not essentially involve the kind of
concrete dynamical processes that are widely held to inform causation (i.e. transfer marks, massenergy, or some other conserved physical quantity, etc.). It is, instead, metaphysical and thus
non-causal. This feature of grounding will become important later in discussing its relevance to
action. For, it is initially puzzling how something that is defined by being non-productive might
explain or define something that is paradigmatically a “doing” of agents.
Once this broader taxonomy is recognized it becomes much easier to see how the specific
relations of dependence that are non-productive might all be characterized as a species of
ground. Other candidate relations that are thought either to be involved with or subsumed under
grounding relations include: constitutive relations, compositional relations,
determinate/determinable relations, part/whole relations, set membership relations, and proper
subset relations, to name a few. There is little consensus regarding how these various relations
should be conceived of taxonomically. As such, I set these debates aside, instead roughly
characterizing non-productive dependence using the grounding relation.

Alternatively, Bennett (2017) provides a comprehensive argument for taking the concept of “building” seriously
as a unified family of relations.
79
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4. Action as Essential Metaphysical Dependence-Redux
With the detailed considerations of dependence, essence, and grounding in hand, I return to
my initial rough definition:
Action as Essential Metaphysical Dependence (ver. 1): A mental event e is an action
iff e essentially metaphysically depends on interactive mental properties, P.
With the concepts used in the previous section we can now specify the generic essential
metaphysical dependence relation more precisely:
Generic Essential Metaphysical Dependence (ver. 1*): For entities x, y; y essentially
metaphysically depends on x, dff: □xRxy, where R= Xs//Ys, [xϵ{Xs}] ⌃[yϵ{Ys}], and y=
□yΓ, hence □x(x//□yΓ).
Or more directly:
Generic Essential Metaphysical Dependence (ver. 2*): For entities x, y; y essentially
metaphysically depends on x, dff: □x(x//□yΓ).
I am here utilizing both Fine’s essential operator ‘□x’ which means “by virtue of the nature of x”
and Schaffer’s binary full grounding predicate ‘Xs//y’, which means “Xs fully ground y”. So,
informally, to say y essentially metaphysically depends on x means “by virtue of the nature of x
x grounds those properties brought about (or propositions made true) by virtue of the nature of
y”. Furthermore, since this is meant as a generic formalization of the relation I take onboard
Dasgupta’s (2014) claim that full grounding should be, in the first instance, formalized as a
many-to-many relation. Of course, this does not preclude a full grounding relation between just
two entities, since the limit case for a set of Xs is one x. It does, however, mean that many-tomany full grounding relations are not ruled out by formal fiat.
This formalization highlights a crucial ambiguity in my original informal statement. In
that statement, “essential” was ambiguous between the essence of x and the essence of y, this
formalization shows that I mean both though in different ways. I claim that x is essentially
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related to y, which Correia (2008) calls “essential involvement.” I stipulate this essential relation
is best understood as grounding. Following Finean style semantics, I claim that y’s essence,
understood as the list, ‘Γ’, of properties brought about (or propositions made true) by virtue of
y’s nature, is one of the relata of the grounding relation. So, “essential metaphysical
dependence” is “essential” in two ways: (i.) it is part of ‘x’s essence that it ground y, and (ii.) one
of the relata of the grounding relation is the essence of y.
We can now apply the specification of essential metaphysical dependence to the specific
case of action:
Action as Essential Metaphysical Dependence (ver. 2): A mental event e is an action
iff by virtue of the essence of interactive mental properties, P; P fully grounds all the
properties brought about (or propositions made true) by virtue of the essence of e.
Two more minor clarifications. As Fine (1994b) notes we can distinguish between the
constitutive essence of an entity and its consequential essence. Roughly, the constitutive parts of
an entity’s essence are those properties that are not had by virtue of any more basic essential
properties of the entity; otherwise it is merely a consequential part of the essence. This is
important to prevent an infinite chain of entailments becoming part of what defines an entity. To
give an example, it is constitutively essential to my volition to drink coffee that it be intentional,
however, it is only consequentially essential to my volition that, the disjunction, ‘it is intentional
or not’ is true. Both claims are made true by virtue of the essence of volitions, however, only the
first forms the “core” of what it means to be a volition (what Fine calls “real definition”),
whereas the second is a logical consequent. Second, if we specify the essences of things by virtue
of what properties they possess (or what propositions they make true) then we still need a way to
limit the range of the consequentialist essences. For example, if we do not limit essential
consequences at all then any necessary logical consequent would be essential as well. But, it
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seems incorrect to say, for example, that 2=2 is part of even the consequentialist essence of my
volition to drink coffee. This is where Fine (1995a; 1995b; 1994a) introduces the notion of
“pertaining” to restrict notion of essence. Though many statements might be true with respect to
the essence of x as a matter of consequence, only a subset of these will actually pertain to the
essence of x, even understood consequentially. As noted above, Fine’s particular account of
pertaining appeals to considerations of “dependence”, which leaves him open to
counterexamples suggested by Wilson, among others.
I cannot motivate a full account of what it means to pertain here in such a way to
appropriately limit the consequential essence of an object. Nor will I adopt the Finian “neutral”
methodology of attempting to describe essences wholly in terms of their consequentialist results
and then extrapolating the constitutive essence via “abstracting away” the merely consequential
bits. Though I agree with Wilson’s assessment that, in many cases, defining metaphysical terms
in the most theoretically neutral manner is helpful for making dialectical progress, this project is
already specific enough to warrant defining particular notions. All I need for the theoretical
outline is the notion of constitutive essence and an informed yet intuitive sense of “pertaining.”
This, then, gives the final version of my account:
Action as Essential Metaphysical Dependence (ver. 3): A mental event e is an action
iff by virtue of the constitutive essence of interactive mental properties, P; P fully
grounds all the properties brought about (or propositions made true) by virtue of the
constitutive essence of e.
With this account fully specified I now turn to examine its applicability and success. I do this in
two ways. First, I examine how it addresses the considerations brought up in chapters 1 and 2.
Specifically, can it meet the desiderata of standard non-causalists while addressing causalist
concerns. Second, I turn to address the specific problems that my account generates regarding
circularity and control. Finally, I conclude by pointing out a final metaphysical concept—
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emergence—that is necessary for my account of action to avoid both problems of transitivity and
also fit in a causally structured world like ours, I then take up this concern in chapter 4.
5. Action as Essential Metaphysical Dependence—Application
Given my motivation for crafting a view that (1) combines the insights of both agentcausal and non-causal views and (2) responds to causalist objections to non-causal views. How
does essential metaphysical dependence fair in comparison to other theories? First, I examine
how account synthesizes the agential and non-causal views by satisfying the desideratum of noncausal views while still positing a direct extrinsic connection to the agent.
5.1 Satisfying Non-causal Desideratum
Essential metaphysical dependence satisfies the most central commitments of noncausalism. First, according to Ginet, as well as Goetz and McCann, an essential feature of our
acts is their active quality. This is one of the reoccurring critiques non-causalist raise against
causal theories. The strongest version of this view is held by Goetz. By his lights, to be caused
conceptually entails being passively produced. Actions are intrinsically active; hence, they
cannot be caused. At first glance, this seems to be a difficulty for my account. Dependence
relations sound like passive relations, in part because the concept of “activity” suggests
“production” and generic dependence relations are neither causal nor agential and thus may
intuitively seem not “productive” in the relevant sense. This concern, however, is unfounded. To
show why I first must clarify what is conceptually at stake in the active vs passive distinction.
What does it mean to say that something is active as opposed to passive? Roughly, something
is active if it “does” things, something is passive if it has things “done to” it. These are already
metaphysically thick notions, but some obvious conceptual points should be highlighted.
Explanation, as such, is more abstract and general than the active/passive distinction. I might
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explain something by citing that X is active with respect to Y, but not all explanations need to
fall into this category. With this in mind, recall that the non-causalist critique, especially for
strong non-causalist views like Goetz, involve pointing out that if simple mental acts are
intrinsically essentially active then it would be odd to say they are produced. Why? Because to
be produced is to be “done to” and such mental acts are essential things that “do”. Given the
plausible claim that an entity cannot have a conflicting essence it seems that such mental entities
cannot be the sorts of things that are “done to”, which is to say they cannot be passive.
Earlier, (in chapter 2), I criticized Goetz’s view on the grounds that he confuses the
constitutive conditions for something’s essence with the conditions for something’s existence.
This critique still applies, but I wish to highlight a difference concern in order to explain why the
active/passive distinction is not a difficulty for essential metaphysical dependence.
Essential metaphysical dependence explains the active nature of simple mental events but
this explanation is not productive and therefore does not entail that the event is “done to” and
hence passive. Explanation is a more general category than production and need not entail that
the explanans is passive with respect to explanandum. Hence, to say that mental event e is an
action iff e essentially metaphysically depends on interactive mental properties P, does not
conceptually undermine the intrinsically and essentially active character of e. In fact, it aims to
explain that character in terms of its being grounded in interactive mental properties.
A generalized example of this claim elucidates this point. Water molecules are essentially
grounded in a certain structure. Further, water’s property of being a solvent is because of its
essential structure. It would be odd, however, to say the event of salt dissolving in water is
passive with respect to the structure. Such an event is an active manifestation of one of the
essential properties of water—loosely speaking, the water molecule does, the salt crystal is done
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to. This active manifestation, however, simultaneously essentially depends on the structure of
water molecules. In like manner, even if simple mental events essentially depend on or are
grounded in interactive mental properties this does not conceptually entail that simple mental
events are passive. They can both depend on these mental properties and be intrinsically active,
indeed my claim is that their intrinsically essentially active character is explained by their
dependence relation to these mental properties.
This raises a second concern. Ginet, among others, argues that whatever makes a simple
mental event an action must also be intrinsic to the simple mental event. In arguing against
agent-causation Ginet points out that if agent-causation were true mental actions should have a
complex structure. The act, as a whole, would consist of two parts: the agent-cause and its effect,
the simple mental event. This dipartite structure would be what the act consisted in. But it seems,
he argues, that we recognize the difference between a simple mental act and a mere mental event
without reference to the relation that obtains between the agent and the act. This criticism has
some weight against my view. If a simple mental event is an action by virtue of being essentially
dependent on mental properties of the agent there seems to be a similar complex structure
between these properties as ground and the simple mental event as the grounded. If so, then the
same critique applies to essential dependence.
This critique, though challenging for my proposal, can be addressed. Ginet’s argument,
like McCann’s and Goetz’s, is in the first instance epistemic. We differentiate between simple
mental acts and other mental occurrences because of some intrinsic features rather than by
introspecting an extrinsic relation between the mental event and the agent or a property of the
agent. As Ginet (1990) notes, a causalist might claim that the intrinsic phenomenal features are
just an intrinsic phenomenal sign of the extrinsic causal relation (pp. 9-12). He dismisses this
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kind of response for leaving difference between veridical and illusory instances of the
phenomena unexplained. If the agent-causalist responds that the phenomenal sign is always
veridical this seems ad hoc. Furthermore, such a position, Ginet (1990) argues, would be
needlessly complex. If we only attend to the intrinsic phenomenal features to distinguish between
the two events why posit a further relation?
Regarding the first concern, on my account saying the intrinsic quality is a veridical
indication of the essential dependence relation is not ad hoc. This is because there are no deviant
dependence relations in the same way there can be deviant causal chains. In particular, since it is
essentially dependence, plausibly, the conditions for something’s essential ground must exist if
the grounded thing exists. I agree with non-causalists that part of the essence of simple mental
acts is a certain kind of intrinsic active quality, but I add that this quality, insofar as it is essential
to the mental act, is itself grounded in the interactive mental properties of the agent. If the actish
phenomenal quality is present the essential grounding relation must be present; if it were not the
simple mental act would not be what it is essentially. This response is not available to agentcausalists because it is possible, according to them, that actions are sometimes caused by
something other than the agent and still feel like actions. On my proposal, it is open for the
grounding relation to always explain the essential intrinsic actish qualities of the simple mental
event even if there is another causal explanation for its existence.
Regarding the second concern, the purpose of positing a further relation is, in part, to
address the causalist criticism that non-causalism’s appeal to phenomenal or experiential
properties are naturalistically inadequate. As O’Connor (2000) says, “seemings are not sufficient
for the realities” (p. 26). The standard non-causalist response is to (1) point out that non-causal
views are consistent and are not proven wrong by merely disputing their plausibility and (2)
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point out the difficulties with causalist alternatives. While this is an adequate defense, it is
clearly not the most persuasive. Indeed, it is this kind of argumentation that leads to the
dialectical stalemate in which non-causalist and causalist theories are enmeshed. If one could
propose an alternative conception that addresses this causalist concerns about experiential
evidence, while at the same time meeting the non-causalist desideratum this alternative would be
dialectically superior. My account is intended to be just such a view.
These considerations show that my view meets the central requirements of a noncausalist view. Furthermore, it incorporates the central causalist insight regarding the need to
ontologically ground actions in some feature of the agent, in my account the interactive mental
properties that jointly constitute the agent’s reason-responsive mechanism. How does this
account address the central concerns causalists raise against non-causalist views? Again, I focus
first on attempts to answer the question, what makes a mental event an action, not questions
regarding what explains action. I address that second question below. However, this distinction
should not be overdrawn. Some causalist views collapse these answers together such that what
makes an event into an action also provides the action explanation. That being said, making this
distinction allows us to focus on the most salient features of the view.
5.2 Addressing Causalist Concerns
A common objection, then, to the non-causal definition of action is that such a definition
does not fit with the causally structured order of the natural world. Seemings are insufficient for
realities and since all of the non-causal views either rely on such seeming to be what makes an
event into an action or are evidence for what does make an event into an action, there is a fatal
obscurity at the heart of such non-causal views. This initial worry can be bolstered by parsimony
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arguments. For example, the natural world is causally structured thus it seems ad hoc to suggest
that humans are somehow exempt.
These concerns are, so far, intuitive. However, Mele (2017; 1992) and Clarke (2010)
have tried to make them more precise. I have already discussed in some detail these objections to
non-causalism in chapter 2. Though the examples given are primarily intended to undermine the
action explanation side of the discussion rather than the action definition side, the point still goes
some of the way toward making the above concern clear. Consider the following case:
Sarah intends to raise her arm in order to get the attention of a speaker. Unbeknownst to
her, the neuroscientist, Andrea, has crafted a device that allows her to remotely
manipulate Sarah’s brain. With this device she both makes Sarah bodily raise her arm and
actively will to raise her arm. Andrea is doing this with the intention to test her device.
Throughout this event Sarah maintains her intention to raise her arm in order to get the
attention of a speaker.
What is the nature of the action in this case? According to causalists like Clarke and Mele, even
though Sarah’s overt bodily movement was initiated by a willing with an actish phenomenal
quality and has an accompanying intention, it would not count as her action, rather it is
Andrea’s. It is explained by Andrea’s intention, not Sarah’s. These kinds of counter-examples,
which were discussed in the previous chapter, highlight the non-causalist difficulty explaining
what the salient connection is between the non-causal features that are meant to explain action
and the actions themselves.
In the previous chapter, I claimed that these cases offer a direct counter-example to views
like Ginet’s, which allow for our actions to be caused-events if they are not actions by virtue of
being caused. It does not; however, undermine other non-causal views. This is because theorists,
like Goetz for example, fall back on “begging the question” style responses. These proponents of
“strong non-causalism” believe that it is conceptually impossible for our active willing’s to be
caused, hence the counterexample does not succeed. This response, though conceptually
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available, is unsatisfying. A causalist would, I believe rightly, see this as a last resort of the noncausalist to save their theory regardless of the weight of evidence.
How does my view fair against such critiques? In response to the intuitive critique my
account fairs rather well. Seemings are not sufficient for realities, but if one can establish that a
seeming is essentially grounded in a property of mind, then this phenomenon becomes veridical
indicator of a real extrinsic connection. The relation of essential metaphysical dependence forges
a connection between a mental property of the agent, in fact the kind of properties that we might
rightly call intrinsically agential, and our simple mental events of willing, deciding, and forming
intentions. In turn, these events get their unique phenomenal character from their essential
relationship to that on which they depend, in the same way that the macroscopic properties of
water are grounded in the more fundamental structural properties of the atoms that constitute a
water molecule.
The more formalized version of this critique raises another issue, namely, just what is the
relationship between the various parts of the mental ontology such that they define what actions
are without becoming a causalist view? Or, to put it another way: Can my version of noncausalism do justice to the intuition that Sarah does not act when she actively raises her arm
under the control of Andrea, rather, Andrea acts through Sarah? These questions push us towards
addressing not just what makes an event into an action but also what explains actions. Which is
to say, what role do reasons play in action theory.
There are really two questions here. How do reasons (or intentions) explain actions and
who’s reasons (or intentions) do they belong to. This difference has not been attended to
sufficiently. Causalists, like Clarke, propose that the best explanation for our intuitions in the
neuroscience cases is that the intentions of the neuroscientist are enacted by the victim’s action,
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they causally explain what is, in fact, going on and for that reasons we should doubt any noncausalist proposals. What has been lost in this discussion is the question of to whom the
intentions belong. To see why this is important it is crucial to become a little clearer on the
relationship between mental events like volitions, decisions, intentions, etc.
First, to recall some basics, all conscious mental events (and perhaps many unconscious
mental events) are made up of (at least) two features: content and mode. The content of a mental
event is what the event is, to speak loosely, “about”. In contrast, the mode is how the content is
held in the mind—for instance, as a belief, or as a desire. This, following McCann, is helpfully
schematized as: Mode (Content). Consider my having an occurrent conscious belief that it is
about to rain. This mental event I am experiencing is describable as: Belief (that it is about to
rain). Or, in like manner, suppose I form an intention by deciding to go for a run later. This
mental event is describable as Decide (to go on a run later) and this, in turn, leaves me with the
mental state of Intend (to go on a run later).
Again, I emphasize that this is only a schema or model of our folk psychology. Within
this framework, however, we can more precisely indicate many useful lines of inquiry. For my
purposes, I merely highlight two features. First, that the mode by which a mental event is held in
a mind is the most important for understanding function or psychological use of these events.
Second, these modes are types. Their tokens are the particular instances of mental events that are
united with particular content.
What then, more particularly, are we to make of intentions? McCann calls them “states”
because they are temporally extended and thus different from mental events, like deciding. This
is a little idiosyncratic, many philosophers regard states as merely a type of event that has certain
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features (being temporally extended, having no clear culmination, etc.).80 Regardless of the best
way to parse up the terminology, intentions are distinguished by two features. On the one hand,
they are distinguished from willings or decisions by being temporally extended plans that may or
may not be enacted or realized at a given time. On the other hand, they are distinguished from
mere desires or desire-belief pairs by being practical. That is to say, to intend something is more
than merely having a belief about how to do something or even a desire to do the thing, it is to
have a commitment to the action. Paradigmatically, this means that when one intends something
that means (1) there was a process, however brief, of deliberation which formed one’s desires
and beliefs into an intention, and (2) the intention will, normally, be realized in some sort of
action.
Also, volitions, mental events of willing, are intrinsically intentional. That is to say, when
I will to do something on a whim with no prior thought or deliberation this willing is still an
intentional act of mine, even if there was no prior intention. I cannot, as it were, accidentally will
something. Now, of course, the results and consequences of my action might be unintentional but
that is because of a failure regarding the action and its result, not a failure internal to the willing
itself. If so, then there is a question. What is the relationship between a willing and an intention.
McCann suggests, I think rightly, that the relationship between them is one of ratification. The

Indeed, there is a larger question here about what exactly a generic “state” is as opposed to an “event”. There is no
clear consensus, however, it seems that for most philosophers the terminology of “events” and “states” are used to
indicate the way objects change or stay the same. Roughly, events are changes in objects or involving objects,
whereas states indicate an object or something involving an object having a property (or properties) without change.
An object can, of course, change from one state to another state, but that change itself is an event. For example, I
might be in a state of unconsciousness while sleeping, then the event of my alarm going off wakes me up, now I’m
in a state of consciousness. As this example shows, events and states can both co-locate and constitute each other in
complex ways. So, for example, my state of unconsciousness while I’m sleeping is partly constituted by repeated
instances of the event of my lungs filling with air and expelling air. Conversely, my being in the state of living partly
constitutes the state of the earth having human life, though if an asteroid is about to hit earth this large-scale state
will change because of that, so-called, extinction level event. Given this, the states and events that are salient for a
given explanatory question depends, partly, on the scope of inquiry.
80
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willing takes the content of the intention and “affirms” it by so willing. This conceptualization is
because, in part, we must avoid the absurdity of there being a second set of intentional content.
Intentions are never doubled. Of course, one might have multiple goals that one aims at with one
and the same action. However, it borders on incomprehensible to speak of intending to pick up a
book and willing, with its intrinsic intention, to pick up a book and then having both these
intentions exist side by side. It is as though one could form two beliefs that it was about to rain,
so that just in case the first belief failed you would have a back-up.
So then, when I enact or realize an intention what is happening just is that by willing I
take up as the intentional content of the willing the prior intention I had formed, which then
guides my volition. This, then gives us a response to Clarke. For we can ask, what was Andrea
the neuroscientist causing? If she was causing Sarah to will to raise her hand then this must be an
intrinsically intentional action, if so what was its content? If it was a ratification of Sarah’s prior
intentional state then there is no puzzle. Sarah did (unfreely) act on her intention to bid for the
painting. If there is any puzzle here it lies in the free or unfree status of her action, indeed a case
like this is more analogous to Pereboom’s manipulation style arguments against compatibilism.
If, however, Andrea causes Sarah’s volition to have a different intrinsically intentional content
that runs contrary to her prior intentional state there is still no puzzle. For, it is sufficient to say
that the intentional content did not belong to Sarah, instead it is Andrea’s intentions that
explaining, fully, the relevant action and Sarah is merely a tool for this action. To put it more
bluntly, this sort of picture is one where Sarah would have seemed, from here own perspective,
to have chosen accidently, which is to say it would be a case where Sarah wouldn’t have willed
anything at all.
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But, it cannot be the case that Sarah wills something and simultaneously has an intention
that both accompanies and is disconnected from the willing. To will just is to act intentionally
and the intentional content is part of the willing. It is not doubled by the willing. This conception
of the relationship between willing and intentional content allows my view to forge a connection
between the reasons and the willing itself, thus avoiding the causalist objection that non-causal
conditions are too thin to define or explain action.
This response also highlights my account of reason explanation. To act for a reason just is
to have that reason figure in the constitutive essence of the relevant mental event, wherein it
functions to teleologically explain why one acted as one did. When I choose to raise my hand to
order to ask a question, the reason “to ask a question” is the goal or purpose for which I raised
my hand. Moreover, it is essentially part of that willing since such volitions are intrinsically
intentional. I may indeed have many reasons for doing what I do but the one that explains my so
acting is the one that (a) teleologically explains my action and (b) essentially figures in the
relevant mental event.
How does this fit with my overall essential metaphysical dependence account? Recall that
the interactive mental properties are, plausibly, constitutive of the reason-responsive mechanism
of minds. If so, then these properties are essentially the sorts of things that ground the essential
nature of the basic mental acts, like volitions. Speaking loosely, what it means for these
properties to be reasons-responsive just is that they ground those mental events that (a) have
reasons as a constitutive part of their essence, (b) in a functionally teleological manner. This
conception of reasons relationship to simple mental acts answers the two central causalist
questions. It answers the question regarding how reasons explain action in a manner common to
most non-causalists—teleologically. It also, however, answers the question how are reasons
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linked to the actions they explain. This second question is at the heart of the causalist objections
raised by Clarke and Mele. My view answers this question by noting that the reasons for which
we act are not a sperate entity, such that they might be explanatorily disconnected in intervener
cases. Instead, they are constitutive of the volitions that they explain and they are made
constitutive by being grounded in those interactive properties that constitute our reasonsresponsive mechanism. Hence, both the constitutive relation which explaining reasons have to
the actions they explain, and the grounding relation, which explains how these reason laden
mental acts come to have they character they do, are non-causal. Hence, reasons can noncausally explain actions without falling victim to intervener style cases.81
6. Objections to Essential Metaphysical Dependence
The previous section presented the final version of my account and then examined how it
met both non-causalist desideratum and causalist objections. I now examine two difficulties for
my argument—the circularity problem and the control problem. These objections concern the
nature of the grounding relation and the nature of mental properties. As such, though they

At first blush, it might seem that my view excludes the possibility of acting for no reason at all or “on a whim.” I
do think that it is possible to act without any prior intention or rational plan. Moreover, I hold that it is possible for
an agent to act suddenly on a whim. I do not believe, however, that such actions are without reasons—broadly
construed. Such actions are not non-rational like a reflex nor irrational like a compulsion. Instead, I agree with
McCann that to will anything requires that there be content to the willing—something that the willing is directed
towards. As I noted in chapter 1, this is what McCann means when he says that willing is always intentional even if
it lacks an accompanying intention. We never will accidentally. The upshot of this is that to act “on a whim” is not
the same as acting accidentally or inadvertently. Moreover, this content is what makes such actions rationally
explainable, in a broad sense the intentional content is our reason for acting. In fact, if you press someone who
genuinely acted “on a whim,” they often merely cite the thing they did as the reason for doing it (e.g. “I just did”,
“just because it was there”, “it seemed like a good idea at the time”, etc.). I think this kind of response is an instance
of sincere reason giving but the reasons given are the barest possible—a mere restatement of the content of the
willing itself. Of course, for most practical purposes we talk of these sorts of reasons as “reason-less” in some sense,
but we should not let this practical function obscure the metaphysical point. This mirrors Goertz’ claim that socalled “irrational” compulsions are better understood as instances where the weight of reasons is subjectively thrown
wholly on one side of a given choice. Such compulsions are properly called irrational, Goetz thinks, because we
understand that the agent is not appreciating their reasons correctly not because the agent lacks reasons. In most
cases, the compelled agent is still acting for reasons, however, their reasons are weighted unusually. My view, then,
makes this same point in the other direction. If compulsion is a case where reasons are excessively on the side of one
choice (thereby practically irrational), then “acting on a whim” is a case where the reasons are deficient enough to
reduce to merely the content of the willing (thereby practically reason-less).
81
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present challenges for my account, they also allow me to clarify what makes essential
metaphysical dependence distinct from other accounts of action.
6.1 Circularity Problem
My account might appear to be subject to a vicious circle. I define interactive mental
properties functionally, as being those properties that give rise to our ability to interact with the
world. Moreover, I claimed that these properties are constitutive of our agency. Even more
directly, these properties were defined by how they ground events with the following two
features: (1) they involve interactions with the world (e.g. volitions), and (2) they are partly
constituted by the reasons for which they are done. I also argued that simple mental events are
actions just in case they are wholly grounded in these interactive mental properties. If so, then it
appears I am saying interactive mental properties are essentially defined by grounding simple
mental actions and simple mental actions are essentially defined by being grounded in interactive
mental properties. The circle is complete and it is unfortunately quite small. This objection fails,
however, by equivocating on the different ways we can essentially define entities. I first clarify
the objection by contrasting it with a similar objection raised against dispositional monism.
Second, I show how the objection fails by confusing the scope of essential definition.
Initially, this objection appears like a concern regarding circular definitions.82 When
defining something the definiens gives meaning to the definiendum. When definition works it is
because the definiens is independently meaningful so it can “pass on” its meaningfulness and
thus elucidate the target term. This motivates the thought that definition must not be circular,

Much of my discussion here is indebted to Bird’s (2007) work on regress objections to monistic dispositional
essentialism. Where I am quoting Bird directly I will indicate, but in general this whole section should be
understood as inspired by Bird’s arguments.
82
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since at some point there must be a term that is already meaningful or acquires its meaning
directly (e.g. by ostentation).
The criticism of my account applies this same structure but to “real definition,” which
defines not the meaning of a term but the essential identity of an entity. I am, after all, answering
the question of what makes something the kind of thing that it is. Given this project, the worry is
not that meaning is constantly deferred but, that essence is being deferred. The ontological buck
passes back and forth between the mental property and the event it grounds without either
gaining enough reality to be adequately defined.
This worry shares many similarities with critiques of monistic dispositional
essentialism—the view that all fundamental properties are essentially dispositional. A property is
essentially dispositional if it is defined by its causal profile and the conditions under which this
profile manifests, sometimes called the manifestation and stimulus respectively. So, for example,
if the property of fragility were essentially dispositional this would mean that fragility just is
understood as the conditional “if struck (stimulus) then shatters (manifestation)”.83 Given this
metaphysical framework dispositional monism faces the same ontological circularity concern as
my account of action. The reality of any given property, for the dispositional monist, is given by
citing the two properties involved in its stimulus and manifestation. Each of these properties,
however, are themselves dispositional on a monistic view, therefore they are defined in terms of
another set of properties, and so on. So, either dispositional properties are infinite or at some
point they make reference to properties that have previously occurred and are thus circular.

Of course, “fragility” is merely a toy example. It is almost certainly not a fundamental property and thus does not
fully fit the monistic dispositional essentialist analysis, however, it is adequate for explaining the general idea of a
dispositional property.
83
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To be clear, if the concern is merely about ontological reality it may be that this is
unfounded, for it clearly begs the question. Why think that dispositions have less “reality” than
other accounts of properties? As Bird (2007) argues, the primary categorical account is, if
anything, thinner than the dispositional account (pp. 521-522).84 It is plausible to think, however,
that the criticism concerns not reality exactly but identity or essence. How can dispositional
properties have the essence or identity that it does if that is only given in terms of other
properties that then also have their essence or identity in terms of other properties, and so on. No
single property has its identity fixed since it gets its identity in terms of another property (Bird,
2007, p.523). This version of the criticism is clearly analogous to the one raised against my view.
Bird’s solution involves appealing to how the identity of individual properties can be
non-vacuously given by reference to the overall interconnected structure of dispositions via wellfounded graph-theoretic principles. If the structure of dispositional properties follows these
constraints it is, in principle, possible to define the identity of every property in the structure
even though they are all interconnected. This attempt is intriguing, and I think successful, but it
is not helpful in my case since I am not implicating the entire structure of property relations. This
response, however, does highlight that my critic misunderstood the ontological scope of my
account. It is the monism of Bird’s account that generates the problems of identity. In contrast,
the definitions involved in my account of action do not rest on an underlying monistic
conception, nor are they even about the same kind of entity. To show why, I consider each side
of the “vicious” circle in turn.
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For, on the categorical account, properties only possess the features of being: (1) distinct from other properties, (2)
universal and thus have instances, (3) for some n it is an n-adic universal. But, all these features are possessed by
dispositional properties as well in addition to the claim that they have an essentially dispositional character.
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First, regarding the interactive mental properties, as noted in the earlier discussion of
essence it is reasonable to think that the essences of things might rest not just on what they
depend on but also what depends on them. This is clearest in Wilson’s example of fundamental
particles. In her case, the particles’ essence, understood in terms of those propositions made true
by virtue of its constitutive identity, only makes references to those things that it grounds. I add
to this account that we might speak of fundamentality in a restricted sense as regarding that
which is fundamental to a domain of objects. For example, suppose physical reductionism
regarding mathematical objects is true. Now, suppose that all mathematical structures, and so the
entities and operations that are defined by them, could be derived from some small set of
axiomatic functions (like the successor function), ‘F’. It seems that the following two claims
would be true: (1) F is mathematically fundamental and so is defined in terms of what it does or
grounds, (2) F is dependent on physical reality, assuming the truth of mathematical reductionism.
So then, these two examples mean that, first, it is intelligible to speak of fundamental entities as
being essentially what they are in reference to what they ground, second, it is intelligible to speak
of domain specific fundamentality.85
Certain mental properties, like the interactive mental properties that constitute our
agency, are fundamental with respect to the domain of agential minds. If so, then it would be
understandable for them to be essentially identified with those mental events that they ground
since, insofar as we are defining their essence qua mentality, there is no more fundamental
mental entities to define them in terms of. If this picture is correct, then there is nothing
unintelligible about a fundamental mental property being essentially defined by the mental
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I have presented this conception of domain specific fundamentality mostly by example. A more rigorous
definition would, I think, define it in terms of domain specific explanatory failure (e.g. the mathematically
fundamental objects cannot be explained any further que mathematical explanation). I, however, do not have the
space to explore what a full account of domain specific fundamentality would look like here.
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events associated with it.86 But, even if it is intelligible to define a fundamental mental property
in terms of the events it upholds, the problem lies in how the events are also defined in terms of
the property that grounds them. It was a vicious circle after all.
This objection also fails. The grounded mental event is not ontologically akin to the
property that grounds it, both by virtue of being a different kind of thing—an event not a
property—and by having a different kind of status—derivative not fundamental. This means that
what is crucial for the essential definition of the mental event in question is how it is an action.
The definition is only insofar as it counts as an action is it grounded essentially in interactive
mental properties.
Another example might help. Suppose that Descartes was right about people being
fundamentally “thinking things”. Plausibly, what people are would be essentially defined in
terms of being the sort of thing that thinks. How are thoughts defined? It seems that, almost
trivially, thoughts are going to be essentially defined as the sort of entity that are brought about
by minds (i.e. thinking things), however, this offers no special puzzle of definition because
“thoughts” have many other properties that aid in their definition. That is to say, the essential
definition of thoughts is not exhausted by referencing their dependence on thinking things even if
that feature of their essences is in some ways most determinate or constitutive.
In like manner, the simple mental events’ essence, which is essentially grounded in
interactive properties of mind, is defined both by being grounded in this way and by other
constitutive features of its essence. For example, volitions may essentially have an actish
phenomenal quality (as Ginet suggests) at least when instantiated in self-conscious minds like
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Indeed, I already ran a similar gambit earlier when discussing the property of consciousness. Insofar as we are
willing to have consciousness defined in terms of the phenomenal awareness (of various types) of events that depend
on it.
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ours. The actional nature of volitions is defined by virtue of its full grounding in interactive
properties and this is indeed essential. A volition doesn’t accidently become an action, it is an
action by virtue of being grounded in the appropriate fundamental mental properties; however, to
say that the essence of a thing is fully grounded and that this specifies the type of thing it is does
not mean that they identity of the thing has been exhaustively given. Just as in my example,
where the type of thing, “thoughts,” were wholly grounded in “thinking things,” but were further
specified by other features. Of course, in a sense, being in the category “thought” was perhaps
the most encompassing or constitutive part of their essence just as counting as an action might be
the most constitutive part of the volitions’ essence but constitutive is not the same as exhaustive
and thus we can avoid the essential circularity objection.
At this point someone might, rightfully, object that even if this response addresses the
concern regarding circularity of “identity” I have not address the similar concern of conceptual
“emptiness.” While it is perfectly intelligible to understand interactive mental properties in terms
of their functional role, or what they ground, it is also unsubstantial. Insofar as the only
difference between interactive and responsive mental-properties is given in terms of the kind of
mental events they ground I have not really said what they are or why I am justified in positing
their existence.
To answer this understandable concern I refer back to section 2 where I originally
introduced the interactive mental property. Part of my argument’s plausibility lay in its analogy
to the property of consciousness. Insofar as the “interactive mental properties” are meant to be
situated to agency just as the “responsive mental properties” are situated toward consciousness, I
do not think the objection that my argument is empty holds. Both our philosophical and folk
psychology concepts already accept a property like this as the unifying and explanatory ground
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for agential mental events.87 My account is only novel in detailing the relationship between these
events and their ground. I claim this relation is what makes the difference between an action and
a non-action and this relation is non-causal. Furthermore, as shown above, my account of this
relation is substantive and highlights the priority of the agential side of the relation—hence, it is
an agency-first account. Given this, it seems that the more pressing objection for my account is
not about circularity, but rather about how the relation itself presents problems for giving an
adequate explanation of action.
6.2 Control Problem
This leads to the second problem—control. Our simple mental acts are paradigmatically
the sorts of things that we have control over. How can a non-causal relation, like essential
metaphysical dependence, provide the kind of control necessary for our volitions to count as
actions of ours? Even if our simple mental acts are caused, my claim is that they count as acts by
virtue of being essentially grounded in our interactive mental properties. Since control is intrinsic
to action, it must be intrinsic to those acts that they are within our control. Hence, for my view to
be plausible control must be explained by the essential dependence relation.
This presents two challenges for my account. First, essential dependence—framed in
terms of grounding—is too thin to adequately explain how simple mental acts might have their
active character. Of course, I argued earlier that grounding relations back metaphysical
explanation and so do not imply passivity for the grounded side of the relation. This objection,
however, cuts deeper. Though I defended against the criticism that dependence implies passivity,
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Some evidence that we already implicitly accept something like these fundamental properties in both
philosophical and folk language includes: (i.) that it is not uncommon philosophically to speak of the “reasonsresponsive” mechanism of minds, which I have suggested correlate with my interactive properties though I hesitate
to use the label because of reductive connotations, and (ii.) that it not uncommon in ordinary language to speak of
“the will” rather than mere willings, where this seems to be indicate some underlying faculty of the mind.
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I have not yet given an adequate account for how it explains activity. Second, essential
metaphysical dependence does not adequately allow for control because it is necessary relation.
That is, the ground entity entails the grounded entity necessarily and such an entailment
undermines the open nature of deliberation. Both of these objections are plausible on their face;
however, they fail for similar reasons. Explaining these reasons help to clarify what, exactly, my
account aims to show.
The first objection is answered quickly, though perhaps in a manner unsatisfying to a
skeptic. The active nature of simple mental acts is adequately explained in part by the intrinsic
nature of the thing grounding my mental acts. As McCann (1998) says, we can explain why
volitions are voluntary in the same way we explain water is wet—intrinsically. While my view is
one step removed, because it appeals to the grounding relation, it still grounds those volitions in
mental properties that are both fundamental within the domain of the mental and are interactive
such that they constitute our agency. To paraphrase McCann, we can explain why those mental
properties constitute our agency are active in the same way we can explain why water is wet. To
cite interactive mental properties at all is already to give a kind of explanation, they just are what
agency consists in and citing something that is intrinsically constitutive of agency just is to show
that it is something under our control. Put differently, part of what makes this an “agency-first”
account is my refusal to decompose agency into its “parts.” This is because, as I have shown, to
do this obscures the very things we are trying to explain. Agency emerges as such and should be
analyzed non-reductively. If so, then it is a mistake to think that we can provide an independent
understanding of “activity” and then ask how agency meets this understanding. Activity and
agency come in together and are in some sense inseparable.88

This point is, I believe, related to Thomas Reid’s famous claim that causation is primarily an agential concept that
we then apply to the world at large. That is, according to Reid, we come to know what it means to cause something
88
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To bolster this response, consider again an analogy to consciousness. It is no puzzle that
we are aware of or have qualitative experiences of events that are grounded in consciousness/
Why not? In part because the properties of consciousness just are the unifying feature of minds
like ours that explains the “qualitative awareness” of all the disparate events of which we are
aware. In like manner, the interactive mental properties just are the unifying feature of minds
like ours that explains the “activity” of all these disparate agential events in our minds. This is
not yet to say that my account adequately explains the mechanism for active control, merely that
the burden of proof is not quite as high as the objection initially proposes.
This response to the initial objection might seem too fast, but it is important to note that
the dialectic is one in which I’ve already defended against the claim that my account entails
passivity and my opponent as already granted the existence of mental properties underlying
agency. Furthermore, they have already granted that these properties are fundamental within the
domain of the mental. In this context, drawing the reader’s attention to the fundamental nature of
those properties and how their existence already implies their active nature is both informative
and sufficient to defuse the worry.
My critics might attempt to frame this worry more precisely. Instead of a general concern
about the metaphysical dependence being too thin to explain active control they might worry that
my account merely defers explanation. On my account, a simple mental event counts as an
action because its essence metaphysically depends on mental properties that constitute agency.
But metaphysical dependence, understood as grounding, is a necessary relation. So, we have the
grounded entity whenever we have the ground, necessarily. In the case of action, this grounding

by virtue of our experience of causing things and then apply this concept widely (and perhaps mistakenly) to
account for events in the world. I doubt Reid’s account of causation gives the full story, however, applying the same
logic to the concept of “activity” or “active control” seems more plausible. Activity is, in the first instance, agential
and we come to know what it means by being agents.
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relation obtains between a particular simple mental event and the agential properties of mind.
For example, suppose mental properties P1 ground the essential features of volition V1 at time t1.
Now, at time t2 the agent wills a new volition V2. We can ask, “what explains the essential
character of V2?” It cannot be P1 because that entails V1 not V2. So, the ground must have changed
to P2 to accommodate this shift.
If so, then it seems like my account merely defers explaining what gives us, as agents,
our distinctive control over simple mental acts. The change in the ground is what actually
provides a metaphysically robust explanation. Moreover, we might then ask about the nature of
this change. If this change is causal then, in fact, causation is at the heart of what makes a simple
mental event count as an action. After all, in this scenario causal changes, at least indirectly,
determine what essential character the volition has.
This version of the objection clarifies why someone might think that a dependence
account of action is inadequate for explaining agential control. It fails, however, because it
misrepresents the scope of my account. A key feature of my account, which I discuss in more
detail in section 7, is its compatibility with a causal account of action generation. Much like
Ginet, I claim that the most plausible non-causal account of action should leave open the
possibility that simple mental acts are caused, they are just not actions in virtue of anything
causal. I argue that my account does this because the conditions for somethings existence are
different then the conditions that explain its essences, thus even if my simple mental acts are
causally brought about they are only acts in virtue of their essential dependence on my agency.
Hence, even if changes in the ground properties are caused this does not matter for the
volition expressing the essential character that it does. Though this causal explanation might
explain the existence of such events, their essential qualities including the intrinsically active
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control agents have over them is explained by their dependence on the agential properties of
minds. As noted above, such agential properties are what constitute agency, and thus no further
explanation is needed regarding why they count as something we control.89
At this point, a critic might note that a necessary relation like metaphysical dependence
undermines the openness of deliberation. That is, my account cannot adequately explain either
contrastive questions (e.g. why did the agent choose this rather than that) or free action (e.g.
could the agent will otherwise?). I do think that this concern merits further consideration,
however, I reemphasize that my account is an account of what makes an event count as an action
not what makes it count as a free action. These concerns track a worthwhile and interesting
question for an account of free action, but it is not a question my argument needs to address.
My account, then, can explain control adequately because active control is an intrinsic
essential feature of our simple mental acts and thus it is grounded in our agency, understood as
non-reductively constituted by fundamental interactive mental properties. Our agency is
paradigmatically (and essentially) something that generates control, thus though an independent
analysis of what control amounts to might be desirable as a supplementary project, my account
needs to go no further to explain the mechanism or source of control. Agency and control emerge
together. This response, however, depends on the intelligibility of my earlier and oft repeated
claim that my account is compatible with our actions being caused. It is time to examine this
claim in detail.

89

I also believe that my critic is relying on the controversial premise that all change is causal change. This claim,
however, does not seem obvious to me. This would, however, require further argument; for now it suffices to point
out that my account is compatible with the claim that the ground properties causally change.

153
7. Essential Metaphysical Dependence as Weak Non-Causalism
I follow Ginet (2002) in thinking that a non-causal theory of action should be compatible
with causation. We should say that agents in a wholly causally structured world are acting, they
are just not acting freely (p. 403). In Ginet’s account this compatibility comes from the fact that
though simple mental events are actions by virtue of their actish phenomenal quality this is
consistent with them being causally produced.
Similarly, essential metaphysical dependence leaves space for agents in a causally
structured world to still act. This is because my account grounds the essence of our simple
mental acts in mental properties and the conditions that characterize essence are separable from
conditions for existence. For example, the dog breed, “schnauzer,” might have certain properties
that obtain by virtue of its constitutive essence—such as, having four legs, being obedient, not
shedding, having a beard, etc. That any schnauzers exist, however, is not contained in this
essence. It is not essential to schnauzers that they exist, instead the breed’s existence depends on
many features outside of their essence—such as, the state of Holy Roman Empire in the 15th
century, the practical need for rat-catching dogs in medieval Europe, the intentional actions of
specific medieval breeders, etc.
Of course, considerations raised by Kripke (1972) regarding the necessity of origin might
seem to suggest that for any particular entity its existence conditions are given by its essence
(pp. 110-116). A skeptic could rhetorically ask, “isn’t it the case that this particular schnauzer—
named Scout, let’s say—essentially depends on the conditions for its existence?” Scout could not
have had different parents because were he to have had different parents he would be a different
particular schnauzer. As such, the conditions for existential dependence and essential
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dependence collapse together. It is part of Scout’s essence that he was brought about exactly in
the manner that he was.
This is a challenge for my view because if it is possible for it to be essential to our mental
acts that they be caused (that is, for the conditions for their existence to be given by their
essence), then it seems that in saying what makes a mental event an action I must make reference
to their causal production, at least in those possible worlds wherein mental acts are causally
produced. But, if this is true, then my account of action sometimes requires that it is sufficient to
appeal to a certain causal structure to characterize a mental action even though it is not
necessary. To admit this, however, raises questions about whether or not my account is
needlessly complex, if an event-causal story can explain why this mental event counts as an
action then perhaps we need only appeal to causation.
This raises many important questions. The first distinction to note is that there is a
difference between saying “that something essentially exists” and “that if something exists it
essentially exists in this way.” Even in the case of Scout, it is not true that he essentially exists
only that since he exists the conditions for his existence are essential to him. To have Scout exist
in another possible world we must replicate those same conditions for existence in that world. Is
it right, however, to conceive of this as an example of Scout’s essence? We’ve already
distinguished between modal conditions and essential conditions, these two conditions come
apart in interesting ways. Might it be the case that it is necessary for Scout to have the parents he
does but not essential? Alternatively, perhaps necessity of origin is part of the consequential
essence of Scout, without being itself part of its constitutive essence. I think both of these
suggestions might allow wiggle room to make the distinction between existential and essential in
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the case of a particular instance of some kind, however, below I consider an alternative response
that is even more direct.
Note that the reason this schnauzer’s origin is essential is in part because in rigidly
designating this schnauzer we name those things that actually constitute it. Whatever else we
might say about schnauzers they are constituted by matter essentially and thus this schnauzer is
constituted by this bit of matter essentially, hence its parents who are determinative of this bit of
matter are essential to this particular schnauzer. Is there an analogous move in action? It does
seem that there is a kind of necessity of belonging, it seems senseless to ask “could someone else
have willed my willings?” It is necessary that this willing belong to me.
Does that mean this willings’ manner of coming to exist is essential such that I cannot
distinguish between the existential and essential manners of dependence? Perhaps not. What am I
pointing to when I indicate this volition? In this case I “point” to something mental, not a bit of
matter as such, rather what this volition has as its essential constitutive features is the rational
content incorporated into the volitions by its grounding in interactive properties of mind. This
point might seem to presuppose a controversial picture of mind, but note that all this requires is
the falsity of naïve mind/brain identity theories, it is still compatible with many other views of
mind.
Let me give some examples. My claim is that even in the case of particular volitions we
can separate the conditions of existential dependence from the conditions for essential
dependence such that a particular simple mental act would still be an act of mine by virtue of
essential metaphysical dependence while its existence is explained by other factors, like causal
forces. This is so my view can be compatible with the plausible thesis that in a causally
structured world we would still act (unfreely), however, events would not count as actions by
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virtue of anything causal. To establish this, the key question is whether or not essential
dependence can adequately explain how particular actions belong to an agent independent from
existential considerations even in those worlds that are causally structured. I argue for this by
showing how all of the conditions that are physically required for causal existence of a simple
mental event might be met without the event counting as an action of the agent’s, thus providing
a counter-example. Consider the following case:
Equivalent Exchange: Suppose Non-reductive materialism and functional-realization
accounts are true. Mental properties and simple mental events, like volitions, are caused
by brain-states which functionally realize mental states. This means that different
physical bases (e.g brain-states, silicon-states, distributed neural network states, etc) can
realize the same token mental state. An agent, Diane, has a device implanted in her brain
by Martians as a baby. This device functions to help realize volitions through normal
causal processes. As such, when the device realizes the volition the essential features of
that volition (e.g. being constituted by the reason for which it is done, having a certain
phenomenal quality, etc.) are grounded in interactive mental properties, which
themselves are functionally realized by a different part of the brain. This device,
however, has a secondary function. Whenever Diane thinks about moving to Denver,
Colorado the device instantly transmutes her entire brain into a silicon based brain. The
causal structures that would normally produce brain-states remain unchanged, only the
nature of the physical base has changed. Diane wills to move to Denver.

How should we understand this case? It seems that certain conditions for the existence of Diane’s
volition have changed but it is still essentially grounded in the same mental property. After all,
that mental property can be realized by different physical basis. This, however, does not yet
show that my particular volitions are actions by virtue of their essential grounding alone, at best
it shows that the existence conditions for action are generic but still essentially required to count
as an action of mine. Here is a similar case:
Equivalent Exchange*: Everything is the same as Equivalent Exchange, except the
Martian device only replaces those physical substrates that underlie interactive mental
properties with a silicone based substance. Diane wills to move to Denver.
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Again, it seems two things remain the same. First, the causal chain that leads to these physical
substrates existing in the manner they do is structurally the same. Second, the mental states that
are realized by this substrate manifest the same dependence relationships, such that the volition
to move to Denver is grounded in the interactive properties of mind. The targeted change in the
substrate does not affect the causal relations that uphold the existence of their realized mental
types any more than the whole brain switch. Again, the point here is that the conditions for the
existence of Diane’s volition to move to Denver are not necessary for them to be an action of
hers. Of course, in one sense they are necessary insofar as some physical base is necessary but
this does not uniquely select the mental event as an action. Instead, its counting as an action
depends on the essential characteristics of that volition being grounded in that mental property,
neither of which make reference to that physical base (since it is compatible with many physical
bases).
The skeptic should still protest that while it is not necessary for a simple mental act to
have its essential character it is nevertheless sufficient. Surely if we know that a particular kind
of physical structure exists that can functionally realize a particular sort of mental property, and
its dependent mental events, then we also know that there is an action. Hence, the underlying
physical/causal structure is sufficient for characterizing when an event counts as a mental act.
Ginet (1990) considers a similar objection to his view (pp. 10-12). If volitions are caused
by neural structures in our brain then we should be able to explain what makes them an action by
reference to those structures. Ginet has two responses, first he notes that it is not conceptually
required for our simple mental acts to have an event causal structure. That is, the concept of a
mental act does not require an appeal to causation regardless of whether or not it is produced by
a causally structured neural process (or is even identical to that process). So, when we mentally
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say the French word peu as opposed to just having the French word peu come to our minds, we
must recognize the difference because of something intrinsic to the event. There is something in
the concept of a mental act that sets it apart from a mere mental happening and we recognize it in
the event. Whatever this indicator is that is intrinsic to the event it cannot be the fact that it is
caused.
This response, as stated, is not adequate. For, the causalist might respond that while it is
not conceptually part of our phenomenal concept of action it might be the case that actions have
causal components that are inaccessible to consciousness. This response is, in some ways,
analogous to the move Papineau (2002) makes when discussing the hard question of
consciousness.90 A causalist about action could make a similar move against Ginet and argue that
there are distinct phenomenal concepts by which we as conscious agents are aware of our actions
but this is merely an epistemic criterion that need not imply any deep metaphysical realities.
Ginet’s (1990) second response is given in his discussion of agent-causal views but it also
applies to the event-causal views of neural-structures. If our phenomenal experience of acting,
Ginet says, is merely a sign of an underlying causal structure then we need some explanation for
what makes the difference between veridical and non-veridical phenomenal experiences. Though
he does not say it directly here I believe Ginet is gesturing towards the problems of causal
deviance, he seems to think that extrinsic relations always have the possibility of obtaining
deviantly. Thus, we need some explanation for what makes the difference between mental events
and mental acts in the two cases. Ginet argues that since there is no phenomenally accessible
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Briefly, Papineau (2002) argues that materialists should be conceptual dualists and ontological monists about
mental properties. While we can refer to mental properties as material, it is also possible to refer to them as
phenomenal in virtue of how they feel. This does not mean they are non-physical, rather, it means that we have two
very different ways of think about the same physical property. Papineau argues that this difference in conceptual
reference is a result of the self-referential nature of conscious thought.
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difference on the causalist view then we really have no idea what the agent-cause (or eventcause) really is with respect to action. It is far more parsimonious to just appeal to the
phenomenal quality as making the difference between an act and a mere mental event.
Whatever the merits of this response for defending Ginet’s view, it will not be adequate
to defend mine. As noted above essential metaphysical dependence is a necessary connection
and thus it cannot fall victim to deviant chains. This is a boon for explaining how the essential
phenomenal character of our volitions might be a veridical indicator of the underlying extrinsic
metaphysical relation, however, once one grants this necessary connection it becomes harder to
separate essential conditions from the causal forces that underlie the existence of those acts in
causally structured worlds.
How then can I respond to the above criticism? Consider this final case:

Equivalent Alien Exchange: Everything is the same as in Equivalent Exchange* except
when the device targets the physical base for Diane’s interactive mental properties it
connects them instantly (via some sort of Martian wifi) to the physical base of another
agent, Clayton, who is also deciding to move to Denver. It is the interactive mental
properties that are realized by the alternate physical base that figure in Diane’s decision
to move to Denver, and vice versa.

What are we to make of this case? The previous examples make clear that differences between
physical basis do not matter with respect to the mental event that is realized, so the mere fact that
a different physical base is realizing the interactive mental property does not change anything.
Furthermore, the causal connections that lead to these physical states are going to be, I presume,
structurally isomorphic—both of them are brain states that are analogously produced. I contend,
however, that the volition that figures in Diane’s deliberation is not an action of hers, even
though the causal conditions for its existence in principle pose no problem for it being an action
of Diane’s. Instead, it is because the volition is itself disconnected from any mental property of
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Diane’s—it is Clayton’s mental property. It seems like the right account of the case is that the
mental event does not count as an action of Diane’s because it is not grounded in her agency and
this is true regardless of the causal conditions for its existence.
So, I conclude, it is possible that a condition for the existence of a given simple mental
act is some neural-event or brain state that causally explains the existence of the particular simple
mental event. What makes this simple mental event essentially an act, however, is the grounding
relation between the agent and the simple mental event not the causal structure that explains its
existence.
8. Conclusion
Action as essential metaphysical dependence combines the most desirable elements from
standard causal accounts, non-standard agent-causal accounts, and traditional non-causal
accounts. I agree with standard causalists that to make actions explicable in a world that is
otherwise causally structured we should appeal to an extrinsic relation; thus, avoiding the
methodological dead-end of dialectical stalemates. The non-causalists, however, are right to
think that the extrinsic relation of causation is unsuited to this task. Not only do causal relations
fail to account for what is distinctive about human agency, they also obscure agency itself. This
failure to adequately keep the agent in view is endemic to most standard accounts of action. One
desirable feature of agent-causal theories is how they link actions directly to the agent. My
account, by defining simple mental acts in terms of their dependence on fundamental mental
properties that constitute agency meets this final desideratum making it a true “agency-first”
account. Moreover, this manner of explaining actions clarifies and resolves the intractable
problems of “activity” and “control” that follow all theories of action. This already does much to
recommend this account as viable, however, there is one final objection that must be addressed.
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I analyze dependence in terms of “grounding” or a grounding-like notion. As I noted
earlier, grounding is traditionally understood as transitive. If so, then there is a serious objection
waiting for my account. If what makes my simple mental event count as an action is that it is
grounded in fundamental mental properties, but those mental properties are (in turn) grounded in
some further set of natural properties, then it seems my actions are also explained by virtue of
being grounded in these further properties. Transitivity means that the agent, once again,
disappears. Agency does not really explain what makes an event count as an action. This
objection is challenging, but I believe there is a response. In the final chapter—chapter 4—I
argue that the concept of “emergence” can explain how there is enough of an ontological “gap”
to avoid the transitivity objection. Moreover, such an emergent account of mental properties fits
well with the non-reductive picture of agency I propose.

162

CHAPTER 4: EMERGENCE AND THE TRANSITIVITY OBJECTION
I claim that what makes a simple mental event count as an action is that it essentially
metaphysically depends on the interactive mental properties that constitute agency—that is, it is
grounded in agential minds. This account of action is vulnerable to the “transitivity objection.”
Grounding is, typically, understood as a transitive relation. If A grounds B and B grounds C,
then A grounds C. Since I analyze “dependence” in terms of grounding, and since grounding is
transitive, it seems like my simple mental events are not only grounded in our agency but also
grounded in the underlying physical features that ground agency itself. This is a problem for two
reasons: (i.) if the dependence relation is what makes an event count as an action then my
account becomes too permissive, what explains actions can be the same underlying dependence
relations that explain non-actions. (ii.) If actions are explained by being grounded in properties
outside of our agency, then the agent does not explain the action in any meaningful way, the
agent disappears from my account of action.
This objection is challenging, but it can be met by allowing a “gap,” which breaks the
chain of transitivity. The central difficulty in this response is making the “gap” a plausible
feature of the world rather than just an ad hoc response to an objection. I argue that the concept
of “emergence” provides just such a solution. If agential-minds are emergent features of the
world, then I argue there is enough of a gap between the mental and the physical to allow our
actions to properly depend on us not on the underlying laws that ground us. Moreover, since
emergence still posits some sort of dependence between the emergent property and its “base”, an
emergent account would be compatible with our larger naturalist conception of the world.
Indeed, I hope to show that an emergent view is far from “radical” and may be supported by our
best science.
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In §1, I argue for this, first, by introducing the concept of emergence in general. I briefly
describe its intellectual history and connect it to various contemporary projects in metaphysics.
Second, I examine more closely the conceptual debates regarding emergence. In particular, I
focus on debates between unitary accounts of emergence, which describe emergence as a single
unified concept, and pluralist accounts of emergence, which describe it as having several distinct
types. In §2, I conclude that a synthetic understanding of the concept is most justified, wherein
the unitary accounts explain what emergence amounts to while the pluralist accounts explain
how it amounts to this. In the second half of the chapter, starting in §3, I turn to apply the
concept to my account of action, reveal what type or “degree” of emergence is needed for my
account. Finally, in §4, I consider the plausibility of emergence by briefly canvasing its use in
various sciences, I pay special attention to whether instances of “strong” emergence can be
justifiably posited given our best science. I conclude that not only can emergence solve the
transitivity problem, but it is open given our best science that such ontological emergence exists
in our world.
1. Emergence—History and Conceptual Development
An emergent property is, roughly, a property that is (in some sense) dependent on the base
properties that constitute or support it, while at the same time (in some sense) autonomous from
those properties (Corradini & O’Connor 2010, p. 3).91 Emergence was coined, as a concept, to
make sense of the seemingly independent nature of the special sciences. This tradition of ‘British
Emergentism,’ which started in the mid-nineteenth century and lasted well into the early 20th
century, began with John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic in 1843 and found its most mature
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These two hallmarks of emergence are often described in passing (Bedau 1997, p. 374; 2010, p.47; Wilson 2015,
p. 346), but more often they are, as Wilson (2015) notes, embedded in particular accounts of what those senses of
dependence and autonomy are (pp. 346-347, fn. 3).
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articulation in C.D. Broad’s The Mind and Its Place in Nature in 1925 (McLaughlin 1992, p. 49).
The British Emergentists were concerned with understanding the “levels” of reality as
demarcated by the special sciences. By their lights, though all entities were composed of matter
and governed by properties described by physics, some “higher” level entities described by the
special sciences possess causal powers that emerge because of those kind material structures that
they possess.
As McLaughlin (1992) notes, these arguments were motivated by the failure of reductive
projects between the chemical and physical levels of reality in the 18th and 19th centuries. This
made plausible the claim that there may be forces, and thus force laws, that are configurational,
which is to say that the law depends on the configuration of the lower-level entities that
constitute the higher-level entity (pp. 52-55). This specific project was rejected after the
successful explanation of chemical “forces” in terms of quantum mechanical understandings of
electro-magnetism (McLaughlin 1992, p.54).92
This failure made emergence fall out of favor for some years, but as non-reductive
approaches in philosophy of mind experienced a resurgence of interests in the mid-20th century
(see, Putnam 1963, 1967; Davidson 1970; Kripke 1972) emergence, of varying sorts, started to
gain ground once again. In addition, arguments against the reduction of the special sciences to
physics (Boyd 1980; Fodor 1974; Putnam 1973) made the concept of emergence an attractive
possibility for non-reductive materialists. In the sciences suspicion of non-reductive projects
continued, bolstered by the continuing success of molecular explanations in biology and
quantum mechanical explanations of chemistry. However, by the 1980 the advent of complexity
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McLaughlin (1992) points out that the last major work by the British Emergentists was by C.D. Broad in 1925
was immediately followed by the quantum mechanical revolution that spelled the downfall for the British
Emergentists project as it was conceived by its proponents (p. 57), further this point has been recognized by earlier
philosophers of science such as Nagel (1952).
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studies, information science, and computer science, had once again shifted the weight of
discussion. To be sure, reductive methodology is still widely used within scientific discourse, but
emergent theories are once again plausible within certain domains.
This large-scale development of emergent concepts in metaphysics has led to a proliferation
of theories. As noted above, all theories of emergence call for the emergent property to be (in
some sense) dependent on the base properties that constitute or support it, while at the same time
being (in some sense) autonomous from those properties. It is widely agreed (Wilson 2015;
Taylor 2015a; Kim 2006; O’Connor 1994), however, that explicating these two features of
emergent properties is a messy project. As such, many recent articles on emergence spend a
significant amount of time taxonomizing the complex theoretical terrain. My account is no
exception. I consider four general types of emergent autonomy that help categorize these diverse
theories—strong, weak, ontological, and epistemic. Before I discuss the four general types of
emergence, I introduce yet another distinction this time between research programs that
philosophers pursue in characterizing emergence.
I distinguish between the conceptual project and the empirical project. The conceptual
project aims to clarify what we mean by emergence, while remaining agnostic about whether any
emergent entities actually exist. By contrast, the empirical project aims to describe what
emergent properties or substances, in fact, exist. Most philosophers in the emergence literature
are engaged in both projects to some degree. Depending on the theories, the order of priority
between the two projects changes. Some philosophers clarify what they take to be the most
rationally defensible concept of emergence and then use the newly clarified concept to determine
what counts as existing emergent phenomena (Dennett 1991; O’Connor 1994; O’Connor &
Wong 2005; Taylor 2015a). By contrast, others start with the empirical phenomena, for example
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uncontroversial cases of emergence in scientific practice, and use these considerations to clarify
the concept (e.g. Batterman 2011; Bedau 1997, 2010; Castellani 2002; Kronz & Tiehen 2002;
Wilson 2013; Gillett 2016). The conceptual project can be further divided between those who
argue for a plurality of concepts (Bedau 2010) and those who argue that there is a single unified
concept of emergence (Taylor 2015a).
In this section, I primarily take up the conceptual project, although I inform this project
by reference to various examples of emergence that any adequate theory should take into
consideration. Specifically, I argue that we should be pluralists about the concept of emergence.
A pluralist about emergence believes that adequately explaining emergent phenomenon requires
at least two (perhaps several) distinct concepts that share a family resemblance. I take up the
standard distinctions between nominal, weak, and strong emergence. But I also argue for variety
between the types of autonomy that the emergent property might possesses: epistemic, causal, or
structural. I defend these claims in the next section against Taylor’s (2015b, 2015a) recent
arguments for a unified conception of emergence defined in terms of explanatory failure. I
conclude that while Taylor does identify a property that all forms of emergence possess, it is not
sufficient to define the concept solely in those terms. Now that the type of project I am pursuing
is clearly in view, I turn to taxonomize emergence by examining the four emergent
considerations—strong, weak, epistemic, and ontological.
When characterizing emergence, theorists first distinguish between whether the
emergence under consideration is “strong” or “weak.” Roughly, the strong/weak distinction
tracks the degree of autonomy that an emergent property has from its base. A strongly emergent
property is more autonomous from its base, a weakly emergent property less so. This autonomy
is then characterized in either ontological or epistemic terms. These two sets of considerations
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cut orthogonally across each other. For example, Chalmers (2006) suggests that the strong/weak
distinction tracks whether the emergent property is un-deducible from our knowledge of the
physical base as opposed to merely surprising or unexpected—this consideration is epistemic
(pp. 244-245). In contrast, Wilson (2015) argues that the strong/weak distinction tracks whether
the emergent property has at least one more power than its base, or if it has less powers than its
base—this consideration is ontological (p. 362).
This suggests that the primary consideration for characterizing an emergence property is
the autonomous side of emergence. That is, philosophers first attempt to distinguish both the
degree (strong/weak) and the characterization (ontological/epistemic) of the autonomy
conferring feature before considering other issues. This is a sensible method but it should not
obscure the other side of emergence—dependence. In what sense does an emergent entity
depend on its base and how is this dependence characterized? Obviously these two lines of
investigation overlap, different explanations of dependence are compatible with different
considerations of autonomy. In the interest of tracking the dialectic accurately, however, it is
useful to remember that characterizing autonomy is vital for establishing the type of dependence
prior to characterizing how such an autonomous feature might depend on its base.
With these general considerations in mind, I briefly note in Table 1 some ways that
emergent autonomy has been characterized. Given this large but still partial list of distinctions,
we should ask if there is any unifying feature that allows us to simplify the conceptual space. I
end this section by considering two such attempts, which inspire the conceptual debate I raise in
the next section—Wilson’s (2015) “powers” account and Taylor’s (2015a) “explanatory failure”
account. Wilson (2015) argues that the myriad of differences among accounts of emergence are,
in fact, superficial (pp. 347-349).
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Table 1. Varieties of Emergence.

Ontological
Characterization

Strong Emergence
Novel Powers- The emergent entity or
property has a new causal capacity not
found in its base properties or by a mere
summation of the powers of these base
properties.
Failure of Realization- The emergent
entity is not functionally reducible to the
set base properties as its realizer.
Non- linearity (strong)- The emergent
entity has features that cannot be
additively derived from the base
properties. The explanation for this
failure is a novel capacity interacting
with the base properties.
Etc. . .

Epistemic
Characterization

Failure of Conceptual Entailment- The
emergent entity does not logically
supervene on the its base. This means
that an idealized conceiver would, in
contemplating the base entity and the
emergent entity, be able to conceptually
conceive of one without the other.

Weak Emergence
Proper-subset of Powers- The
emergent entity possesses a nonempty proper subset of the token
powers of the base properties.
Degrees of Freedom (limit)- The
emergent entity requires less
independent parameters to
characterizes its states than its base
properties.
Non-linearity (weak)- The emergent
entity has features that cannot be
additively derived from the base
properties. The explanation for this
failure involves the complex
interactions of microlevel entities in
the base properties that can only be
identified at the macrolevel.
Etc. . .
Explanatory Incompressibility- The
emergent entity can be derived from
its base properties, but only by
iterating the systems’ microdynamic
while taking the initial starting
conditions as inputs. That is to say,
the emergent entity is derivable only
by “simulation.”

Etc. . .
Etc. . .

169
Wilson claims that, given what it would take for an emergent entity to be metaphysically
distinct from its base, there are two and only two schemas for characterizing emergence.
Moreover, both characterizations involve constraints imposed on the powers of the emergent
property with respect to the base. These two strategies track the “strong” vs. “weak” distinction
that other theories have indicated, but they do so in a more principled manner:
Strong Emergence: Token higher-level feature S is strongly metaphysically emergent
from token lower-level feature P, on a given occasion, just in case (i) S synchronically
depends on P on that occasion; and (ii) S has at least one token power not identical with
any token power of P on that occasion. (p. 362)
Weak emergence: Token higher-level feature S is weakly metaphysically emergent from
token lower-level feature P on a given occasion just in case (i) S synchronically depends
on P on that occasion; and (ii) S has a non-empty proper subset of the token powers had
by P, on that occasion. (p. 362)
Wilson (2015) means “powers” to be understood in as metaphysically neutral a manner as
possible. As she puts it, “talk of powers is simply shorthand for talk of what causal contributions
possession of a given feature makes (or can make, relative to the same laws of nature) to an
entity’s bring about an effective, when in certain circumstances” (p. 354). This is meant to track
the uncontroversial thesis that the way entities are contributes to what entities can do. Given this
frame, the Strong Emergence thesis captures well the intuitive claim that what matters most for
an emergent entity to be strongly autonomous is that it makes contributions to how the world
“unfolds” that are not reducible to the contributions of any of its parts.
The characterization of Weak Emergence requires more explanation. The proper subset
strategy was first posited and developed by Wilson (2011, 1999) to solve puzzles regarding
mental causation, however, it is useful as a general characterization of weak emergence. 93 It is
motivated, primarily, by cases of multiple realizability. The idea is that powers of a multiply

A strategy similar to this has, predominately, been associated with Shoemaker’s (2007, 2001) work on
realizability. Wilson’s (1999) earliest account, however, predates these later publications.
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realized type are those in the intersection of the sets of powers of its realizing features, and hence
these powers are part of a proper subset at the token level (p. 358). This schema ensures
autonomy in two ways, first it ensures ontological autonomy by simple non-identity. If the
higher-level emergent entity has only a proper subset of its base’s powers then it is distinct from
its base by Leibniz’s law. Second, it ensures causal autonomy by having a distinctive “power
profile” (i.e. a set, collection, or plurality of powers), rather than a distinctive power (p. 360).
One way to see the plausibility of this is to consider how a proper-subset view supports a
counterfactual or “difference-making” account of causal explanation. For example, suppose that
some mental state, M, is multiply realizable. Further, suppose, M, is the state of feeling hungry,
which causes an effect, E, of reaching for an apple. In this instance, M was realized by physical
state P, but suppose it had instead been realized by P*. Would E still have occurred? It seems the
answer is, yes, because the differences between P and P* do not matter for E, all that matters is
the powers associated with M. That is, all that matters is M’s distinctive power profile, which
contains just the powers crucial for E. This gives us, Wilson (2015) argues, a principled reason
for taking M to be efficacious with respect to E in a way distinct from P or P* (p. 361).94
Another, additional reasons to think that Weak Emergence still can guarantee a certain
kind of causal autonomy is that distinctive power profiles (at least sometimes) are governed by
(or ground) distinctive systems of laws. It is plausible that for certain special sciences, the laws
they posit track the powers of the emergent type S that has a proper subset of the powers of its
physical realizer, P. Moreover, it is plausible to think that systems of laws track causal features
in nature. Hence, S’s distinctive power profile may indicate a distinctive causal feature in nature.
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As Wilson (2015) notes, part of why this emergent schema is considered a version of weak emergence is because
it is compatible with E also being caused by P or P*. The thought is merely that difference-making considerations
give a principled reasons to think that M is distinctively efficacious with respect to E, insofar as M’s power profile
tracks those powers that are relevant to the production of E across counterfactual situations (p. 361).
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Such law-like causal stories might overlap, as in the overlap of the subset of powers shared by S
and P. But, if these causal features are, as a whole, different then there is a principled basis for
taking S to be distinctively efficacious with respect to its effects insofar as its powers are part of
a difference system of laws than P.95
Hence, the two schema’s—Strong Emergence and Weak Emergence—characterize
emergent accounts by specifying the different ways powers in an emergent entity may differ
from its base. Moreover, Wilson (2015) argues that, given the difficulties of maintaining the
independence of higher-level causation, these two schema provide the only principled basis for
explaining the metaphysical emergence of higher-level broadly scientific entities by ensuring
genuine autonomy. Strong autonomy, by virtue have having more powers than the base entity;
and weak autonomy, by having less powers than the base entity (p. 363). Wilson (2015) thinks
that the other, more specific accounts of emergence considered above all conform to one of these
two schema and agues for this in detail (pp. 363-388). She also argues that epistemic accounts of
emergence are either backed by some sort of ontological account (e.g. Chalmer’s 1996, 2006,
understanding of failure of conceptual entailment is meant to establish the strong emergence
scheme suggested by Wilson.) or are not a genuine account of emergence but rather reductive
physicalism offering a purely epistemic error theory for explanatory gaps. Of course, Wilson
recognizes that the motivations for these reductive epistemic accounts tracks broader motivations
for holding “genuine” emergent views (i.e. our failures in explaining higher-level entities). But,
these accounts assume ontological and causal reduction and locate the appearance of autonomy
in a mere failure of cognitive connection; hence, by Wilson’s lights, they ought not be
considered emergent accounts.

Wilson (2010) further defends this claim in the context of a “degree of freedom” account of non-reductive
materialism.
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This general schema of emergences which conceives of it as being centrally a
metaphysical concept capturing broad dependence and power based ontological and causal
autonomy is a good foil to Taylor’s (2015a) alternative schema for bring conceptual order to the
house of emergence. Taylor (2015a) argues that emergence is best understood as a unitary
concept that tracks explanatory failure of a certain kind. The motivation for sort of account is
twofold, first, it provides a unified concept that is flexible enough to be used by both scientists
and philosophers, thus allowing productive discussions about emergence without merely talking
past each other. Second, it solves a problem that Taylor (2015b) thinks is endemic to all
emergent theories, the collapse problem. In the rest of this section I present Taylor’s (2015a)
account and explain the primary differences between it and Wilson’s account. The collapse
problem I save till the next section, wherein I evaluate which of these conceptual accounts of
emergence is the most successful.
Taylor is motivated in part by a wider sort of conceptual unclarity. Taylor (2015a), like
Wilson, is also concerned with the messiness of philosophical theorizing, but by her lights an
equally important challenge is how the concept of emergence can be effectively deployed across
scientific and philosophical discourse (p. 654). As she notes, many philosophers think that the
difference between emergence as discussed in the sciences and emergence in philosophy is so
great that they are different concepts (pp. 656-657).96 Taylor (2015a) disagrees and claims that
much scientific theorizing about emergences maps onto philosophical debates, however, the
attendant philosophical unclarity obscurers this fact (p. 658). To address this unclarity for the
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Taylor (2015a) cites Chalmers (2006, pp. 1-2 [sic. pp. 244-245 in my document]) and Stephan (2006, p. 485). In
both examples, it is worth noting, the authors take the “scientific” concept of emergence to be something similar to
weak emergence as spoken of by philosophers. In contrast, Gillett (2016) argues that not only are the scientific and
philosophical concepts of emergence distinct, but this distinction cuts across the strong vs weak divide. That is, even
philosophical concepts of “weak” emergences are still inadequate for explaining emergence as used in the sciences.
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sake of improving both scientific and philosophical discourse Taylor (2015a) proposes using the
method of “rational reconstruction” to more precisely define emergences as used in scientific
and philosophical practice (p. 658).
Rational reconstruction involves taking a vague concept and making it more precise by
attending to its use within various domains. Such a method aims to unify the concept by taking
into account, insofar as is justifiable, the various uses of the concept. This project is not, Taylor
(2015a) argues, determined by the original use; revision of the concept is possible (p. 658). Such
revisions follow standard theoretical desideratum such as simplicity, fruitfulness, and accuracy.
These considerations are then weighed against the primary aim of unifying discourse and
preventing equivocation. Taylor (2015a) thinks that once this method is applied to emergence,
we find that all of the significant discourse can be subsumed under an ecumenical conception of
emergences as a kind of explanatory failure (pp. 658-659).
According to Taylor (2015a), emergence is best captured by the following explication:
(EM) Given components A, B, C . . . n arranged in relation r into a whole, and an
observer O, property x of the whole is emergent for O iff there is no scientific
explanation available to O of the fact that the following regularity obtains of natural
necessity: Whenever components A, B, C … n are combined in relation r, the resulting
whole instantiates property x. (p. 659)
A few of these terms require clarification. First, in this explication “components” should be
understood as merely a placeholder for whatever “bears” the base properties (or micro-level
properties, as Taylor prefers to say) and “whole” should be understood as a placeholder for
whatever bears the purportedly emergent properties (or macro-level properties). Second, the
“observer” is meant to indicate any observer or any number of observers. Third, and finally,
“explanation” should be understood very broadly. Though Taylor (2015a) considers it
“scientific” this merely indicates that whatever form of explanation should be salient to our
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understanding of empirical reality, insofar as this is the relevant domain of questions regarding
emergence (p. 660). Within these broad boundaries the concept of explanation can encompass
many different types, such as, mechanistic explanation, statistical explanation, deductive
explanation, computational explanation, etc.
Taylor’s (2015a) understanding of emergence, then, has several interesting features. First,
it follows that nothing is emergent per se but only emergent relative to an observer with respect
to a particular domain of explanation. This implies that a property’s status as “emergent” can
change depending on the observer and the domain of explanation. For example, the properties of
chemical compounds are emergent with respect to mechanistic explanation, but not with respect
to statistical quantum mechanical explanations. In like manner, a property might be emergent to
actual human observers but not to an idealized observer. It also implies that emergence is
prevalent and cheap, a point I will return to below. Second, it follows from Taylor’s account that
we cannot discern anything about how an emergent property obtains from the mere fact that it is
emergent. Sometimes, Taylor (2015a) notes, a property might be emergent for metaphysical
reasons at other times it might be emergent for epistemic reasons, but in both cases the presence
of the emergent property itself only indicates a certain failure of explanation with respect to a
certain (group of) observer(s) (p. 660).
Taylor (2015a) thinks that this conception is unifying in a justifiable manner because
there is an important conceptual connection between emergence and explanation, which is
present even in accounts that are not explicitly formulated in explanatory terms (p. 660). For
example, given the wideness of her concept of explanation, failure of conceptual entailment,
associated with Chalmers (1996), is a sort of explanatory failure. In like manner, a more
ontological account, like O’Connor’s (2000; O’Connor & Wong 2005), can be easily re-
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described in explanatory terms, a point evident from O’Connor’s own discussion. For example,
O’Connor (2000) speaks of emergence as a natural, non-structural property possessed by systems
that obtain a certain level of complexity, which exerts downward causation (p. 111). But, he goes
on to explicate a “non-structural property” as a property with powers that are not explainable by
reference to a mere summation of the powers of its micro-level constitutes (pp. 111-112; see also
p. 109). Likewise, he motivates accepting conceptually the distinctness of macro-level properties
and their unique causal powers by discussing the potential failures of lower-level laws to explain
all the physical processes of the system under consideration (p. 113). In both cases, the concept
of emergence used by philosophers can be made compatible with EM without doing violence to
their distinctive explanations for how the given property is emergent (presumably metaphysical
reasons for O’Connor’s and perhaps conceptual reasons for Chalmers).
Furthermore, Taylor (2015a) argues that EM is also preferable because its flexible
account of explanation and shifting definition of an “observer” encompasses a wide variety of
domains in both philosophy and sciences (p. 660). This allows it to meet the two primary aims of
rational reconstruction—unifying discourse and preventing equivocation—better than alternative
theories. This very flexibility might be taken as flaw in the theory. For example, if an observer
has mistaken or little scientific knowledge compared to another observer then it follows that
more entities would count as emergent for the first observer. Taylor (2015a) recognizes this but
thinks that the prevalence and “cheapness” of emergences is a benefit of her view (p. 661).
Explicating emergence in terms of EM reframes the discussion from why and whither an entity is
emergent to how and for whom an entity is emergent. This shift, then, gives theorists more
resources to consider what types of emergences are important and, importantly, why we consider
them important.
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For example, the emergence of an entity because of a failure of explanation that depends
on the scientific ignorance of the observer has very little, if any, philosophical interest qua
emergence. EM can explain this lack of importance in terms of the narrowness of its two main
variables (i.e. the type(s) of observer(s) and the kind of explanation). In this example, the
variables are greatly constrained. After all, the type of explanation at stake is not scientific
explanation as such but rather the flawed conception of scientific explanation idiosyncratically
held by a particular observer. In like manner, the observer in questions is a single, non-ideal, and
likewise idiosyncratic person. In contrast, interesting cases of emergences can be explained by
their wide construal of EM’s variables. For example, strong metaphysical emergence would
involve, plausibly, all observers and a robust and universally applicable type of scientific
explanation. Taylor concludes that since EM does not require that all cases of emergences have
equal importance and it gives us the resources to explain this differential importance in a
principled way; hence, the fact that it makes emergence widespread is not a problem for the
theory.
Wilson’s (2015) power-based account and Taylor’s (2015a) explanation-based account
are both attempts to impose conceptual unity on the discourse about emergence. In Wilson’s case
this unity is metaphysical; in Taylor’s case it is merely explanatory and therefore epistemic. Is
one to be preferred? Taylor (2015b) has gone on to motivate her account by raising a general
problem for all metaphysical accounts of emergence, which she calls the “collapse problem”
(pp.732-733). She argues that because no alternative accounts can adequately address this
problem her theory of emergence as explanatory failure is the only option. In the next section, I
consider the arguments surrounding the collapse problem as a way to evaluate the power-based
and explanation-based strategies of conceptual unification. I conclude that while metaphysical
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accounts can survive and respond to the collapse problem, the other desideratum that Taylor
(2015a) offers in her positive account requires that we take the epistemic construal seriously. I
end this section by offering a hybrid view which takes a certain type of explanatory failure to be
indicative of metaphysical emergence. This, then, allows us to return to apply my concept of
emergence to the case action as essential metaphysical dependence and thus address the
transitivity objection.
2. The Collapse Problem and a Hybrid Account of Emergence
Taylor (2015b) argues that all going versions of emergence face a generalized collapse
problem. This problem arises because emergent accounts presuppose a distinction between the
micro-level (base properties) and the macro-level (emergent properties), but for any instance of
emergence there are properties that on the face of it belong to the micro-level yet if included at
that level the purported emergent entity fails to be sufficiently autonomous (p. 732). Taylor
(2015b) calls these properties, “collapse-inducing properties”, because once included in the
micro-level the emergent macro-property effectively “collapses” down to that level (p. 732).
Moreover, there seems to be no non-arbitrary way to exclude these collapse-inducing properties.
Taylor (2015b) claims that this problem suggests that emergence tracks relationships between
arbitrary properties, rather than distinctions in levels of nature (p. 733).
The method for generating collapse objections is simple: for any micro/macro distinction
used in an account of emergence, find a micro-level property that crosses the line marking
emergent autonomy yet, according to the original micro/macro distinction, is still solidly part of
the micro-level (p. 744). This makes the problem quite broad. Here are two examples (one of
which Taylor also discusses) taken from the views presented above:
(Ex. 1) Weak Emergence via Underivability- The emergent entity can be derived from its
base properties, but only by iterating the systems’ microdynamic while taking the initial
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starting conditions as inputs. That is to say, the emergent entity is derivable only by
“simulation.”
This account of weak emergence is most associated with Bedau’s (2003a, 2003b, 1997)
descriptions of artificial life (or Alife) simulations, in particular Conway’s famous “Game of
Life” simulation. These Alife simulations consist of a grid in which each of the cells can be
either alive (filled) or dead (empty). The grid follows simple update rules that govern what,
given the current configuration of alive and dead cells, the cells will look like after a single tick
of the game clock.97 Though some configurations are simple enough that one can derive later
configurations via computational shortcuts, other configurations can only be derived via
simulation. That is, some later configurations can only be “discovered” through repeated
application of the update rules on the Alife world as we find it. Bedau contends that in these
underivable configurations have “weakly emergent” properties and underivability except by
simulation is necessary for weak emergence.
For example, Bedau (2003a) discusses how the ‘R-pentomino’ configuration of cells (a
configuration of five cells in a vaguely ‘R’ shape) starts off very simple yet evolves into an
increasingly chaotic state (p. 20). At later states the configuration starts to generate cohesive
combinations of cells that “move” across the grid (referred to as “gliders”) as they iterate living
and dying patters. This raises a question, does the ‘R-pentomino’ configuration propagate
indefinitely? The answer is ‘no,’ at the 1103rd iteration of the Alife world it settles into a stable
state of cells that do not expand out or create further “traveling” configurations (p. 20). But,
The four rules for Conway’s “Game of Life” are as follows:
For a space that is populated:
(1) Each cell with one or no neighbors dies, as if by solitude.
(2) Each cell with four or more neighbors dies, as if by overpopulation.
(3) Each cell with two or three neighbors survives.
For a space that is empty or unpopulated
(4) Each cell with three neighbors becomes populated.
97
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Bedau argues, there is no way to derive this fact prior to simulating each step for that
configuration of cells. Moreover, this is not a result of continent human limitation. A Laplacian
supercalculator presented with all of the initial information would also have to iterate each
subsequent step of the system in order to know that the R-pentomino halts at the 1103rd iteration.
Here, then, is the objection: according to Bedau, having a halting point at the 1103rd
iteration is an emergent property of the R-pentomino configuration. But, a filled cell in the Game
of Life has the dispositional property of forming a configuration whose development halts at the
1103rd generation when combined with other cells into an R-pentomino. Since this is the
property of a single cell, this is plausibly part of the micro-level, however, if it is included in the
micro-level then the supposed emergent macro-property is derivable from the micro-level.
Hence, the emergent property ‘collapses’ into the micro-level (Taylor 2015b, p. 737).
Of course, Taylor (2015b) notes that any observer faced with the R-pentomino
configuration for the first time would be unlikely to know that the configuration halts when it
does, however, such knowledge is beside the point. The question is whether, in fact, a filled cell
has the dispositional property and thus it is irrelevant whether anyone knows if it has the property
(p. 737). Having the property is all that is necessary for establishing the collapse objection. I now
turn to a second example, this time of strong emergence:
(Ex. 2). Strong Emergence as Novel Powers: The emergent entity or property has a new
causal capacity not found in its base properties or by a mere summation of the powers of
these base properties—that is, the new property is non-structural.
A view like this has been predominately associated with O’Connor and Wong’s (2005) strong
emergentist account as well as O’Connor’s (2000) earlier work on agent-causation. In both cases,
the emergent property is understood as a non-structural natural property that is exemplified when
systems attain an appropriate level of complex organization. The micro-properties that are so-
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organized jointly cause the occurrence of the emergent property, which then non-structurally
exhibits novel downward and linear causal powers (p. 111; O’Connor & Wong 2005, pp. 663667). A property, P, is “structural” just in case the proper parts of entities with P themselves
have properties that are not identical to P and jointly stand in a relation, and this state of affairs
just is the entity having P (2000, p. 663). So, to say that the emergent property is non-structural
is to say that its existence is over and above the composite of properties had by its base, that is, it
is the claim that some basic or fundamental properties are had by composite individuals (p. 664).
This view is also subject to the collapse problem, perhaps even more obviously than in
the previous weak emergence example. If the micro-properties already have, by O’Connor’s
lights, the disposition to jointly cause the emergent property when organized in the appropriate
way, then it is reasonable that they also have the disposition to exhibit the macro-level causal
power via producing the emergent property when organized in the appropriate way. But, if so,
then the supposedly novel power of the emergent property just is one of the potentialities of the
micro-properties. Hence, the strongly emergent property collapses to the micro-level.
In sum, emergent properties were thought to mark genuine levels in nature by establishing real
distinctions between properties that trace nature’s joints. The collapse problem suggests that
emergence merely tracks arbitrary distinction between properties and offers no indication of real
or significant differences.
The most natural way to resist this problem is to somehow restrict which properties can
legitimately be included in the micro-level. If these ‘collapse inducing properties’ can be
excluded for principled reasons, then the collapse problem is no longer applicable. Taylor
(2015b) argues that all of the most plausible ways to do this fail by making the conditions for
distinguishing between the micro-level and macro-level both too restrictive and too permissive.
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Taylor (2015b) considers three distinctions one might use to try to exclude collapse
properties from the micro level: (1) the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, (2) the dispositional/nondispositional distinction, and (3) natural/non-natural distinction (pp. 739-744). I briefly rehearse
her responses. Regarding (1), the emergentist may want to restrict micro-properties to only
include properties considered intrinsically. This is both too restrictive and too permissive. It is
too restrictive because many micro-level scientific properties are extrinsic. For example, the
property of being a synaptic cleft is an extrinsic relational property between two neurons that is
fundamental to structures in neuroscience. Moreover, such a property plausibly operates as the
micro-base in many emergent accounts of conscious minds. It is too permissive because, as many
theorists hold, dispositional properties are often understood as intrinsic. So, even if we restrict
the micro-level to include only intrinsic properties the properties that generate collapse in many
cases would still be included.
Taylor (2015b) argues further that strategy (2), directly ruling out dispositional properties
from the micro-level, also will not work. This strategy seems plausible, in part, because most of
the collapse inducing properties were themselves dispositional. But, this tactic is, again, both too
restrictive and too permissive. It is too restrictive because there are many natural micro-level
properties that are considered dispositional and yet are not collapse inducing. For example, the
property of being a working neurotransmitter receptor. This property has the requisite stimulusresponse structure of dispositional property and yet it is a perfectly respectable neuroscience
property without any danger of collapse. Eliminating dispositional properties would also be too
permissive, since there are some properties that generate collapse yet are not dispositional. For
example, Chalmers (1996; 2006) takes an emergentist view of consciousness, wherein all facts
about the world are logically necessitated by fundamental physical facts except for facts about
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consciousness. Instead, the fundamental physical facts in the base properties are related to
emergent properties by psychophysical laws. But, Taylor (2015b) argues, this property of being
governed by the Psycho-Law, if included at the micro-level, would mean that the micro-level
logically entails the emergent properties (p. 738). Thus, Chalmers’ proposed distinction
collapses. Moreover, the property of being governed by the Psycho-Law is not a dispositional
property, it has no clear stimulus-response type structure. Hence, even if we exclude
dispositional properties from the micro-level, there will still be collapse inducing properties.
Finally, Taylor (2015b) considers (3), distinguishing between natural and non-natural
properties. Natural properties are those properties that figure in natural laws or play a role in
causation. They are thought to serve as the ground for other sorts of properties and are
distinguished from non-natural amalgamations or mere Cambridge properties.98 This attempt,
Taylor (2015b) argues, also fails. It is too restrictive for two reasons. First, because the
natural/non-natural distinction is usually understood as a spectrum, we would have to find some
point on that spectrum to exclude properties from the micro-level (p. 743). This attempt runs the
danger of being ad hoc if it merely targets properties known to generate collapse, but if it instead
restricts it to only perfectly natural properties then it is far to0 restrictive since there are many
plausible base properties that are not perfectly natural (e.g. certain structural properties). Second,
the natural/non-natural distinction does not make good sense of examples like the Artificial Life
case discussed above. In this case, none of the properties consider are natural full-stop, but if

The term “Cambridge property” comes from discussions in the mid-20th century regarding the criterion of change.
An initial proposal was that an object has change just in case it is true (false) that it has property P at time T 1 and
false (true) that it has property P at time T 2. That is, change was thought to track the gaining or losing of properties.
This, however, so-called “Cambridge criterion” was shown to be overly simplistic because an object can gain or lose
properties without undergoing a change (i.e. Socrates gaining the property of being taller than infant Plato merely
by virtue of Plato being born). These properties, which undermined the Cambridge account of change, became
known as Cambridge properties, in part because of Geach’s (1969) terminology that first highlighted the problem.
For more a more detailed account of these properties and their features see Francescotti (1999).
98
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naturalness is context dependent than the lines of demarcation of even blurrier.
Moreover, this attempt is also too permissive. Taylor (2015b) argues that properties like
those considered in the Chalmers example above (e.g. being governed by a Psycho-Law) are
plausibly natural, but if so than at least some collapse inducing properties are still included (p.
743). Given these problems, Taylor (2015b) concludes that the only way to avoid the collapse
problem is to shift discussion from properties in the world to the kind of explanations being
offered in emergent accounts. Taylor argues that what is going wrong in examples of collapse is
a violation of explanatory principles. This, then, points to a conception of emergences that is
focused on a kind of explanatory failure, such as that elucidated in her other work (2015a).
As Taylor (2015a) argued, one reason to endorse her explanatory conception of
emergence is that we already hold that there is a conceptual connection between emergence and
explanatory failure (pp. 660-661). Here (2015b) she argues further that her conception provides a
simple solution to the collapse objection (p. 748). Instead of restricting the collapse inducing
properties from the micro-level base properties, she advocates a principle which excludes them
from being part of the explandum of an explanatory relation. She does this by arguing for the
following minimal condition on explanation:
Let us say that two sentences are ‘factually equivalent’ iff there is no metaphysically
possible world in which either sentence is true and the other false. So, for instances, ‘all
ravens are black’ and ‘all non-black things are non-ravens’ are factually equivalent . . . I
propose that no explandum can be explained by a sentence to which it is factually
equivalent. (2015b, p.749)99
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She makes two further points here, first, that this is only a minimal constrain since it obviously takes a lot more
for one sentence to explain another. Second, there is one important set of exceptions to this rule. In cases where the
explanadum is metaphysically necessary, no attempt at explanation will meet the factual non-equivalence condition,
however, one might think that certain metaphysical necessities still admit to certain kinds of explanations (e.g.
mathematical explanations). But, even so, these exceptions should be small.
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She calls this the “factual non-equivalence” criterion. This account and her explanatory construal
of the concept of emergence (EM) provides all of the resources needed to prevent collapse
problems from occurring. According to Taylor, the collapse inducing properties provide a
powerful objection to traditional theories of emergence because there is no principled way to
exclude them from the micro-level. In contrast, given the explanatory account of emergence
provided by EM the only way a collapse objection could succeed is if the collapse inducing
property provides an explanation which fills the explanatory gap. Call such an explanatory
scheme a ‘collapse account.’ It is evident, however, that such collapse accounts violate the
factual non-equivalence criterion.
For example, consider again Bedau’s (2003a) Artifictial Life example. On the EM
account the fact that the regularity ‘whenever five living cells are combined into an R-pentomino,
the resulting configuration halts at the 1103rd iteration’ is without an adequate explanation is
what grounds the claim that Alife simulations have weakly emergent properties. The previously
considered collapse inducing property was a living cell has the dispositional property of
generating a configuration that halts at the 1103rd iteration when combined with four other
living cells in a R-pentomino. If this is still to be collapse inducing for an EM version of Alife
emergence, then the collapse inducing property should figure in a collapse account that explains
the purported explanatory gap. This explanation, however, takes the following form: “A living
cell has the dispositional property of generating a configuration that halts at the 1103rd iteration
when combined with four other living cells in a R-pentomino and that explains why living cells
in a R-pentomino form a configuration that halts at the 1103rd iteration.” Clearly, this runs afoul
of the factual non-equivalence criterion and as such this proposed property cannot induce
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explanatory collapse, but since emergence just is a kind of explanatory failure on EM, neither
can in induce an emergent collapse.
In sum, Taylor (2015b) has further supported her account by both showing that all other
metaphysically construed accounts are subject to the collapse problem and then showing that the
collapse problem itself seems to point to the EM’s account of emergence as the only viable
alternative. I now consider two reasons to believe that Taylor’s construal of the collapse
objection fails.
Skiles (2016) criticizes Taylor’s (2015b) solution to the collapse problem on two fronts.
First, he argues that the explanatory principle regarding factual non-equivalence that she adverts
to as a solution to the collapse problem is faces counter-examples. Second, he argues that there is
still a successful version of the restriction strategy that takes the essential/non-essential
distinction as a principled way to exclude collapse inducing properties from the micro-level. I
briefly consider these proposals in reverse order.
Skiles (2016) argues that collapse can be avoided by appeal to the concept of something’s
“generic essence.” In particular, the suggestion is that we can avoid the collapse of emergent
property, S, by requiring that its micro-physical dependents, P, taken ether individually or
collectively do not have S as part of their generic essence (pp. 837-840). As Skiles (2016) puts it,
“we demand the collection of features that constitutes a micro-level base of an emergent feature
[S], be pure of [S]” (p. 840). Skiles (2016) uses Correia’s (2006) specification of generic essence
here in order to generalize the concept, and regimenting what it means for something to be
“involved” in the generic essence of something else.100 Skiles concludes that restricting the
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Some of the specifics are similar to Fine (2015) attempts to clarify the concept, which I discussed in chapter 3.
These are different enough, however, that it is useful to briefly canvas the details of Correia (2006) account as used
by Skiles. Correia’s (2006) formulation is meant to capture both the generic essence of collections and individuals:
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micro-level properties in this way is principled and avoids the difficulty of excluding too much
or too little, which plagued other attempts (pp. 839-840). Taylor (2018a) responds to Skiles
proposal by raising two potential objections to his response to the collapse objection. First, she
argues that since Skiles admits that tit is part of the generic essence of the collection of features
being sodium and being chlorine that when combined these create a compound that is watersoluble, then it seems there is no way to block the inclusion of many other features as part of the
generic essence that collection (e.g. when combined these an ionic compound, when combined
these create a salt that is white in colour, etc.). If so, however, then the generic essence becomes
merely a list of true conditions about the collection of features, rather than an account of what it
is to have those features (p. 392).
To truly capture the essence of being sodium and being chlorine we must instead focuses
on features by virtue of which those mere “true conditions” obtain, such as their respective
atomic numbers. This, Taylor (2018a) argues, is a problem for Skiles because it shows we do not
have a good reason to take “when combined creates a compound that is water-soluble” to be part
of the generic essence of being sodium and being chlorine, as opposed to merely another true
condition of those features (p. 392). As Taylor (2018a) concludes, “if water-solubility is not part
of that generic essence, then properties involving water-solubility cannot be excluded from the
micro-level base of water-solubility, and Skiles’ solution to the collapse problem is undermined”
(p. 392). In like manner, Taylor (2018) argues that Skiles claim that “forming a compound that is
water-soluble” is not part of the generic essence of being sodium but is part of the generic

⊟F1, F2 . . . P
Where this reads “what it is for an entity to have F1 , some (perhaps different) thing to have F2 . . . is (at least in
part) for the proposition that p to be true” (Skiles, 2016, p. 839) So, ‘p’ reports the generic essence of F1 and
F2 as a collection. Importantly, this answers the question “what does it mean to have a given feature?”
(generic essence), not “what kind of thing is the feature?” (objectual essence).
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essence of the collection being sodium and being chlorine is tenuous at best (pp. 392-393). There
seems to be no principled reasons for attributing the water-solubility to the collection but not the
individual features.
Taylor’s (2018a) objections to Skiles account raise good questions, but they seem to
depend on an understandable yet unfortunate misreading of Skiles (2016). Contrary to Taylor’s
(2018a) claim that Skiles requires the collection of Na and Cl have the feature “forming a
compound that is water-soluble” as part of their generic essence, Skiles (2016) states the
opposite:
The distinction [between features taken individually or collectively] is important, as even
if one resists that it is part of the generic essence of Na (i.e. being sodium) what occurs
when it is bound with Cl (i.e., being chloride), and vice versa, one might nonetheless
accept the following as a truth about the generic essence of the two features taken
together:
⊟Na, Cl Ɐx Ɐy (x is bound with y to form NaCl →ⱻz (z is water soluble))

Presumably, though, the ‘genuinely novelty’ [sic] required for water solubility to be
emergent—and thus, the proper way to formulate the ban against features that threaten
it—would preclude water solubility from appearing in the very nature of being Na and
being Cl, take either individually or collectively. (pp. 839-840, emphasis added)
Given this, Taylor’s (2018a) objection to Skiles account fails to address the account as stated.
Moreover, because of the severity of this misunderstanding even if we reconstruct Taylor’s
(2018a) objection so that it addresses Skiles’ actual claim, it still does not succeed. After all,
Skiles would agree that “being water-soluble” is merely a “true condition” of the collection
being sodium and being chlorine precisely because “water-solubility” is the target emergent
feature, and thus should be excluded from the generic essence of the micro-properties either
taken individually or collectively.101

101

I hasten to add that Skiles’ (2016) only explicitly uses examples that take the collapse properties to be attributed
to individual micro-properties, even though he clearly implicates both individual and collective properties when he
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There are still, however, reasons to reject Skiles (2016) response to the collapse problem.
Baysan and Wilson (2017) argue that whatever merits it might have there remain two significant
concerns. First, the notion of essence itself remains, for many, conceptually obscure and thus its
specification is notoriously contentious. This is not a decisive reason to reject such a theory,
however, since the collapse problem is a very general concern there is wisdom in seeking a more
ecumenical approach (p. 77). Second, and more decisively, several going accounts of broadly
scientific properties suggest that they are individuated by the laws they enter into. This entails
that the essences of micro-level features of a purported emergent would fail to be “pure” of the
emergent feature as Skiles requires, hence, collapse would remain a threat (p. 77).
What of Skiles’ (2016) negative argument against the “factual non-equivalence”
(hereafter FN) criterion used by Taylor (2015b) to solve the collapse account? Skiles uses the
famous example of a flagpole and its shadow, widely attributed to Bromerger (1966), to develop
a counter-example to FN along the following lines:
p=def. The flagpole’s height is 10 meters,
pc=def The background conditions required to derive q from p,
q=def. The length of the flagpole’s shadow is 5 meters.
Skiles (2016) argues that the conjunction of (p⌃pc) explains q. Moreover, if pc is held fixed then
p and q are interderivable. Thus, (p⌃pc) and (q⌃pc) are factually equivalent by Taylor’s definition
since there is no metaphysically possible world in which either is true while the other is false.
According to FN, a sentence cannot be factually equivalent to what it explains, yet, plausibly
(p⌃pc) partially explains (q⌃pc). Hence, FN is false by counter-example (pp. 835-836).

generalizes the account. This choice of examples did Skiles no favors and, I suspect, contributed to Taylor’s (2018a)
misreading.
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Skiles (2016) notes that his objection has two key parts that might be questioned. First, he
claims that FN is a requirement for partial explanation, since the same motivations that justified
our acceptance of FN in the case of full explanation (e.g. avoiding circularity) also apply to
partial explanation. Second, he proposes that any sentence that appears in a full explanation is a
partial explanation (pp. 836-837). Hence, since (p⌃pc) fully explains q, it should be a partial
explanation of (q⌃pc). If these two steps work, then it seems that Taylor (2015b) solution to the
collapse problem also fails.
Taylor’s (2018a) response to Skiles fairs better than her objection to his positive account,
but I argue that it should also be rejected. Taylor (2018a) gives two objections to Skiles counterexample. First, she claims that since pc appears in both the explanans and the explanandum
Skiles objection runs dangerously close to self-explanation. Given this, Taylor (2018a) argues,
we should be suspicious of the claim that (p⌃pc) at least partially explain (q⌃pc) (p. 388). This
response is too thin to go through. Skiles (2016) does have an argument for this claim, which
involves iterating his earlier principle:
(PE) It is at least sufficient for a sentence (or sentences) to yield a partial explanation if
conjoining it (or them) with other sentences yields a full explanation. (p. 836)
Given this, consider the following argument (Skiles 2016, p.837):
Given the following definitions:
p=def. The flagpole’s height is 10 meters,
pc=def The background conditions required to derive q from p,
q=def. The length of the flagpole’s shadow is 5 meters.
And the principle (PE)
(1) Let b = the conjunction of sentences (S1⌃ S2⌃ S3 . . . etc), that together fully explain Pc
(2) If so, the conjunction (p⌃pc⌃b) together fully explain q⌃pc
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Therefore:
(3) By (PE), (p⌃pc) partially explains (q⌃pc)
Minimally, this shows that Skiles claim regarding the explanatory relation between (p⌃pc) and
(q⌃pc) is supported by the sufficient condition for partial explanation, (PE), given above. As
such, the self-explanation worry is less important than addressing (PE) directly, something that
Taylor (2018a) goes on to do, which I discuss below.
We also might use this argument to avoid the self-explanation worry in the following
manner. In the above schematic form, it seems that (p⌃pc) fully explains ‘q’ and b fully explains
pc, which is why the conjunction (p⌃pc⌃b) together fully explain the conjunction (q⌃pc). But, if
so, then in the partial case what is being explained by (p⌃pc) just is ‘q,’ however, since the
statement under consideration is (q⌃pc) it is a partial explanation since it only explains the ‘q’
part of (q⌃pc). I am not sure Skiles would agree with this way of visualizing the explanatory
relationships, but at the very least it would avoid any charge of self-explanation.
Leaving these speculations aside, Taylor (2018a) next argues against the Skiles’
underlying principle (PE) directly (pp. 388-389). Here she asks us to consider a fully physical
explanation of a complex physical event, in this case Andy Murry winning the 2016 Wimbledon
final. Such a full explanation will make reference to gravity and hence the following sentence
will appear: “according to Newton’s law of universal gravitation, a particle attracts every other in
the universe with a fore directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely
proportional to the square of the distance between them.”102 Taylor (2018a) notes that if (PE) is
true, then the above sentence must be a partial explanation of Murray’s win; however, intuitively
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it is not even a partial explanation of the win (pp. 388-389). I take it the intuition tracks the
thought the sentences about gravity, though necessary for a complete physical explanation of a
given event, are too far removed to partially explain the same event.
I do not share this intuition. To be sure, the above sentence about gravity figures in
explanations of almost all events, but this generality and “distance” from the target explanans
does not mean it does contribute at all to partially explaining that event. I suspect what Taylor’s
(2018a) intuition tracks is the salience of explanations in certain conversational contexts. It is
true that in most everyday context when someone asks “why did Murray win?” appeal to gravity
would not answer the question, even partially. This is not, however, because gravity is not a
partial explanation of the event of Murray winning, objectively understood. Rather, it is because
when asking that question what we usually mean is something like, “assuming all the normal
background conditions, what additional factors explain Murray’s win?”
Taylor (2018a) recognizes the need to further support her intuition and appeals to
contrastive explanations (p. 389). She claims that, “an explanation of Murray’s win would help
us to understand why it occurred as opposed to not occurring” (p. 389). This need for a
contrastive explanation, or as Taylor (2018a) puts it a favoring explanation, supports the intuition
that sentences about gravity are not even a partial explanation for Murray’s win since gravity
says nothing about why Murray won rather than lost (p. 389). Of course, as Taylor (2018) notes
not all explanations are contrastive explanations, however, she claims that all is needed is one
case to provide a counterexample to (PE) (p. 389, fn. 13).
I believe this claim is incorrect. Remember, Skiles posits:
(PE) If conjoining a sentence (or sentences) with other sentences yields a full
explanation, then this is sufficient for it (or them) to yield a partial explanation.
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It makes no claims regarding contrastive explanations. In order for the objection to go through it
would have to be:
(PE*) If conjoining a sentence (or sentences) with other sentences yields a full
explanation, then this is sufficient for it (or them) to yield a partial contrastive
explanation.
I doubt, however, that Skiles would accept this principle. Adding the contrastive requirement to
the antecedent of (PE) does not help either:
(PE**) If conjoining a sentence (or sentences) with other sentences yields a full
contrastive explanation, then this is sufficient for it (or them) to yield a partial contrastive
explanation.103
This, even if a plausible principle, does not make good sense of the counter-example. For, it is
unclear to me whether laws of gravity would figure in a “full contrastive explanation” of the
event of Murray’s win. This is because, by my lights at least, “contrastive-explanation” serves to
narrow the domain of explanation while “full explanations” serve to widen it. Thus, without a
clear account of what a “full contrastive-explanation” amounts to, I am not sure how to evaluate
Taylor’s counterexample.
These considerations show that Taylor’s (2018a) defense of her FN principle are
insufficient. We should not, however, miss the broader point. The central contention between
Skiles and Taylor, I suspect, revolves around how “metaphysical” explanations should be taken
to be. Both Skiles and Taylor agree that some types of explanatory circles undermine
explanatory power, but they disagree about how these vicious circles should be characterized.
Skiles (2016) argument is about how Taylor’s (2015b) factual non-equivalence principle is
insufficient for characterizing this constraint on explanation. Though Skiles does not frame it in
this way, I believe his argument works because Taylor’s account ignores questions of priority.
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That is, the debate between Taylor and Skiles mirrors debates concerning the relationship
between dependence and modality. As I discussed in chapter 3, modal covariance may not yet
say anything about what depends on what. In like manner, Taylor’s (FN) principle is a modal
principle, but it does not yet say what explains what. Put flatfootedly, the flagpole has
explanatory priority over the shadow even if background conditions are held fixed such that
statements about the shadow and statements about the flagpole were interderivable. Flagpoles
explain shadows, not the other way around.104
Of course, if Taylor’s (2015b) attempt to solve the collapse problem fails for the reasons
brought up by Skiles (2016) and if Skiles’ own attempts at a solution are inadequate as Baysan
and Wilson (2017) suggest, then we still need to address the collapse objection. Here I advert to
the work of Baysan and Wilson (2017) who show, convincingly, that there are several wellmotivated distinctions that would allow an emergentist to defend a metaphysically construed
sense of emergence against various forms of the collapse objection, including Taylor’s. Their
argument is primarily aimed at defending various forms of strong emergence against collapse,
but if a collapse defense of strong emergence is possible then weak emergence would not be hard
to support. Baysan and Wilson (2017) argue that there are four distinctions that would allow for
a principled defense from the collapse objection: (1) direct vs. indirect powers, (2) Lightweight
vs. substantial dispositions, (3) Powers relativized to fundamental interactions vs. new powers,
and (4) Strongly emergent objects. (p. 54).
The distinction between direct and indirect allows the emergentists to concede that, in
some sense, the micro-physical level “inherents” the powers that are attributable to the macro-

I suspect this style of critique, and Taylor’s (2018a) recent responses, are motivated by a disagreement regarding
the metaphysical robustness of explanation. Skiles seems committed to a more “realist” account whereby scientific
explanation tells us something about the entities that explain, whereas Taylor seems more comfortable with a “antirealist” or at least “pluralist” conception of explanation, which tends towards a more epistemic flavor.
104
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level, but the emergentists then deny that these powers are had in the same way. The thought is
that the micro-level base do not have the feature directly or in an immediate way, instead they
only have it indirectly. Baysan and Wilson (2017) argue from analogy to temporally extended
causal chains, where even though each link in the chain is sufficient for the next we can still
distinguish between direct and indirect causes (p. 79). Just because there is a causal link between
my birth and my lighting a fire in the fireplace does not mean that “lighting a fire” is not a novel
event, nor does it mean that my birth has the power to light fires, except perhaps indirectly.
The second strategy, distinguishing between metaphysically lightweight and substantial
dispositions, allows the emergentist to concede that the micro-level does have dispositions that
bring about emergent features, but they then deny that these dispositions are metaphysically
substantial. Instead, they are mere preconditions for the possession of the relevant emergent
feature (2017, pp. 80-83). This avoids problems, noted by Taylor (2015b) that come from merely
excluding all dispositions from the micro-level, instead it notes that some dispositions are
different in character. Of course, the work now must go into determining whether or not a given
disposition is lightweight or substantive, but prima facie the intuitive reaction that collapse
inducing properties are somehow “cheap” or “missing the point” suggests that the burden for
doing this lies with the proponent of collapse.105
The third principled response involves a more stringently scientifically grounded
distinction. Baysan and Wilson (2017) note that it is a scientific truism that powers are dependent
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Taylor (2015b) notes this same intuitive reaction to collapse properties in light of her own explanatory response,
As she says, “we can see that this result [i.e. that collapse properties violate a basic explanatory principle regarding
factual non-equivalence] accords with a common, intuitive response to collapse objections, which is something
along the lines of ‘that’s cheating’ or ‘that’s clearly not what the author meant.’ The collapse objections generate
dissatisfaction, and the connection between emergence and explanation reveals why this is the case . . . collapse
objections simply bypass that explanatory work. A collapse objection is an attempt to establish ‘on the cheap’ that
some property is non-emergent, and so it makes perfect sense to regard collapse objections as illegitimate.” (p. 751).
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on, in some sense, fundamental forces or interactions.106 For example, the power to bond to
another electron is grounded in the electromagnetic interaction, as opposed to the strong nuclear
interaction; or the power of a chair to uphold a human without them falling through is grounded
in the gravitation and electromagnetic interactions jointly, etc. (pp. 83-84). The thought is that
there are strong scientific reasons to think both that there are fundamental interactions/forces and
the powers of ordinary objections, systems, and events are metaphysically dependent on such
interactions (p. 84). If so, then we could define a metaphysical conception of emergences as
whether the emergent property both depends on a physical base but also possess a power that is
not dependent on any fundamental forces or interactions, that is to say, it would count as its own
fundamental force or interaction.
This account clarifies what it would mean, metaphysically, for something to have a new
fundamental power (as in strong emergence) and as such provides a principled reason for
excluding certain higher-level features from the micro-base. The emergentist can concede that,
relativized to fundamental interactions, the micro-level might inherit all the powers of any
feature they necessitate, it could still be that composite features are associated with powers that
are “new”, in not being grounded only in the set of physical fundamental interactions (pp. 8489).
Finally, Baysan and Wilson (2017) argue that an emergentist could hold that strongly
emergent features must be instantiated in a new object, different from the micro-level object’s
base features (pp. 89-90). On this view, the collapse objection would plausibly be blocked
because if no micro-level object is suited to be the bearer of the strongly emergent feature, where
this feature distinctively involves a new power, then it is likewise plausible that the micro-level
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features had by the micro-level objects also do not have that power (p. 89). Effectively, the new
object strategy flips the collapse objection. Instead of the possession of a disposition or property
entailing a collapse from the macro-level to the micro, the possession of a property entails the
expansion of salient objects and features.107
We have considered two ways of unifying the concept of emergence, Wilson’s (2015)
“power-based” conception and Taylor’s (2015a) “explanatory failure” account. Moreover, we
examined at length the collapse problem, an objection that Taylor (2015b) raises against all
current philosophical accounts of emergence especially those that are more metaphysically
situated. Taylor (2015b) intends this problem to support an argument for her preferred
conception of emergence as the only solution. I concluded that, in light of her debate with Skiles
(Skiles, 2016; Taylor, 2018a), her solution to the collapse problem does not succeed. Further,
even if Skiles’ preferred solution also does not work, Baysan and Wilson (2017) have
persuasively argued that there are several principled ways for an emergentist to respond.
Where, then, does this leave us? Even if the collapse problem can be addressed without
endorsing the Taylor’s (2015a; 2015b) account of emergence, there are other consideration that
recommend her account, such as its conceptual unity and dialectic clarity. My preferred
conception of emergence is a synthetic view that unites the dialectical clarity of Taylor’s
explanatory failure account, with the metaphysical import of Wilson’s power-based account. I
claim we should combine the two conceptual strategies for two reasons. First, given that
emergence is used in many discursive contexts in both science and philosophy, there is strong
reason for preferring a unitary conception of emergence as such. Moreover, because of the strong
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Baysan and Wilson (2017) also note that this strategy might work for weak emergences as well, at least under the
“proper-subset” strategy (p. 96). In such a case, it may be that having a proper-subset of the micro-level powers
might itself sometimes entail a new object to bear such a property.
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conceptual connection between emergence and explanation, I agree with Taylor that the best
generic characterization of emergence will focus on explanatory failure. Second, it is important
to recognize that though emergence appears in many discursive contexts, these contexts share an
important feature. Concepts of emergences are deployed within debates regarding reductive or
non-reductive accounts. It is in this context that the concept of emergence was both developed
and utilized, thus I agree with Wilson that having a concept with metaphysical import is crucial
for capturing emergence as it is actually used.
Given the above considerations, I argue that emergence, as such, is related to strong
emergence and weak emergence, as a genus is related to its species. Consider the following:
Generic Emergence (GE): A feature, F, is emergent from its microphysical base, B,
where B is constituted by elements a, b, c, . . . etc. standing in relation R, just in case (i.)
as a matter of nomiological necessity that F depends on B and (ii.) there is either no
scientific or no metaphysical explanation for (i.) in terms of B.
Strong Emergence (Species I.): A feature, F, is strongly emergent if (GE) is true
because F has one token power not identical with any token power of B on that
occasion.
Weak Emergence (Species II.): A feature, F, is weakly emergent if (GE) is true
because F has a non-empty proper subset of the token powers had by B, on that
occasion.
These schema attempt to incorporate and relate the explanatory account of Taylor (2015a) with
the power-based account of Wilson (2015). I have adjusted the explanatory account to remove
the observer-relative notion that Taylor (2015a) emphasizes. Given that the concept of
emergence is situated in debates about reductive and anti-reductive metaphysics, I concur with
Wilson’s (2015) claim that weak observer-relative emergence is not best understood as an
account of emergence, but rather an error theory in support of reductive metaphysics (p. 396).
Given that emergence was conceptually developed as an alternative to reduction, explicating a
generic understanding of the concept in a manner that excludes such types of observer-relative
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emergence is both useful and justified. Moreover, removing the observer-relative notion from the
generic definition is consistent with my background assumptions of explanatory realism.
I have also adjusted the generic definition to included either scientific or metaphysical
failures of explanation in an inclusive disjunct. This is meant to capture minimal cases of weak
emergence that may be explainable scientifically at the micro-physical level, by a non-linear
mathematical apparatus for example, yet are ontologically distinct, by Leibniz’ law, and thus not
metaphysically explained by the micro-physical level. As Wilson (2013) argues, certain kinds of
non-linearity, such as when a higher-level entity exhibits fewer degrees of freedom than its base,
are both “theoretically deducible” yet “ontologically irreducible” (pp. 227-229).108109
The emergent species are primarily applications of the strong and weak emergent schema
proposed by Wilson (2015), I have taken them up with little change in part because I favor her
more metaphysically robust construal of the concept. The only adjustment is in altering the first
half of the schemas to reflect what makes them both belong to the emergent genus Thus, the
second half of these schemas (e.g. the “New Power Condition,” and the “Subset of Powers
Condition”) becomes a differentia for the generic first half. This provides an answer to the
question, in what sense are both of these emergent?” without losing the metaphysical specificity
of an individual species-level account.110

I am glossing over an important feature of Wilson’s (2010) discussion, namely that there are actually three
different ways that the degrees of freedom of higher-level special science entities might be characterized in contrast
to the degrees of freedom of their micro-physical components: “’reductions,’ ‘restrictions,’ and ‘eliminations’ in
degrees of freedom” (p. 281). Strictly speaking, only “eliminations in degrees of freedom” support weakly emergent
entities in Wilson’s account.
109
As a brief reminder, a “degree of freedom” is roughly “an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity
as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior” (Wilson 2010, p. 281). The
term is drawn from scientific discourse; however, it also has useful applications in metaphysics, metaphysics of
nature, and philosophy of science. For an early explication of this concept, applied specifically to the relationship
between supervenience and determinism, see Thalos (1999a; 1999b).
110
Given Wilson’s (forthcoming; 2014) arguments against unnecessary unification and for concept pluralism in
discussions of grounding and dependence, I suspect she might be against the modifications I have made. In
response, I would point out that one salient difference between emergence and grounding is that emergence is
108
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With this hybrid, genus/species account of emergence in hand, we can now turn to the
primary task of applying this concept to the transitivity objection to my agency-first account of
action. In the next section I articulate the objection more precisely, then I consider how the
resources of emergence offer a way out of the objection. I then, in the final section, consider the
plausibility of the sort of emergence needed to avoid the transitivity objection.
3. The Transitivity Objection and Emergent Agency
In chapter 3 I gave the following analysis of what makes an event count as an action:
Action as Essential Metaphysical Dependence (ver. 3): A mental event e is an action
iff by virtue of the constitutive essence of interactive mental properties, P; P fully
grounds all the properties brought about (or propositions made true) by virtue of the
constitutive essence of e.
Part of the rational for having e’s essence fully grounded in P rather than partially grounded was
to ensure that this account explains action uniquely in virtue of its relation to agency. If such
dependence was only partial and distributed, then my account would have failed to say anything
interesting. But, a natural criticism is that my own use of the full grounding relation to describe
how action-events relate to agents undermines this motivation. Grounding is, as I noted in
chapter 3, traditionally understood to be a transitive relation. As such, if it is part of the essence
of the properties that constitute our agency that they ground simple mental action-events and if,
plausibly, our mental properties have their essence grounded in some lower-level features, then it
follows that the simple mental action-event is also grounded in these lower-level features. Hence,
if the relation of essential metaphysical dependence, construed as grounding, is meant to explain
what makes an event count as an action, a critic can rightly ask why did I stop at the agential
properties? Why not, instead, posit that what makes an event count as an action is that they are

explicitly used in scientific discourse. As such, the justification for attempting to provide a unified conception is, I
believe, higher.
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grounded in some micro-features that themselves ground agency? It seems, given transitivity, the
ontological buck is passed down to the more fundamental supporting features and as such the
agent, once again, disappears.
What is needed is a principled reason for taking the dependence of simple mental events
on agential-properties and exclusively on agential properties to explain why an event counts as an
action. I first consider two potential strategies for doing this that will not succeed before turning
to my preferred response, which involves emergent mental properties.
An initially promising response involves the essential/existential distinction that I first
investigated in chapter 3. Recall that, roughly, existential questions ask what is necessary for
something to come into being, to begin or continue existing, whereas essential question ask what
is required for something to be the sort of thing it is, to be itself rather than some other kind of
thing. These correspond to different types of dependence relations: existential dependence and
essential dependence. The relationship between the conditions for somethings existence and the
conditions for something’s essence are closely interconnected, but they can come apart. As I
discussed, the dog breed, schnauzer, has many essential features (e.g. four leggedness, whiskers,
stubborn disposition, etc.), which explain what makes a schnauzer be the sort of thing it is. None
of these, however, explain the existence of schnauzers. Instead, the existence of schnauzers
depends on certain facts outside of their essence (i.e. the political and social state of 15th century
Germany, the need for rat-catching dogs in medieval Europe, the intentional actions of some
breeders, etc.).
One might suggest that the transitivity objection can be avoided by claiming that while
there is a transitive chain of existential dependence, essential dependence can in principle be
separated from this. After all, I have already argued at length that essential dependence need not
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collapse into existential dependence. If such a distinction can be maintained transitivity does not
need to be invoked for the essence of actions, only their existence.
This response does not, however, address the objection. The criticism leveled at my
account involves chains of essential dependence. Insofar as the agential properties of mind have
essential features, it is appropriate to ask what makes these features be what they are, upon what
do they essentially depend? If that question is answerable, then there is still a problem of
transitivity, for whatever essentially grounds them would also essentially ground the simple
mental events that are basic actions.
Another, perhaps more plausible response, is inspired by one of Baysan and Wilson’s
(2017) attempts to solve the collapse objection, is to distinguish between direct and indirect
grounding (p. 67, fn 10; pp. 78-80). There are two ways to see this, first, suppose that necessity
of origin is true and that this is an essential feature of entities. If so, then I essentially depend on
the Big Bang. It seems that, even if this is true, it is not as salient for explaining upon what my
thoughts essentially depend. If I answered the question, “what makes thoughts the sort of things
they are” with “the Big Bang” this would, even if true, miss the point. Even if various features of
me depend on distantly past events or fundamental laws they depend on these things only
indirectly rather than directly.
The second way to make this point is inspired by Yates (2016) in his discussion of what
he calls the “grounding objection” to physically acceptable strong emergence (pp. 834-837).
Yates (2016) is arguing that we can make sense of strong emergence as an “in virtue” relation,
wherein a given entitiy qualitatively realizes feature, F, wholly in virtue of its basic physical
properties, B. The novel power, P, however, is solely exhibited in virtue of F, and it is necessary
that F’s exhibit P (p. 835). In other words, P indicates that F is strongly emergent, in virtue of its
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sole dependence on F. The critic, however, points out that since F is grounded in B, and P is
grounded in F, it seems that P must really be grounded in B and thus P does not indicate
emergence of any kind. The emergent power collapses.
Yates (2016) claims that the problem is that the critic is confusing the abstract logical
relation of generic grounding (what Yates calls, “Grounding” with a capitol ‘g’) with the
particular grounding relations (or “little-g grounding”) involved between the B and F or F and P
(p. 835). The key point is that the sense of “in virtue of” is different in each instance, in the first
instance the “grounding” relation is one of “qualitative realization,” whereas in the second
instances the “grounding” relation is one of “causal power conferral” (p.835). Both of these are
instances of the “Grounding” relation, but they are distinct “grounding” relations. This
distinction between relations offers a principled way for Yates (2016) to avoid the grounding
version of the collapse objection.
Both Baysan and Wilson’s (2017) arguments regarding direct/indirect dependence and
Yates’ (2016) argument about generic Grounding/particular grounding relations offer principled
ways to mark breaks in chains of transitivity. Might they be useful for my purposes? Yes and no.
I hold that both of these attempts, especially as they are situated in larger accounts of emergence,
are on the right track. I have two concerns. First, Baysan and Wilson’s (2017) appeal to more or
less direct dependence has vague boundaries, a fact they readily acknowledge (p. 80). Given that
my project aims to answer what makes a simple mental event count as an action, it seems
preferable to advert to a distinction with sharper boundaries if possible. Yates (2016) proposal is
closer to what I would prefer, however, it is very specific to his account of strong emergence.
Though I am, in general, sympathetic to strongly emergent accounts of mind (include broadly
physicalist ones like Yates’), for a broad account of action like essential metaphysical
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dependence, it would be methodologically preferable to not make it depend on a particular
account of strong emergence. That being said, Yate’s view is, roughly, on the right track. In what
follows I will, using it as inspiration, apply it in conjunction with my hybrid account of
emergence to solve the transitivity problem.
I claim that agential properties are plausible candidates for emergence, if anything is,
though I will remain agnostic as to whether this emergence is weak or strong. Recall, that generic
emergence is defined as:
Generic Emergence (GE): A feature, F, is emergent from its microphysical base, B,
where B is constituted by elements a, b, c, . . . etc. standing in relation R, just in case (i.)
as a matter of nomological necessity that F depends on B and (ii.) there is either no
scientific or no metaphysical explanation for (i.) in terms of B.
So then, my claim is that the agential properties of mind as a matter of nomological necessity
depend on some physical base properties (i.e. brain states, micro-physical states, etc.), but there
is not a scientific or metaphysical explanation in terms of those base physical properties for the
agential properties of mind. This statement of GE is already suggestive. In chapter 3 I noted that
my preferred conception of metaphysical dependence construed grounding as backing
metaphysical explanation, in the same way that causation backs causal explanations. Moreover,
as I noted in the Introduction, I am presupposing explanatory realism, which claims that—all
other things equal—explanations (or failures of explanation) tell us something about what
determines the explanandum. Given these prior assumptions, the failure of explanation in GE
with respect to agential properties already suggests a failure of grounding. In some sense, the
agential properties are not wholly grounded in their base, because if they were they would be
explainable in terms of their base alone.
We want to know, however, how this failure fits with my account of action. The species
of GE are Strong Emergence and Weak Emergence:
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Strong Emergence (Species I.): A feature, F, is strongly emergent if (GE) is true because
F has one token power not identical with any token power of B on that occasion.
Weak Emergence (Species II.): A feature, F, is weakly emergent if (GE) is true because F
has a non-empty proper subset of the token powers had by B, on that occasion.
I am following Wilson (2015) in taking “power” to be defined very broadly. Let’s examine how
each species of emergence would apply to my account of action.
Species I. The agential properties are not explainable in terms of merely their physical
base properties because the agential properties have the power to perform complex actions,
which is not identical with any of the powers of the base properties. Moreover, agential
properties have this power in virtue of how simple mental acts are wholly essentially grounded
in these properties. Remember, my view is that simple mental acts (i.e. volitions) are basic
actions, more complex actions have such basic actions as their causal source. So, then, the
“power” had by agential properties just is the power to cause complex actions via volitions and
this power is “had” in virtue of the agential properties fully grounding the essence of these
volitions.111
Given this account, I claim that the transitivity problem can be avoided in a manner
similar to the collapse problem. That is, the sense in which the agential properties “depend” on
their physical base is different than the sense in which a volition “depends” on the agential
properties. It is this difference that, in part, marks out the agential properties as an emergent
feature. My suggestion dovetails with Barnes’(2012) account of strong emergence.112 She claims

I am assuming a power can be “had” in this lose sense even if it is never actualized. So, in a world where an
agent has volitions but is unable to perform any complex actions, the agential properties would still be emergent in
virtue of the unique power that they have, which the agent (tragically) can never utilize.
112
Strictly speaking Barnes (2012) is using considerations from debates in meta-ontology to characterize ontological
emergence in part to say something about the usefulness of meta-ontology for questions in first order metaphysics. I
largely ignore the nuances of this feature of her argument, instead focusing on her insights regarding strongly
emergent properties.
111
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that the thesis of strong emergence amounts to the claim that some things which are fundamental
are also ontologically dependent. More generally, the metaphysical distinction between
fundamental and derivative cuts orthogonally across the distinction of dependent and
independent—if so, then if emergent entities exist, they are those entities that are fundamental
yet ontologically dependent. The autonomy of the emergent entity is to be explained in terms of
this fundamentality, especially one indication of fundamentality in nature is the existence of
genuine, non-derivative, powers.
Earlier, in chapter 3, I proposed that a minimal condition of fundamentality is a kind of
domain specific explanatory failure. There I suggested that agential mental properties were
fundamental within the domain of the mental, drawing an analogy to baseline properties of
consciousness. This means that these agential properties cannot be explained in terms of more
fundamental mental properties that give rise to them, rather they can only be characterized by
pointing to the other properties they support or give rise to, in this case simple mental events like
volitions. This, in light of the connection between explanatory failure and emergence, both
speaks to agential properties being emergent features and provides a solution to the transitivity
objection. For, if there is a break in explanation then, given the connection between explanation
and dependence, there is also a break in the transitivity of grounding.
This is not to deny that agential mental properties aren’t, in some sense, dependent on
their physical base for their existence. However, the part of those features that make them
fundamental or autonomous would be, by definition, not explainable in terms of the base and so
are qua fundamental or autonomous feature grounded in the physical base. Put differently, I
deny that simple mental acts are grounded in the dependent part of the emergent property, but
rather only the autonomous part. This provides a principled reason for denying the transitivity of
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dependence with respect to simple mental events, they are still wholly characterized by their
essential dependence on the agential properties and not the underlying base properties that
support the essence of the agential properties themselves.
We might, naturally, want more details here. I wish to remain agnostic concerning the
details of particular emergent relations, in part because I do not believe we know enough to be
certain. But, here is a toy example that is plausible enough: Suppose that O’Connor and Wong’s
(2005) dynamic causal emergence account is, roughly, correct for characterizing how physical
base properties produce a baseline emergent property. On this picture, then, agential properties
would depend on their base properties in the sense of causal dependence. Once generated,
however, the emergent properties then give rise to new features. For example, suppose that once
the baseline emergent agential properties are generated they non-causally ground the essences of
volitions, which confer the power of acting on agential minds. If so, then the fundamental and
autonomous aspects of the emergent property, in virtue of which it is rightly called emergent,
stand in a different relation (one of essential metaphysical dependence characterized by
grounding) to those features that it generates, than it does to its own physical base. This explains
how we can dismiss the transitivity objection in a principled way.
Species II. The agential properties are not explainable in terms of merely their physical
base properties because the agential properties have the power to perform complex actions,
which is a proper subset of the token powers had by their physical base on this occasion.
Moreover, the agential properties have this power in virtue of how simple mental acts are wholly
essentially grounded in these properties. It is natural to worry that weak emergence, unlike
strong emergence, does not have the ontological resources to avoid the transitivity problem. I
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argue, however, that even this minimal account of emergence can avoid the objection in a
principled way.
Remember, the proper subset is meant to show how there can be genuine emergence
without rejecting any standard physicalist desideratum. In this case, the weak emergentist denies
that all instances of causal overdetermination are metaphysically problematic. As Wilson (2011)
claims, the weak emergence necessary for non-reductive physicalism holds that certain special
science entities (e.g. minds) are nothing over-and-above their physical base, that is they are
physically realized (pp. 121-124). These special science entities, however, are also autonomous,
that is, they are “distinct from and distinctively causally efficacious as compared to—the lowerlevel entities upon which they depend” (p. 121).
The proper-subset strategy holds that the higher-level entity is physically acceptable
because it is nothing over-and-above its physical base, it is realized by its base and the novel
powers it has are also possessed by a subset of the base. It is for this reason that the weakly
emergent entity does not participate in problematic over determination. In one sense, both the
physical base and the emergent entity are causing a given effect, however, the weak emergentist
would claim that there is only one power on offer here. Thus, the sort of “overdetermination” (if
that is even the right word) is not akin to problematic firing squad cases. As noted above, the
autonomy, both ontological and causal, is provided by virtue of the distinctive profile that the
special science entity “has,” which enters into special science explanations and causal
interactions. If an entity possess a proper subset of its base’s powers, then it is ontologically
distinct simply by Leibniz’s law (Wilson 2011, p. 129). It is distinctively causally efficacious in
comparison to its base because it has a distinctive causal profile. The thought is that for the
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emergent entity to be causally distinctive it does not require that it has a new power, it is enough
that it have a distinctive set or collection of powers (p. 129).
One way to see this is to consider multiple realization. Following Wilson’s (2011)
example, suppose that a mental state, M, of “being tired” causes the effect, E, of desiring coffee
and suppose M is realized by physical base P. Now, suppose it was also realized by different
physical state P*, in relevantly similar conditions. Would M still cause E? Plausibly, yes,
because the only powers that matter for E’s occurrence are the subset of powers associated with
M, all the other powers that differ between P and P* are irrelevant. That M’s power profile (i.e.
its collection or set of powers) is salient for E’s occurrence is a good reason to think that M’s
power profile is distinctively efficacious as compared to P overall.
Moreover, these subsets of powers are what enter into special science laws and
explanations, and it is plausible to think that if a particular subset of powers, had by an entity, is
consistently referenced in the laws and explanations of a well-established science, this is
sufficient reason for taking it to be tracking a distinctive causal contribution. This is meant to go
hand-in-hand with the generic conception of “power” that Wilson is using, which we discussed
above. Remember, the generic sense of “power” is just supposed to track the simple idea that
what a particular can do depends on how it is—that is, what features, structures, or properties it
has or is composed of. As Wilson (2011) explains, “it is in virtue of being massy, not magnetic,
that a magnet falls to earth; in virtue of being magnetic, not massy, that a magnet attracts steel;
and so on” (p. 126). So, then, the emergent property in the weak case has a distinctive power, not
because it is new, but because it has a distinct collection of powers, and in light of the special
science entity being this way (rather than the physical base being that way) it can make the
causal contributions that it does. This larger point about the possession of powers—even if this
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is merely the possession of a collection, set, or plurality—underwrites the claim Baysan and
Wilson (2017) make regarding the potential of a “new object” strategy for avoiding the collapse
objection, for it might be that sometimes the existence of a new object is required to bear the
distinctive subset of the powers of the base entities (p. 96, see also pp. 92-93, and p. 93, fn 23).
How then does all of this fit with my account of action such that it provides a principled
reason for rejecting the transitivity objection? On this view, the agential properties are only
weakly emergent, this means that they are physically realized by some base entity (e.g. brain
states), but they possess a distinctive subset of the powers of this physical base. In this case, it is
the subset of powers associated with causing complex actions, but this subset is “had by” the
agential properties in virtue of their fully grounding simple mental events—volitions. This is
meant to track the plausible claim that the entity that is associated with the subset of powers both
is not identical with its base (by Leibniz’s law) and is causally distinctive and that the
conjunction of these facts suggests that the bearer of this proper subset is a new, though
admittedly only weakly emergent, entity.
This limited sort of novelty is enough to avoid the collapse objection, but I argue it
avoids the transitivity objection as well. For, in this case, while the physical base broadly
grounds the existence of the agential properties, it does not ground, qua physical base as such,
the essence of the agential properties. For, these essential features of the agential properties, the
kind of features that in turn fully ground simple mental acts like volitions, are only grounded in a
proper subset of the physical base, but this subset is not, as argued above, the same as the
physical base. Rather, this subset alone just is the essential ground of the agential properties and
their subsequent powers. This means that there is, in some sense, a complete scientific
explanation for the distinctive powers of the emergent entity, after all, it is a subset of the
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physical base. But, there is still a failure of metaphysical explanation in terms of the physical
base, because we must posit an ontologically and causally distinctive entity to “track” this proper
subset and the contributions it makes to causal outcomes. This is consistent with my account of
the genus “emergence,” or GE, which requires that there is a failure of either scientific or
metaphysical explanation. My claim, then, is that this break in metaphysical explanation
provides a principled reason for thinking there is a break in essential dependence as well, given
the close conceptual connection between grounding and explanation and my background
assumption of explanatory realism.
Put differently, there is nothing scientifically unexpected regarding the actual powers
possessed essentially by the agential properties in virtue of their grounding volitions, which is to
say that there is nothing scientifically surprising about their existence. What makes them
essentially the kind of thing they are, however, requires reference to the emergent level entity in
order to “fix” the essential features, but if this “fixing” presupposes the emergent entity then it is
not really essentially explainable in terms of its physical base alone. That is, the agential
properties are contextually fundamental at the level of mental properties and thus weakly
emergent.
Interestingly, this weak emergence interpretation of my account of action has some
resemblance to Ginet’s (1990) response to claims that physical brain events are the non-actional
cause of volitions, which then causally explain actions (pp. 9-10). Against this claim, he notes
that any brain processes that, plausibly, underwrites our actional mental processes are already
actions themselves, thus they cannot explain what makes something count as an action by the
mere fact that they causally underwrite volitions (pp. 10-11). Because of this, Ginet (1990)
famously claims that even if volitions are identical with certain neurological causal processes it is
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not in virtue of these causal processes that they count as actions instead it is something intrinsic
to the simple mental event, which has no further causal structure (pp. 12-13). In like manner, the
weak emergence view articulated above supposes even if agential properties have powers
identical to a proper subset of the powers of its base, this cannot explain what it is for these
properties to be what they are. Instead, we must look at what they essentially do at the level of
mental properties to characterize them and it is at this level that in virtue of their essential
grounding of simple mental events that these agential properties possess the powers they do.
4. Conclusion—A Question of Plausibility?
The above considerations show that, though initially challenging, the transitivity
objection can be addressed in a principled way by applying the concept of emergence. Moreover,
my account can remain agnostic regarding whether strong emergence or weak emergence best
characterizes the relationship of the mental to the physical.113 In either case, the emergence of
agential properties answers the transitivity objection by providing principled reasons for holding
that a mental property is either all-things-considered fundamental, as in strong emergence, or
contextually fundamental, as in weak emergence. Furthermore, this fundamentality goes hand-inhand with a kind of explanatory failure, either scientific or metaphysical, which provides strong
reasons to doubt the continuity of essential dependence relations. Even if the above account is
correct, however, there is a final lingering question: “is such a view plausible?” Emergence, of
all sorts, has been subject to much doubt concerning its scientific respectability. Thus, even if
this is a possible solution, one might worry it is not a plausible solution for any theory that
wishes to remain scientifically respectable.
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As an aside, I note that I am sympathetic to a strongly emergent account of the mental, especially the agential
features of mind, which plausibly possesses new and fundamental powers.
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Answering this concern fully would be beyond the scope of this project, however, I partly
support the plausibility of my appeal to emergence by canvasing the various ways that
emergence is returning to scientific discussions. The upshot of these examples is simply that
emergence, of both strong and weak verities, is a live option at nearly all levels of scientific
study. Moreover, the seriousness of these options is reflected in the lively debates between
scientific reductionist and scientific emergentists.
I take Gillet’s (2016) monograph on scientific emergence as my point of departure, and
most of the examples I use are either referenced by or related to research programs that he
mentions. I should also note before engaging with specific examples that I am deliberately
eliding some details about how both the scientists and philosophers of science I mention are
using the concept. Undoubtedly, sometimes the conceptualization of emergence used in one
research program will contradict that used in another domain. Moreover, Gillet’s (2016) own
notion does not neatly fit with the conception of emergence I propose above. Again, the aim of
this conclusion is merely to establish that emergent interpretations of scientific data and theories
is a viable scientific interpretation and not merely an invention of philosophers. Merely
indicating the existence of the debate, without clarifying the details of every account is sufficient
for this aim.
The explanation for why emergence has returned to scientific discourse is disputed.
Biophysicist Harold Morowitz (2002), famous for his work on the application of
thermodynamics to living systems and the emergence of life, argues that scientific emergence
has its roots in the early development of statistical mechanics, which was then accelerated by the
rise of both information and complexity studies—aided by computers—in the mid-20th century
(pp. 9-14). Gillett (2016) points to theoretical physicist Philip Anderson’s seminal 1972 article
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on the tension between symmetry breaking in physics and certain reductionist paradigms of
explanation as a “first salvo” in the present set of emergentist debates (p. 3, fn 6).114
Regardless of the genesis of contemporary scientific reduction, there is no doubt that it
has come to play an important role in contemporary theorizing. So much so, that Robert
Laughlin (2005), a prominent condensed mater physicist, has boldly proclaimed:
Much as I dislike the idea of ages, I think a good case can be made that science has now
moved from an Age of Reductionism to an Age of Emergence, a time when the search for
ultimate causes of things shifts from the behavior of parts to the behavior of the
collective. (p. 208)
This is, I think, perhaps a little too hasty. As Gillet (2016) rightly observes, the question of
whether reduction or emergence is the right scientific research paradigm is still an open question;
in part because more empirical evidence is needed or because even where evidence is suggestive,
there has not been enough attention paid to plausible rival explanations (pp. 322-323). However,
given statements such as McLaughlin’s (1992) conclusion that though emergentism is rationally
coherent its defenders do not have a “scintilla of evidence” for their claims, the mere fact that
there exists a lively debate in various sciences is a far better empirical situation for supporters of
emergentism than the first half of the 20th century provided (p. 90-91).115 It is with an eye
towards this overall contested yet scientifically lively situation that I provide the following,
suggestive examples.116
Philip Anderson (1972). “More is Different: Broken Symmetry and the nature of the Hierarchical Structure of
Science.” Science, 177, pp. 393.
115
Indeed, so lively it has appeared in congressional testimony. The funding debates regarding the so-called
“supercollider” in the late-80’s and mid-90’s involved, among other things, disputes among the scientific experts
regarding if the project was worth the large amount of governmental money. Philip Anderson famously testified
against the collider. This testimony is sometimes characterized as exemplifying the deep scientific conflict between
high-energy physicists and condensed matter physicists in America, however, some recent studies have also pointed
to Anderson’s aforementioned emergentist commitments, whereas the research paradigm of the proponents of the
collider tend to have a more reductionistic paradigm. See, Martin (2015) for more historical details about these
methodological, social, and scientific conflicts. For an interesting account from the other side of these funding
debates, see Weinberg (1987) republished in Bedau and Humphreys (2008).
116
Though I mention several different scientific examples, many of them are taken from physics. This is, in part,
because contemporary debates regarding scientific emergence started with condensed physics. I think the more
114
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(i.) Physics, Complexity Studies, and Computer Science
I have already mentioned Anderson’s (1972) initial work on emergence and “symmetry
breaking,” this area continues to be a fruitful line of inquiry for emergentists.117 Laughlin and
Pines’ (2000) general treatment of spontaneous symmetry breaking in the context of condensed
matter physics is an accessible discussion of why, as they claim, such principles lead to
“protectorates” within physical theories that are governed by higher-level organizing principles
and nothing else (pp. 261-262). Batterman (2011) attempts to flesh-out the implications of such a
theory—building also on Batterman (2002) and (2000)—particularly with an eye towards how
details of the mathematical apparatus can be used to explain the existence of such emergent
“protectorates” from the more fundamental symmetries without denying their emergence. For a
recent, very technical, account of the limits of these implications, however, consider Landsman’s
(2013) account of spontaneous symmetry breaking in quantum systems.
The concept of symmetry breaking historically developed in condensed matter physics
and many of the sources mentioned above tend to use, among other things, examples from
condensed matter physics. Laughlin (2005) is, again, a good source for information about this, in
particular he focuses on the phenomenon of superconductivity. By his lights, the properties of
superconductors are novel, precisely because they exhibit features that would not exist if we
merely look at the underlying quantum mechanical laws. For a philosophical interpretation of
this Gillet (2016) and Auyang (1998) are both good sources.

important feature, however, is that philosophers, including philosophers of science, tend to privilege physics. This,
for better or worse, shaped the available accessible sources I used.
117
Symmetries are, roughly and generally, defined as invariances across some set of transformations. There are a
host of physical phenomenon that exhibit such symmetries (e.g. the rotational symmetry of space-time). Symmetry
breaking, then, is when a phenomenon depends (or is describable) only by “breaking” a broader symmetry group to
a lower-level symmetry, one of its sub-groups. The type of symmetry breaking that is most encouraging for
emergentists is, so-called, “spontaneous symmetry breaking” where there are solutions to equations pertaining to a
given symmetry that are not invariant with respect to that symmetry, even though there is no outside asymmetric
input, hence the spontaneity.
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In the above examples, part of the theoretical apparatus used to make sense of these
higher-level phenomenon is the technique of “renormalization”—see Batterman (2011, pp. 10421044) for a good explanation of the procedure—and the associated loss of “degrees of
freedom.”118 We have already seen the concept of degrees of freedom used to great effect by
Wilson (2011), however, Thalos’ (2006) account is useful in applying it more directly to some of
the physical theories we have been discussing, including thermodynamic behavior at “critical
states,” as also discussed in Batterman’s (2002;2000) accounts. One important difference in
Thalos’ (2006) discussion is that whereas Wilson and Batterman focus on “eliminations” of
degrees of freedom as a sign of emergence, she discusses the “conferring” of degrees of freedom
as a more viable (and more properly non-reductive) alternative.119 Taking the theme of
thermodynamics a step further, but tying it together with questions of explanatory fictions and
issues in quantum mechanics, Shech (2018) has provided a recent study that, though technical,
offers interesting conclusions about the viability of certain claims of scientific strong emergence
with respect to quantum phenomenon.
Turning more explicitly to quantum mechanics, Humphreys’ (1997) account of the
relation between entangled quantum states and emergence is a good representative account from
a philosophy of science perspective. It has been critically assessed and expanded upon by Kronz
and Tiehen (2002), who offer several alternative interpretations of what emergence, in light of
quantum mechanics, must look like. More broadly, Effective Field Theory (EFT)—a
contemporary development of Quantum Field Theory—has been assessed as a locus of
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If one wants a deeper dive into questions of the exact nature of renormalization explanations as an explanation of
universalities see Franklin (2018)
119
Though Thalos does not frame it this way, I wonder if this difference between accounts of DOFs might track a
meaningful distinction between conceptions of weak vs conceptions of strong emergence.
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emergence, Cao and Schweber (1993) being a representative example.120 Tying these quantum
considerations back to the issues arising in condensed matter physics, Franklin and Knox (2018)
have argued for a novel case of scientific emergence in the case of phonons (a “quasiparticle”
associated with the collective excitation of arrangements of atoms and molecules in condensed
matter) and underlying quantum mechanical laws. It is also worth mentioning Wilson’s (2013)
intriguing proposal that the discovery of the weak nuclear interaction can be characterized as the
discovery of “fundamental novelty” in nature and thus provides a model of scientifically
respectable strong emergence (p. 211).121
Finally, taking a broader view, Coleman (2018) and Blundell (2016)—both physicists—
have attempted to provide holistic accounts of how emergence functions methodologically in
physics. Blundell (2016) takes emergent features to primarily be a function of the limited
subjective awareness of finite minds and thus it serves as a kind of “storytelling” for making
sense of reality, however, he seems to reject the conclusion that this makes emergence “merely”
epistemic, instead favoring a hybrid approach.122 Coleman (2018), in contrast, suggests a
reconciliatory account that takes both reduction and emergence to be an ineliminable part of
physics, but where reduction is primarily methodological and merely provides the mathematical
techniques and tools for understanding genuine emergent reality.
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For a critical assessment of their strongly antireductive claims, see Castellani (2002). She argues that EFTs do not
prove as much as Cao and Schweber think, though she remains agnostic about a summery verdict in the proreduction direction either.
121
I should also, for the sake of completeness, mention Crull’s (2013) interesting proposal that quantum
decoherence actually undermines the whole dialectic of both reduction and emergence.
122
I confess that I find his reconciliatory conclusion philosophically puzzling, but I mention it because it is coming
from a physicist and thus serves to substantiate my claim that emergence is considered a live option within physics.
Blundell (2016) seems to claim that because human minds are embedded in the natural world we should take these
epistemic limitations to be, in some sense, an indication of what is real. As he describes, “emergent laws and
properties are independent, novel structures that function effectively because they are well adapted for human
thought processes” (p. 2) and again, “But isn’t this just weak emergence? Are not scientists simply struggling with
their imperfect models and wrestling with questions of epistemology, rather than addressing reality head on? I reject
such a clear-cut distinction. Emergent properties are members of the set of elements of reality, and as such merit
ontic status” (p. 11).
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Many of the considerations above are linked with nonlinearity and complexity studies. Of
course, nonlinearity has already been mentioned in the context of Wilson’s (2013) work, but it is
worth noting again here the development of such ideas in Alife simulations and other synthetic
life projects. Bedau’s (2013; 2003a; 2003b; 1997) accounts are the most commonly cited
examples, but Varenne et al. (2015) takes these ideas a step further and applies them to simulated
social or group lifeforms. Perhaps the best resource for discovering a host of these nonlinear
examples in sciences ranging from condensed matter physics all the way up to biology is Scott
(2007).
(ii.). Biology and Bio-Systems
I have already mentioned Morowitz (2002) the biophysist who concluded that his work
on the origins of life and thermodynamics provides evidence for several kinds of emergent
properties. Most of the recent arguments regarding emergent properties in the life sciences come
of systems biology, which takes the functioning of wholistic biological systems as the
fundamental subject of inquiry. O’Malley and Dupré (2005) provide a good overview of the
relationship between systems biology and emergent properties.123 Gillet (2016) has pointed to
several specific examples of this as well, including Boogerd et al. (2005) who argue that
biochemical networks in eukaryotic cells provide evidence of emergence and Richardson and
Stephan (2007), who apply it to the regulation of diauxic growth in Escherichia coli. Mosso,
Bich, and Moreno (2013) have, more generally, worked to provide an account of inter-level
causal relationships in biology, describing this this as a kind of physically respectable emergent
causal power.
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For an interesting discussion about background challenges for systems biology and what metaphysics of nature
best supports it see Bertolaso and Ratti (2018).
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Wilson and Holldobler (1988) have a classic study regarding eusocial insects (mostly
ants), which is notable because Wilson was initially a scientific reductionist yet he seemed to
accept some sort of emergent phenomenon in these cases. Wilson (1998) would latter renounce
this acceptance of emergence and return to a more full-throated reductionism, but the reasons for
both of his changes of mind are enlightening. The evidence from eusocial insects has been
picked up by other scientists and philosophers of science, with Mitchell (2009; 2012) providing a
good representative example this time focused on bees. Gillet (2016) has a useful overview of
the whole development of these insect studies.124
(iii.). Psychology and Cognitive Science
Psychology and Cognitive Science are both scientific domains that are close to the most
contentious debates about emergence in philosophy. As such, it is useful to remind ourselves that
regardless of the trenchant debates in philosophy of mind the concept of emergence appears in
viable scientific debates. Of course, philosophers have long pointed to the failure of a reductive
behaviorist research program as evidence that the mind might not be well modeled by a reductive
paradigm (e.g. Burge, 2010a; 2010b), but it is true that the language of emergence itself is not
often explicitly used in psychology. Antonietti (2010) has offered a general analysis of why this
might be the case, along with a helpful survey of how the concept might be clarified within
psychology. Walmsley (2010) has, in like manner, offered an analysis of how emergence relates
to the so-called “dynamical approach” to cognitive science. Finally, Runyan’s (2014)
monography on neural cause of human action provides an interesting scientific and philosophical
account of emergence and its relation to agency.
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I also briefly note that discussions about the relationship between evolutionary development itself and emergence,
which were popular in the late 1800s and early 1900s (e.g. the biological and philosophical work of de Chardin),
might be a viable contemporary research program (see Salmon 2009, and Bedau’s 2018 APA-Pacific talk) but since
I know of no current research programs along those lines I leave this as a footnote.
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(iv.) Final Considerations
This very limited list of scientific examples (and philosophy of science interpretations) is
both rough and incomplete, however, it provides a helpful antidote to a general emergence
skepticism.125 Of course, this does not establish the applicability of emergence to reality, like
Gillet (2016) I want to caution restraint about making such claims with any certainty. It is
enough for my argument to show that emergence is a viable scientific interpretation. Moreover, I
note in passing that if we think, for independent reasons, that my account of action is the most
plausible and it requires emergence, then we would have some defeasible justification for
accepting the emergence of mental properties.

125

Gillet (2016, p. 351, fn 18) mentions several examples in addition to those already brought-up, including:
Prigogine’s (1968; 1997) work on thermodynamical systems; Garfinkel (1987) and Goldbeter’s (1997) work on
chemical signaling in slime molds; Freeman (2000a; 2000b) on neural populations; Couzin and Krause (2003)
regarding flocking behavior in animals, and Camazine et al. (2001) with a survey of many examples of biological
self-organization, etc. For full citations see Gillet (2016).
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CONCLUSION
Where does this leave us? I have argued that what makes a simple mental event count as
an action is as follows:
Action as Essential Metaphysical Dependence (ver. 3): A mental event e counts as an
action iff by virtue of the constitutive essence of interactive mental properties, P; P fully
grounds all the properties brought about (or propositions made true) by virtue of the
constitutive essence of e.
This picture was motivated by two considerations: (1) causal conceptions of action tend to be
reductive and for this reason lose sight of the agent in trying to describe actions. This often leads
to counter-examples, as in causal deviance cases, and where causalists avoid these counterexamples they often must smuggle broader non-causal features of agency back into their account.
(2) Most non-causal theories of action are opaque regarding exactly what is the relationship
between agent and action. Non-causalists often focus on phenomenal features as either an
explanation for what counts as an action or evidence that actions are uncaused. Relying on such
arguments puts causalists and non-causalists into a dialectical stalemate that not only is
unproductive, but also contributes to the unpopularity of non-causal views among philosophers
of action.
Unlike these standard views, my account tied simple mental actions directly to agents by
appealing to the non-causal yet extrinsic relation of essential metaphysical dependence.
Moreover, such an account meets many of the desideratum of weak non-causalism (i.e. it is nonreductive, compatible with actions being caused, intrinsically active, etc.) and addresses crucial
objections from causal theories (i.e. it involves an extrinsic relation, preserves agential control,
etc.). Finally, I addressed the plausibility of my account, especially in light of the transitivity
objection, by examining the concept of emergence and how it applies to action. I concluded that
even a minimal account of emergence would prevent the transitivity objection from succeeding.
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Whether or not mental properties are strongly emergent is a matter of much debate, however, the
claim that they are at least weakly emergent is more widely held. Moreover, given the myriad of
live debates in both metaphysics and science about emergent properties in nature, I take the sort
of emergence that allows my account to avoid the transitivity objection is, in fact, plausible.
The previous chapters do not provide a conclusive argument for my essential
metaphysical dependence account; however, I do think they articulate a plausible alternative to
current theories of action, which resolves the dialectical stalemate between causalists and noncausalists. I conclude my dissertation by gesturing towards two avenues of future research that
my account of “essential metaphysical dependence” invites: (1) free action, and (2) animal
action.126
1. Free Action and Essential Metaphysical Dependence
First, and most obviously, the topic of free action. In my dissertation I have carefully
abstracted away from libertarian and compatibilist concerns, even though many traditional noncausalists are motivated by their libertarian sensibilities. A complete theory of action must deal
with free action and essential metaphysical dependence is no exception. I highlight, roughly,
what shape such developments might take and note the outstanding challenges for crafting a
libertarian version of essential metaphysical dependence—my preferred view.

126

In this conclusion I only examine two future avenues of research, however, I briefly note that divine action is
another subject to which my account could be fruitfully applied. Traditional puzzles in philosophy of religion about
how God could act in the natural world could benefit from a view of action that does not place (in the first instance)
an act within the causal nexus but rather in how an event depends or is grounded in a mind—potentially a God-like
mind. Such an account has precedent, for example, Aquinas explanation of miracles (as I understand it) shares some
features. According to Aquinas, a miracle does not imply that God breaks into or intervenes upon causal chains
within the world. Instead, because all entities depend on God for their being (essence), God “acts” by fully realizing
a feature of their being (essence) that was previously obscured. Though clearly different in many ways, such an
account is similar to mine insofar as it looks to a relationship of essential dependence as the basis for (some of)
God’s actions.
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First, an account of action in terms of metaphysical dependence suggests that dependence
relations, in general, may be useful for understanding traditional problems of free will. Several
philosophers of action and metaphysicians have started using the notion of dependence to talk
about traditional problems in action theory. For example, Tognazzini’s (2015) argument
regarding the luck objection (the objection that indeterminism undermines freedom by making
agency “random”), which frames the strongest form of the luck objection in terms of what
grounds actions. Indeed, though Ginet (2014, 2007) never uses the term “ground” or
“dependence” explicitly, his engagement with the luck objection suggests that he understands it
as a question of dependence. Such uses of the dependence idiom have also appeared in
discussions of freedom and foreknowledge, such as Swenson’s (2016) treatment of divine
foreknowing and freedom.127 Swenson’s (2016) work is doubly useful since, though it is aimed
at the foreknowledge and freedom debate, in it he also provides an account of “ability” in terms
of dependence. This works suggest that the time is ripe for philosophers to explore how
dependence and traditional problems of free will might relate.
After establishing the salience of dependence for questions of freedom, the next step
would be to give a positive account of free agency. I believe that such an account could be
presented as a contrast case. I would contrast my agency-first, grounding based, account of
action with Ginet’s (1990) non-causal conception of free agency, on the one hand, and
O’Connor’s (2001) agent-causal account, on the other. Since my account of action shares
elements with both Ginet and O’Connor’s, it is natural to try and frame an account of free agency
in light of their contributions. It is difficult to see, ahead of time, how such an account might
unfold, however, several challenges are obvious from the beginning. An account of free action in
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For an extended look at the metaphysics of foreknowledge which uses the concept of dependence but attempts to
more precisely state what this dependence might look like, see Anderson and Watson (2010).
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terms of metaphysical dependence, if it is going to be a libertarian view as I would prefer, would
need to distinguish itself from compatibilism. As my view of action is currently framed, the
weak non-causalism combined with the necessity of the grounding relation might legitimately
raise questions regarding, in what sense, the agent is free. Of course, something like a grounding
interpretation might suggest source incompatibilist views, such as those recently defended by
Pereboom (2014). I see two potential ways forward: First, following Tognazzini’s (2015) work
on the luck objection, I could attempt to reformulate the deterministic threat in terms of
grounding and thus make incompatibilism via a failure of dependence more plausible. Second,
following O’Connor’s (2005) work on the distinctive limitations of human freedom, I could talk
about how questions of dependence and sourcehood might be related to more traditional
alternative possibility incompatibilist views. Regardless of the success of such arguments, it
seems that there is room to explore what freedom as uncaused essential metaphysical
dependence might look like.
2. Animal Action and Essential Metaphysical Dependence
Philosophers of action are, as a rule, focused on human action. Such accounts appeal to
relatively complex mental entities like intentions with propositional content, or sophisticated
conscious experiences like the “actish phenomenal quality.” All of these views, as plausible as
they might be, tellingly avoid the question of non-human animal action. Some moral
philosophers have taken up this question in the context of trying to understand the nature of
rationality/agency’s relationship to morality—most notably Korsgaard (2018)—however, most
have not dwelt extensively on this topic from a purely metaphysical perspective.
This blind spot in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and metaphysics is
beginning to be filled. In the past 15 years or so there are several works, especially in psychology
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and philosophy of mind, that are taking the status of animal agency seriously (e.g. Lazareva,
2012; Burge, 2009; Allen, 2006; Hurley 2003). There is, however, no extensive treatment of
animal agency from the perspective of philosophy of action. My account, in contrast to
traditional theories of action, does not focus on sophisticated mental entities or phenomenal
qualities, but rather an extrinsic relation of dependence between minds and simple mental events.
As such, it leaves the exact manner or characterization of the properties involved open to
specification. Insofar as my theory of action does not, from the outset, overintellectualize what
makes an event an action there is space to use my view as a starting place for discussing animal
action.
Moreover, O’Connor (2005) argues that we can clarify the concept of free agency by
framing human action against the upper limit-case of divine action (or what divine action must
be, if it exists). This method is admirable, but it should be extended by considering the lower
limit-case—non-human animal action. Clarifying what it means for animals to act, aside from its
intrinsic interest, allows us to better understand the place of human action in the world.
Furthermore, once agency is seen as primary it gives us a helpful frame for understanding how
agency develops in the natural world.
Finally, investigating non-human animal agency from the philosophy of action
perspective allows us to raise new question that have been largely ignored. For example, few
have considered possibility and the scope of non-human animal freedom. Though, as with free
human action, one cannot prejudge how these arguments will unfold, I suspect that animal
freedom is both more common and more extensive than is often thought by philosophers.
Supposing this is correct, if one is a libertarian and if one wants to maintain the plausible claim
that most animals are not morally responsibility, then this recommends a novel inverse of
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Fischer’s (2007) “semi-compatibilist” view. Freedom—of a certain sort—is necessary but not
sufficient for moral responsibility.
Developing my account in these directions situates human action within a broader
continuum of agency that includes non-human animals. This both clarifies what is unique about
human action (and free action) while, at the same time, revealing how it fits into the larger
natural world. Overall, these two considerations—free action and animal action—show that my
account of action has room to grow into a full and fruitful non-causal theory of agency.
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